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In this dissertation I establish some of the first evidence on the early career labor market
experiences of young American men from the Millennial cohort. I also conduct a cross-
cohort comparison of the early career outcomes of Millennials compared to their predeces-
sors from the Baby Boomer cohort. The empirical analysis in this dissertation is facilitated
by the 1997 and 1979 samples of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).
First, I document the racial gaps in early career labor market trajectories of a cohort of
early Millennial men (NLSY–97, born 1980–1984), and explore the driving forces behind
them. Tracing the experiences of Black and white young men over their first eight years
after school completion, I show that racial gaps in various labor market outcomes opened up
immediately post-schooling, and largely persisted over the subsequent years. In particular,
I find that measured Black-white disparities in accumulated education and skills, especially
cognitive skills, play the central role in explaining the observed racial gaps in employment
and earnings.
Second, I compare how the racial labor market gaps have changed between the Baby
Boomers (NLSY–79, born 1957–1964) and these Millennials. Both Black and white men in
the older cohort experienced upward-sloping trajectories in employment and earnings in the
first four to five years post-schooling. In the younger cohort, the labor market trajectories,
especially for employment, were comparatively flatter both for Black men and for white
men. Relative to the older cohort, a larger share of the racial employment and earnings gaps
in the younger cohort cannot be explained by measured racial differences in observable pre-
market characteristics. Yet education and skills remain the key explanatory factor among
observable characteristics.
Third, in co-authored work, we examine how the wage returns to cognitive skills have
evolved across cohorts of white men in the U.S. labor market. We show that the distribution
of measured cognitive skills has diverged between the NLSY–79 and the NLSY–97. This
divergence has a meaningful impact on estimated returns to cognitive skills. We explore
why this divergence has occurred, considering both economic and measurement explana-
tions, and we conclude that the conventional wisdom of a declining return to cognitive
skills may well be incorrect.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Millennials now make up more than one-third of the American labor force, a number
projected to grow in years to come as older cohorts gradually leave the workforce (Pew
Research Center, 2018; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019). In the 2018 midterm election,
Millennials cast more than one-fifth of all votes, and their turnout nearly doubled from 2014
(Pew Research Center, 2019b).1 In contrast to the increasingly notable role of Millennials
in American economic, social, and political life, our understanding of the early career
experiences of this cohort is still preliminary and relatively limited.
Growing anecdotal evidence suggests that Millennials are struggling to gain a foothold
in the labor market and to climb up career ladders (The Atlantic, 2015; Forbes, 2016).
This observation is worrisome not only because Millennials constitute a crucial part of the
potential labor force but also because a failure to attach to the labor market may lengthen
the time that it takes for Millennials to achieve other conventional milestones. Compared
to earlier cohorts, such as the Baby Boomers, at similar ages, Millennials are more likely
to live at the homes of their parents, are less likely to be married, and are less likely to
have a child (Pew Research Center, 2017; 2020). Conducting a comprehensive and serious
examination of the early career labor market patterns of the Millennials is then of great
importance to public policies that focus on young Americans, both inside and outside the
labor market.
1The Pew Research Center defines Millennials as the cohort born between 1981 and 1996. Baby Boomers
are usually referred to as the cohort born between 1946 and 1964, based on the post-World War II birth surge.
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This dissertation provides some of the first empirical evidence on the labor market
experiences in the early careers of Millennial men and how the patterns have evolved across
cohorts. In the second chapter, I examine the racial gaps in labor market outcomes among
Black and white Millennial men and explore the underlying explanatory forces. The third
chapter extends the analysis to compare the racial labor market gaps between the Millennial
cohort and the Baby Boomer cohort. In the fourth chapter, coauthored with Judy Hellerstein
and Sergio Urzúa, I study how the wage returns to cognitive skills have changed across
cohorts in the U.S. labor market.
The empirical analysis in this dissertation relies mainly on the 1997 and 1979 cohorts
of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY–97 and NLSY–79), two nationally
representative samples of young Americans born in 1980–1984 and 1957–1964, respec-
tively. The NLSY–97 cohort can be regarded as early Millennials, who were in their 30s
in the 2015 survey, and the NLSY–79 cohort can be regarded as late Baby Boomers. The
NLSY keeps a rich record of individual and family characteristics, and its restricted-use
geocode files allow me to link to external sources to construct measures of neighborhood
characteristics. This facilitates a comprehensive decomposition that consists of the main
component of this dissertation’s second and third chapter.
Since the Civil Rights Act of 1964, substantial economic progress has been made in
closing racial gaps in various aspects of U.S. society (Smith and Welch, 1989). However,
more recent evidence casts doubt on whether this relative Black progress is continuing
(Hellerstein and Neumark, 2012; Neal and Rick, 2014; Council of Economic Advisors,
2016; Wilson and Rodgers, 2016; Daly, Hobijn, and Pedtke, 2017). For example, Bayer
and Charles (2018) show that when the non-employed population is taken into account, the
median earnings gap between Black and white men has grown since mid to late 1970s and
has reached a level as large as it was in 1950.2 Recent research shows that substantial and
2In particular, the incarceration rate has more than tripled since 1980, and criminal justice policies have
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significant racial gaps still persist in the early career labor market outcomes among young
Americans today (Chetty et al. 2020). In June 2020, demonstrations across the country
in support of the Black Lives Matter movement has again brought to national attention the
long-standing racial disparities in and beyond the labor market.
One key factor contributing to the persistent racial gaps in labor market outcomes is
pervasive racial discrimination experienced by Black Americans in schools, during job
searches, at workplaces, in interaction with the criminal justice system, in the housing mar-
ket, and across numerous other facets of their lives (e.g. Massey and Denton, 1993; Lang
and Lehmann, 2012; Reardon and Owens, 2014; Council of Economic Advisors, 2016).
Past research suggests that having an arrest history generates future non-employment among
young men and poor labor market prospects further induce criminal activity (Grogger,
1992; Grogger, 1998; Pager, 2003). Racial discrimination in the criminal justice system
can therefore cause and enlarge the racial disparities in labor market outcomes. This dis-
cussion is especially relevant and particularly important in the context of the Black Lives
Matter movement, because the Millennial cohort have spent much of their childhood and
early adulthood in a period of historically high incarceration rates (Council of Economic
Advisors, 2016).
In addition, education and skills accumulated prior to labor market entry have been
shown in past studies to be a key determinant to labor market outcomes, health outcomes,
and criminal behaviors (Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzúa, 2006; Garcı́a, Heckman, and Ziff,
2019; Garcı́a et al., 2020). Yet more than sixty years after Brown v. Board of Education,
segregated schools are still preventing many Black children from obtaining education and
skills that are crucial for their future success in work and life (Reardon and Owens, 2014;
been shifting toward more punitive treatment, the burden of which falls disproportionately more on Blacks
(Neal and Rick, 2014; Council of Economic Advisors, 2016). Bayer and Charles (2018) show that ignoring
the trend of increasing institutionalized population leads to an understatement of the racial earnings gap,
especially since late 1970s.
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The Atlantic, 2018; New York Times, 2019; Economic Policy Institute, 2020). Though
the second and third chapter of this dissertation focus particularly on racial gaps in labor
market outcomes, my empirical findings, as I will discuss later, are consistent with the
academic literature and public discussion about the continuing Black disadvantages inside
and outside the labor market.
Most of the existing academic narrative on racial gaps in the labor market comes from
previous cohorts of Americans. The evidence to date on the drivers of the racial labor
market gaps among Millennials is far from conclusive. Given that both the characteristics
of Americans and the overall structure of the labor market have changed dramatically in
the past several decades (Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange, 2012; Castex and Dechter, 2014;
Deming, 2017), one cannot simply assume that the early career experiences of previous
cohorts apply to this new cohort of Americans.3
The second chapter documents the racial gaps in the early careers of Millennial men
(NLSY–97 cohort) and evaluates the roles of different underlying factors behind the ob-
served labor market gaps. I trace the trajectories of employment and earnings outcomes
in the first eight years post-schooling and find that Black men fell substantially behind
their white counterparts in the various labor market outcomes in the very first year post-
schooling. Over the following years, the initial racial labor market gaps either stayed stable
or grew even larger.
Using the semi-parametric decomposition method first introduced by DiNardo, Fortin,
and Lemieux (1996), I estimate how much of the racial employment and earnings gaps
observed over the sixth to eighth years post-schooling in the NLSY–97 cohort can be ex-
plained by measured racial differences in four factors: education and skills, family back-
3One of the first papers that compare the cohorts of Millennials and Baby Boomers is Altonji, Bharadwaj,
and Lange (2012). When the authors wrote the paper, the sample of Millennials (NLSY–97 cohort) had not
accumulated much labor market experience, and the focus of their paper is how the characteristics of young
Americans have changed across cohorts.
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ground, childhood neighborhood, and the school-to-work transition. I choose the sixth to
eighth years because this is when employment and earnings outcomes of young men in the
NLSY–97 cohort started to reach a relatively stable stage.
I first show that racial differences in education and skills play the key role in explaining
the racial gaps in employment and earnings. The explanatory power of education and skills
is mainly driven by measured racial gaps in cognitive skills rather than by gaps in formal
schooling or non-cognitive and social skills. It is important to emphasize that cognitive
skills can be accumulated through childhood. The measure of cognitive skills in the data,
the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score, is recorded around ages 12–18 and is
at least partly a function of early childhood exposures to differential family investments
and school influences (Cunha et al., 2006; Cunha and Heckman, 2007).4 What my finding
does suggest is that paying attention to the reasons for Black disadvantage in the skill
accumulation process may be a promising pathway to reduce racial disparities in labor
market outcomes. School segregation may have limited the opportunities for Black children
to obtain education and skills, and to narrow the racial gap. As many studies have pointed
out, Black men may have accumulated lower levels of education and skills as a result of
anticipating discrimination in the labor market (Neal and Johnson, 1996; Heckman, 1998;
Darity and Mason, 1998). If Black children and Black families anticipate that they will
face discrimination in the labor market so that their skills will be rewarded unfairly, they
4An important question related to the AFQT score, just like other psychometric test scores for skills and
abilities, is whether the test is biased. For the AFQT score, since its first introduction by the Department of
Defense for screening enlistees and assigning them to different occupations, a key question especially relevant
for this dissertation is whether the score is racially biased. If so, the AFQT score will be partly capturing bias
against Blacks in the test rather than true racial differences in cognitive skills. In 1991, the National Academy
of Sciences (NAS) led a study in the military focusing on the racial fairness of the test and concluded that the
AFQT score does not systematically underpredict the job performance of Blacks relative to whites (Wigdor
and Green Jr., 1991). The NAS study provides the best evidence to date regarding the fairness of the test, as
it links the AFQT score to direct measures of military job performance, which are rarely available in civilian
datasets. Whether the findings of the NAS study can be applied to civilian population is largely an open
question. In the literature, some studies cast doubt on the racial fairness of the AFQT score (Rodgers and
Spriggs, 1996), while others come to the opposite conclusion (Heckman, 1998).
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may underinvest in skills prior to labor market entry.
Focusing on a cohort close in age to the NLSY–97 cohort, Chetty et al. (2020) shows
that racial differences childhood neighborhood, measured with census tract fixed effects,
explain about 31% of the observed racial income gap in their data. When discussing this re-
sult, Heckman (2018) argues that it is unclear how much of the documented effect of neigh-
borhood reflects the residential sorting of families and individuals across different locations
rather than the effect of neighborhood per se. Using the NLSY–97 data, I show that un-
conditionally, my measures of childhood neighborhood characteristics explain 20%–30%
of the racial earnings gap (and 10%–20% of the racial employment gap), which is arguably
close to Chetty et al. (2020). When conditioning on racial differences in education and
skills and family background, the explanatory power of measured childhood neighborhood
characteristics falls to 7% for racial earnings gap (and goes away completely for the racial
employment gap). This finding suggests that much of the documented unconditional role
of neighborhood, both in the NLSY–97 cohort and in the cohort of Chetty et al. (2020),
comes from one or both of two channels.
First, it is possible that the unconditional neighborhood effect on racial labor market
gaps largely reflects the fact that people with different individual and family backgrounds
live in different neighborhoods and that the true role of neighborhood is actually limited in
the context of understanding racial gaps in labor market outcomes. Numerous articles have
documented housing discrimination against Black Americans, even decades after the pas-
sage of the Fair Housing Act, and that housing discrimination has contributed to residential
segregation by race and further harmed labor market prospects of Black workers (Kain,
1968; Massey and Denton, 1993; Yinger, 1995; Cutler and Glaeser, 1997; Ondrich, Ross,
and Yinger, 2000; Charles, 2003; Zhao, Ondrich, and Yinger, 2006). The unconditional
neighborhood effect that I document in the NLSY–97 data can therefore also be a result of
racial discrimination in the housing market as reflected in neighborhood sorting.
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Second, some of the racial gaps in education and skills may have originated from neigh-
borhood influences. Though past studies have shown that growing up in good neighbor-
hoods has a positive effect on children’s educational outcomes (Aaronson, 1998; Chyn,
2018), it is unclear how large is the role of neighborhoods in terms of explaining the over-
all racial education and skill gaps. In the decomposition, I find that the explanatory power
of education and skills is quantitatively robust no matter whether it is estimated condition-
ing on racial differences in childhood neighborhood characteristics or not. This suggests
that the second channel is not well supported by the NLSY–97 data. In future research, I
plan to further explore whether and how the racial gaps in education and skills have come
from racial differences in neighborhood characteristics at a more local level (such as the
census tract).
In addition to understanding Millennials alone, the third and fourth chapters compare
them and their early career experiences with their predecessors in the Baby Boomer cohort.
In the third chapter, I extend the analysis in the second chapter and ask how the early ca-
reer racial gaps and the underlying driving forces have changed from the NLSY–79 cohort
to the NLSY–97 cohort. Tracking the employment and earnings outcomes year by year
for young men from the two cohorts, the starkest cross-cohort change is in the shapes of
the employment and earnings trajectories. In the NLSY–79 cohort, both Black and white
men experienced an upward-sloping trajectory in employment and earnings in the first four
to five years post-schooling. The trajectory was steeper for Black men, and as a result,
the racial gaps (especially in employment) narrowed over the early career years. In the
NLSY–97 cohort, the labor market trajectories became much flatter for both races. In par-
ticular, from the first to the eighth year post-schooling, there was little to no improvement
in employment outcomes at various margins.
Although the shapes of labor market trajectories have changed across cohorts, the
change occurred for both Black and white men, and the racial gaps have not changed by a
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statistically significant degree from the NLSY–79 cohort to the NLSY–97 cohort. To un-
derstand whether and how the underlying explanatory factors of the early career racial gaps
have changed across cohorts, I again focus on racial gaps in employment and earnings out-
comes observed over the sixth to eighth years post-schooling and apply the semi-parametric
decomposition of DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996).
I first look at the overall explanatory power of racial differences in pre-market charac-
teristics, including education and skills, family background, and childhood neighborhood,
measured with the same or similarly constructed variables from the two cohorts. In the
NLSY–79 cohort, measured racial differences in all pre-market characteristics together ac-
count for about 70%–80% of the racial gaps in employment and earnings. In the NLSY–97
cohort, the explanatory power of pre-market characteristics falls to around 50%. These
findings suggest that racial differences in unobservables are playing a bigger role in the
younger cohort.
I discuss three cases of potential unobservables. First, I examine if the lower explana-
tory power of pre-market factors in the NLSY–97 cohort is due to omitting hard-to-measure,
but important, neighborhood characteristics. Focusing solely on the NLSY–97 cohort, I in-
corporate extra variables that measure childhood neighborhood characteristics at a more
detailed level. Although these variables alone have meaningful explanatory power, includ-
ing them adds little extra explanatory power to the existing set of pre-market characteris-
tics. Second, I look at the role of the school-to-work transition, which has been documented
to have a persistent impact on later outcomes (e.g. Kahn, 2010; Schwandt and Wachter,
2019). Conditioning on racial differences in pre-market characteristics, I show that Black
disadvantage in the school-to-work transition, measured as weeks worked in the first year
post-schooling or county unemployment rate in the year of labor market entry, can explain
an additional 10% of the racial gaps in employment and earnings at the sixth to eighth years
post-schooling. Third, I discuss the channels through which labor market discrimination
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against Black men could affect my results. For example, it is well documented in past stud-
ies that Black men face discrimination in the hiring process of entry level jobs (summarized
in Lang and Lehmann, 2012). During the school-to-work transition, Black men may end up
with worse employment outcomes because of discrimination, or they may be discouraged
from actively searching for jobs as a response to the expectation of discrimination. I argue
that understanding how racial discrimination has evolved overtime in the U.S. labor market
merits more future research.
From the NLSY–79 cohort to the NLSY–97 cohort, education and skills have remained
as the key explanatory factor among all observable pre-market characteristics, confirming
the findings of Neal and Johnson (1996) and the second chapter. But the absolute explana-
tory power of education and skills has fallen across cohorts, as the racial gap in cognitive
skills, measured by the AFQT score, has narrowed substantially across cohorts. In the
NLSY–79 cohort, the explanatory power of education and skills almost fully comes from
measured racial differences in family background and childhood neighborhood characteris-
tics. In contrast, in the NLSY–97 cohort, the role of education and skills in explaining racial
labor market gaps is largely independent of racial differences in family and neighborhood
characteristics, as measured in the NLSY data.
The third chapter examines how pre-market characteristics have changed across cohorts
and how they have affected racial labor market gaps. In addition to changing characteristics,
changing labor market returns to the same characteristics could have also led to different
early careers outcomes of young men from the two cohorts. In the fourth chapter, I study
how the labor market return to one of the key pre-market characteristics, cognitive skills,
has changed from the NLSY–79 cohort to the NLSY–97 cohort.
The structure of the U.S. labor market has changed dramatically over the past few
decades, potentially favoring some types of skills over others (Autor and Dorn, 2013;
Beaudry, Green, and Sand, 2016; Autor, 2019). It is challenging to establish how labor
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market returns to a specific type of skills at the individual level have evolved over time, as
doing so requires a measure of skills that is consistently observed over time. Two influential
studies provide empirical evidence that the wage returns to cognitive skills have declined
from the NLSY–79 cohort to the NLSY–97 cohort, while the wage returns to other types of
skills have increased (Castex and Dechter, 2014; Deming, 2017). Specifically, both studies
estimate Mincerian wage regressions for the two NLSY cohorts and find that the OLS esti-
mates of returns to cognitive skills, measured by the AFQT score, have gone down across
cohorts. Using the empirical evidence they make from the NLSY data, both studies try to
further explore why the returns have changed and conclude that technological change has
fundamentally shifted the relationship between skills and labor market outcomes over the
past 40 years.
In the fourth chapter, my coauthors and I re-examine the finding of declining returns
to cognitive skills among the sample of white men. We first show in a simple investment
model that if technology is indeed driving the changing returns to cognitive skills, it should
also be driving investments in cognitive skills and therefore the population distribution of
cognitive skills, a theoretical implication that the previous two studies have not formally
taken into account. Applying the non-parametric method introduced in Yitzhaki (1996),
we show that the Ordinary Least Squares estimates of how the returns to cognitive skills
have changed across cohorts, as established in previous studies, are critically dependent on
the changes in the distribution of the measured cognitive skills (AFQT score). In particular,
there is a strong divergence in the distribution of the AFQT score from the NLSY–79 cohort
to the NLSY–97 cohort: while a greater share of young Americans in the NLSY–97 cohort
achieve high AFQT scores than in the NLSY–79 cohort, a greater share of the younger
cohort are also being left behind with very low AFQT scores.
Non-parametrically, we decompose the Ordinary Least Squares estimate of wage re-
turns to cognitive skills into a weighted average of unit treatment effects. The weighting
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function is purely governed by the distribution of the AFQT score. As the distribution of
the AFQT score diverged from the NLSY–79 cohort to the NLSY–97 cohort, the Ordinary
Least Squares estimates are weighting the unit treatment effects differently in one cohort
than in another. To make the estimates directly comparable between the two cohorts, we
hold the weighting function consistently fixed at the NLSY–79 level for both cohorts and
show find that the estimated returns to cognitive skills actually slightly increase from the
NLSY–79 cohort to the NLSY–97 cohort.
Have the wage returns to cognitive skills really declined in the U.S. labor market? We
argue that the jury is still out. Evidence suggests that the AFQT score in the NLSY–97 co-
hort may be subject to non-classical measurement errors, which adds further complications
to a cross-cohort comparison (Schofield, 2014). However, this does not exclude the possi-
bility that there has been a real decline in returns to cognitive skills. In fact, we find some
suggestive evidence that if the decline is real, it is likely not happening uniformly across
the whole cognitive skill distribution. We construct local estimates of the relationship be-
tween log wages and AFQT scores and find that the relationship is relatively flat in the
NLSY–97 cohort for people with below-median AFQT scores. In particular, the “decline”
in the estimated wage returns to cognitive skills from the NLSY–79 cohort to the NLSY–97
cohort seems to be solely driven by people with below-median AFQT scores. There is not
a similar “flatness” among the sample of white women in the NLSY–97 cohort, suggesting
measurement error may not be the sole driver of the story and that the declining returns to
cognitive skills may be real for low AFQT scorers.
The focus of this chapter is on cognitive skills, but what about other types of skills,
such as non-cognitive skills or social skills? Compared to the measurement of cognitive
skills, there is less consensus among economists (and social scientists in general) on how
to measure non-cognitive or social skills. Deming (2017) draws information from different
sections of the NLSY–79 data and the NLSY–97 data to measure non-cognitive and social
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skills and shows that the estimated wage returns to non-cognitive skills, and especially
social skills, have gone up across cohorts. Given that the Ordinary Least Squares estimate
of returns to skills is highly dependent on changes in the skill distribution, there is legitimate
concern about the measurement of non-cognitive and social skills and how the distributions
of non-cognitive and social skills have evolved across cohorts. Future research needs to also
re-examine the influential finding of Deming (2017) and construct alternative non-cognitive
and social skill measures that are more comparable across cohorts (and across datasets).
This dissertation aims to paint a broad picture of the early career labor market experi-
ences of Millennial men and how they have evolved relative to a previous cohort of Baby
Boomers. The second and third chapters focus on racial gaps in labor market outcomes of
young men and show that, in both cohorts, education and skills play the key role in explain-
ing the observed racial labor market gaps. The third and fourth chapters make cross-cohort
comparisons, with different emphases on the pre-market characteristics of young men and
labor market returns to the characteristics (with a special focus on cognitive skills). The
findings in this dissertation add new evidence to our understanding of the importance of
skills in the U.S. labor market.
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Chapter 2: Understanding Racial Gaps in the Early Careers of Millennial
Men
2.1 Introduction
More than five decades after the Civil Right Act was signed into law, racial gaps persist
in various dimensions of the U.S. labor market. Although substantial economic progress
was made in closing these racial gaps (James Smith and Welch, 1989), the trends seem to
have stagnated or even reversed since 1980 (Wilson and Rodgers, 2016; Daly, Hobijn, and
Pedtke, 2017). As the cohort of Millennials comprise an increasingly important share of
the American labor force, recent evidence has also documented substantial income gaps
between Black and white men in this cohort (Chetty, Hendren, Jones, and Porter, hereafter
CHJP, 2020).1
Most of the existing narrative on the causes of racial gaps in the labor market comes
from previous cohorts of Americans. The evidence to date on the drivers of the racial la-
bor market gaps among Millennials is far from conclusive. Do Black-white differences in
skills play an important role, as with previous cohorts? What about the roles of family
background, childhood neighborhood, the school-to-work transition, and discrimination?2
1The Pew Research Center defines Millennials as the cohort born between 1981 and 1996 (Pew Research
Center, 2019a). Millennials now make up more than one-third of the American labor force, a number pro-
jected to grow in years to come as older cohorts gradually leave the workforce (Pew Research Center, 2018;
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019).
2The literature on the potential determinants of racial labor market gaps is enormous, and many of the
papers are based on previous cohorts of Americans. For example, pre-market skills (or human capital) have
been shown to be crucial in understanding racial gaps in labor market outcomes (Neal and Johnson, 1996;
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Given that both the characteristics of Americans and the overall structure of the labor mar-
ket have changed dramatically in the past several decades (Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange,
2012; Castex and Dechter, 2014; Deming, 2017), one cannot simply assume that the early
career experiences of previous cohorts apply to this new cohort of Americans.
This chapter answers these questions by evaluating the roles of different factors in shap-
ing the racial gaps in the early career experiences of Millennial men.3 I study the 1997 co-
hort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY–97), a nationally representative
sample of young Americans born between 1980 and 1984, and document the racial gaps
among young men in this cohort in their labor market trajectories, observed in the first eight
years beyond schooling completion. In both employment and earnings, Black men lagged
substantially behind their white counterparts beginning in the first year out of school. The
racial gaps in employment and earnings largely persist in the following early career years.
This persistence motivates my decomposition analysis, in which I explore what has driven
the observed racial gaps in this cohort.4
In particular, I study the contributions of individual skill, family background, childhood
neighborhood, and the school-to-work transition. I harness the richness of the NLSY–97
and its restricted geocode file to include a detailed list of observable characteristics in each
Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzúa, 2006; Urzúa, 2008). Family background and parenting style have been long
understood as pivotal predictors for children’s outcomes, and evidence shows that there are important racial
differences in how parents raise and educate their children (Lareau, 1987; McAdoo, 2002; Thompson, 2018).
“Good” childhood neighborhoods are shown to have an impact both on future adult outcomes (Aaronson,
1998; Chetty, Hendren, and Katz, 2016; Chyn, 2018; Chetty and Hendren, 2018a) and on reducing racial
gaps in adult outcomes (CHJP, 2020), although it remains largely unknown what constitutes a “good” neigh-
borhood. School-to-work transitions (i.e. how people initiate their careers) are found to have a persistent
impact on future labor market outcomes (Light and Ureta, 1995; Neumark, 2002; Kahn, 2010; Rothstein,
2019; Rinz, 2019; Schwandt and Wachter, 2019; Yagan, 2019). The racial difference in school-to-work
transition has been less explored. In addition, an important series of studies has emphasized the role of dis-
crimination (e.g. Donohue and Heckman, 1991; Pager, 2003; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Charles and
Guryan, 2008; Council of Economic Advisors, 2016).
3I focus on the racial gaps between Black and white non-Hispanic men. There are other important racial
and ethnic gaps among both men and women that merit exploration in future research.
4Throughout this chapter, I use the word “cohort” to refer to men born between 1980 and 1984, not a
specific birth year.
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of these four factors.5 Applying the semi-parametric decomposition method introduced by
DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), I establish two key findings regarding the extent to
which the four factors have driven the racial employment and earnings gaps observed in
this cohort of young men.
First, racial differences in measured individual skill explain up to half of the mean racial
gaps in employment and earnings. This central role of skill is attributable primarily to racial
differences in measured cognitive skills rather than to gaps in formal schooling. Looking
at racial gaps at the 25th percentile, the median, and the 75th percentile of Black and white
men’s employment and earnings distributions, individual skill differences also usually have
the largest explanatory power.
Second, on its own, the set of childhood neighborhood characteristics I observe explains
approximately 10%–20% of the mean racial employment gap and approximately 20%–30%
of the racial earnings gap. Conditional on family background and individual skill, however,
the explanatory power of neighborhood characteristics is negligible. Although the geocode
file of NLSY–97 does not allow me to control for neighborhood characteristics that are
as detailed as in some other datasets (such as in tax records), my neighborhood measures
unconditionally achieve explanatory power close to what census tract fixed effects do under
a similar context in a different study (CHJP, 2020).6
The central role of skills in explaining racial labor market gaps is consistent with nu-
merous existing studies conducted on previous cohorts (Neal and Johnson, 1996; Heckman,
Stixrud, and Urzúa, 2006; Urzúa, 2008). For example, in Neal and Johnson (1996)’s influ-
ential work, cognitive skills, as measured by the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)
5I largely follow the literature in variable construction for individual skill and family background (Al-
tonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange, 2012; Deming, 2017; Baumrind, 1991; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2017). I use the
restricted geocode data of the NLSY–97 and control for childhood neighborhood characteristics at as detailed
a level as the data allow, and I measure the school-to-work transition with weeks worked during the first year
beyond schooling completion.
6The geocode file of NLSY–97 is as detailed as the county level, and I also include some measures of
within-county neighborhood quality.
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score, on their own account for about 60% of the racial wage gap among young men from
the NLSY–79, an older cohort born between 1957 and 1964.7 Urzúa (2008) makes a dis-
tinction between measured cognitive skills (the AFQT score) and underlying cognitive
ability, and shows that cognitive ability explains about 40% of the racial gaps in wages
and earnings in the NLSY–79.8
This chapter provides the first evidence on the key importance of skills in understanding
racial labor market gaps for the cohort of Millennials. Until now, our understanding of the
sources of racial labor market gaps in this cohort largely has been shaped by the recent pa-
per of CHJP (2020), who emphasize the key role of childhood neighborhood in explaining
the racial income gap observed in their data. My findings do not directly contradict their
findings, as CHJP do not incorporate direct measures of cognitive skills into their analysis.
However, my finding that the explanatory power of childhood neighborhood characteristics
diminishes to small or non-existent suggests that either one of the following two stories, or
both. First, the unconditional explanatory power of neighborhood documented both in the
NLSY–97 and in CHJP’s data may reflect residential sorting of Black and white families
into different neighborhoods, as pointed out by Heckman (2018). Second, if there is indeed
7An important question related to the AFQT score, just like almost all other psychometric test scores for
skills and abilities, is whether the test is biased in favor of one group over another. For the AFQT score, since
its first introduction by the Department of Defense for screening enlistees and assigning them to different
occupations, a key question especially relevant for the purpose of this chapter is whether the AFQT score
is racially biased. In 1991, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) led a study in the military focusing
on the racial fairness of the test and concluded that the AFQT score does not systematically underpredict
the job performance of Blacks relative to whites (Wigdor and Green Jr., 1991). The NAS study provides
the best evidence to date regarding the fairness of the test, as it directly observes and measures military job
performance and links it to the AFQT score, which is hardly available in civilian datasets. Whether the
findings of the NAS study can be applied to civilian population is largely an open question. In the literature,
some studies cast doubt on the racial fairness of the AFQT score (Rodgers and Spriggs, 1996), while others
conclude otherwise (Heckman, 1998).
8In a structural model, Urzúa (2008) emphasizes the key insight that observed (AFQT) test score is a
function of both underlying (cognitive) ability and other characteristics, including family background charac-
teristics (such as parental income). According to the model, cognitive ability explains a smaller share of the
racial gaps in labor market outcomes than AFQT score, because the racial gap in the AFQT score also picks
up racial differences in family background characteristics that have a direct effect on labor market outcomes.
Although I do not formally model the skill formation process, my interpretation of the estimated explanatory
power of the AFQT score is consistent with the intuition of Urzúa (2008).
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a true effect of neighborhoods on racial labor market gaps, it is likely working through the
channel of skill formation.
What does the primary role of racial skill differences imply? Although there is no
policy panacea to reduce racial labor market gaps, my findings shed light on potentially
promising pathways as we move forward. In particular, my findings reinforce older studies
that emphasize the critical role of skill development and suggest that it is important to con-
tinue to focus on institutional and economic barriers to Black men in the skill accumulation
process.
For example, the measure of cognitive skills in my data, the AFQT score, is observed at
ages 12–18, and is a function of a series of family investments and neighborhood influences
in early childhood years. It is possible that some of the racial differences in measured
cognitive skills in my data could have originally come from Black and white men’s earlier
childhood exposure to different unobserved neighborhood characteristics, such as local
school quality. Meanwhile, as emphasized in Cunha et al. (2006), family investments may
play a more crucial role than schools in children’s skill accumulation process. Identifying
the specific mechanisms behind the racial skill differences among Millennials is essential
to understanding the racial gaps in the labor market outcomes of this and future cohorts.
An important source of the observed racial gaps in the U.S. labor market is discrimina-
tion (e.g. Donohue and Heckman, 1991; Pager, 2003; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004;
Charles and Guryan, 2008; Council of Economic Advisors, 2016), and there are multiple
channels through which discrimination relates to the factors incorporated in my analysis.
First, as has been widely discussed, discrimination can have a “feedback” effect on indi-
viduals’ pre-market investment decisions. For example, Black men (or their parents) who
anticipate that there will be labor market discrimination may underinvest in skill accumu-
lation.9 Second, racial differences in the school-to-work transition also could be picking
9Discrimination beyond the labor market, such as in the criminal justice system, can have a similar feed-
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up discrimination faced by Black men in their initial labor market experiences. Third, 21%
of the mean racial employment gap and 7% of the mean racial earnings gap remain unex-
plained in my data. If, due to discrimination, Black and white men are receiving different
labor market returns to the same characteristics, then this will be reflected in the residu-
als. Note that the impact of discrimination on racial labor market gaps goes beyond the
border of labor market. For example, racial discrimination in the criminal justice system
reduces the labor market prospects of Black men, which could further discourage Black
children and Black families from investing in education and skills. Racial discrimination
in the housing market and in the education system could limit the opportunities for Black
children to live and learn in promising environments, and therefore restrict the possibility
of narrowing the racial skill gap.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I describe the NLSY–
97 data and present descriptive facts on the racial gaps in early career work trajectories of
young men in this cohort. Section 3 describes the semi-parametric decomposition method.
Section 4 details the definition of individual skill, family background, childhood neighbor-
hood, and the school-to-work transition used in the decomposition and summarizes racial
differences in these characteristics. Section 5 presents the decomposition results. In Sec-
tion 6, I summarize the main findings and lessons.
2.2 Description of Racial Gaps in Early Careers of the NLSY–97
2.2.1 NLSY–97 Data: A Sample of Early Millennials
The primary dataset used in this chapter is the NLSY–97, a nationally representative
sample of Americans born between 1980 and 1984. According to the Pew Research Cen-
back effect. For example, if black men anticipate that racial discrimination in the criminal justice system will
increase the probability that they will have a criminal record that, in turn, will harm their future labor market
prospects (e.g. Pager, 2003), they may invest less in skills that will be rewarded in the labor market.
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ter’s definition, this NLSY cohort can be considered early Millennials. The respondents
were between age 12 to 16 at the first interview in 1997, and they continue to be inter-
viewed on an annual or biannual basis. My sample of analysis includes Black and white
men from the core sample and the supplement minority sample of the NLSY–97. I use the
NLSY custom sample weights both when creating summary statistics and when conducting
decomposition analysis.
As the whole NLSY–97 cohort is now in their 30s (as of the most recent survey in
2015), the vast majority should have completed their formal schooling and should have had
the opportunity to participate in the labor force for a number of years. Thus, now is the
appropriate time to study the early career experiences of this cohort of young Americans
without serious concern of sample truncation. Defining the exact schooling completion
time is challenging because most datasets do not keep a detailed record of individuals’
school enrollment history and young adults often move back and forth between school and
work in their early careers. The NLSY–97 has a monthly retrospective diary of school
(including college) enrollment status, which allows me to identify the exact time that an
individual stops enrolling.
I follow the literature in defining schooling completion and work trajectories (Light
and McGarry, 1998; Neumark, 2002). Specifically, I identify the first month when a young
man was no longer enrolled in school and define the next 12 months as the first year post-
schooling completion. In my preferred sample, I keep a balanced panel of young men who
completed schooling at least eight years (or 96 months) prior and track their labor market
outcomes through the first eight years post-schooling. As I show in the next section, the
work trajectories of both Black and white men in the NLSY–97 reach a relatively steady
stage about six to eight years beyond school completion. I also show robustness using an
alternative unbalanced panel, which includes up to eight years of labor market experiences
for young men who completed school at least two years prior. My preferred balanced panel
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includes 839 white men and 406 Black men, and the alternative unbalanced panel includes
1,210 white men and 534 Black men. 10
For early Millennials in the NLSY–97, an important and distinctive marker of their early
adulthood is the Great Recession. Rinz (2019) shows that compared to previous cohorts, the
Millennials suffered more from the Great Recession in terms of a greater employment loss
and a more long-lasting earnings loss.11 Regarding my focus on racial gaps in early career
experiences, if Black and white men left school and entered the labor market at different
times, the Great Recession may have different impacts on their labor market outcomes. I
examine this cohort’s exposure to the Great Recession in Figure 2.1, which separately plots
the corresponding calendar years for the first and eighth year post-schooling for Black and
white men in the NLSY–97. In my sample, the vast majority of this cohort had already
completed schooling before the start of the Great Recession in late 2007, and the first
post-schooling year is spread generally evenly from 1997 to 2008.12 Some in this cohort
who left school earlier experienced the entire eight post-schooling years prior to the Great
Recession, and those who left later spent at least some of the eight years under the shadow
of the Great Recession.
10My definition of schooling completion and work trajectories involves two steps. First, I define young
men as having completed schooling in a given month-year if they are not enrolled in school in any month
of the year and in any following years in the sample. For example, if a young man graduated from high
school, worked for a few years, went back to college, and rejoined the workforce later, their post-schooling
experiences are defined to only include the post-college years. This definition therefore excludes two kinds
of work experiences: 1) part-time jobs while enrolled in school and 2) relatively temporary work spells that
are followed by returning back to school (as in the previous example). These short-term work experiences
are not the focus of my analysis here but might be of particular interest to other research purposes. Second,
I restrict the sample to a balanced panel of young men who have completed formal schooling for at least
eight years and track their labor market outcomes through the first eight years post-schooling. The two costs
of requiring a balanced panel of eight years are sample size (as some young adults have only completed
schooling for less than eight years) and potential sample selection (as some young adults may change their
school-completion time based on their anticipation of labor market prospects). My findings are robust to
using an alternative unbalanced panel, which includes up to eight years of work experiences for young adults
who have completed schooling for at least two years.
11Rinz (2019) defines the Millennials as born between 1981 and 1996 and compares them to three previous
cohorts (Generation X, Baby Boomers, and the Silent Generation).
12In the alternative unbalanced panel, the first post-schooling year spreads from 1997 to 2014, and the
Black-white difference in the timing of school completion is also modest.
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Arguably, the more important pattern in Figure 2.1 is that the Black-white difference
in the timing of school completion is modest. On average, Black men left school and en-
tered the labor market earlier than white men, which is not surprising given that Black men
had lower education levels on average, but the difference is limited and does not seem to
be concentrated in any specific calendar year.13 If anything, this modest difference indi-
cates that Black men’s early careers are slightly less exposed to the Great Recession, on
average.14 Even though Black and white men in the NLSY–97 entered the labor market at
similar times, it is still possible that they experienced differential exposures to the Great Re-
cession because they lived in different geographic areas or worked in different occupations
and industries. As I introduce in detail in Section 3, I incorporate a measure of the school-
to-work transition, which is one’s employment status in the first year post-schooling, in
my decomposition analysis. To the extent that the differential impact of the Great Reces-
sion is reflected in Black and white men’s employment immediately beyond schooling, my
school-to-work transition measure absorbs the potential effect of the Great Recession.15
2.2.2 Descriptive Facts on Racial Gaps in Early Career Trajectories
How do Black and white men of this cohort fare in their early careers? What are the
racial gaps in their very first year beyond school completion, and how do the initial racial
gaps evolve over time? In this section, I summarize the labor market trajectories of Black
and white men in the NLSY–97. I start by visually presenting how employment and earn-
ings evolve from the first through eighth year post-schooling.
13On average, Black men were also slightly younger than white men in the first post-schooling year, but
the difference is small in magnitude (19.3 years old for Black men and 19.6 years old for white men).
14One thing to note is that for Black men, a visibly larger share of the eighth year corresponds to the
start of the Great Recession around 2007–2009. This might explain why some employment and earnings
trajectories for Black men, as presented in Figures 2.2–2.4, show a small dip at the eighth year. However, my
decomposition results are robust to excluding the eighth year from the analysis.
15Otherwise, the effect of the Great Recession on the racial labor market gaps will be captured by the
residuals in the decomposition analysis.
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Figures 2.2–2.3 plot the trajectories of employment outcomes at different margins, and
Figure 2.4 plots the trajectories of annual earnings.16 The consistent pattern observed
across outcomes is the substantial racial gap that began immediately in the first year post-
schooling and the gap’s strong persistence throughout the eight early career years. For
example, 96% of white men were employed in their first year beyond school completion,
while fewer than 85% of Black men were employed. This 11 percentage point gap nar-
rows somewhat over the following years but largely persists and is statistically significant
throughout the eight years.
At the intensive margin of employment, white men on average, worked for 41 weeks
in their very first year post-schooling, while Black men, on average, worked for 32 weeks.
Again, this large and significant gap persists to the eighth year. Similar differential trajecto-
ries are documented for employment outcomes at other margins, such as the share of people
who worked for at least 26 weeks a year and the share who worked for at least 50 weeks
a year (which can be thought of as a measure of “half-year” and “full-year” employment,
respectively). As shown in Figure 2.4, as with employment, substantial initial racial gaps
are also observed in both annual earnings and log annual earnings in the first year beyond
schooling completion. The initial gaps either stay largely stable (for log earnings) or grow
(for earnings) through the early career years.
The strong persistence of the racial employment and earnings gaps suggests that to
understand the gaps, it is essential to pay particular attention to pre-market factors (such
as skills that young men are about to bring to the labor market) and the events affecting
Black and white men immediately upon schooling completion and labor market entry.17
This pattern motivates my focus on individual skill, family background, and childhood
16Annual earnings are adjusted to 2013 dollars. I use inverse hyperbolic sine to allow for zeroes. For
simplicity, I use the word “log” instead of inverse hyperbolic sine throughout the chapter
17It is possible that the work trajectories of Black and white men in the NLSY–97 will either converge
or further diverge in the longer run. This goes beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is something I could
investigate when the NLSY–97 cohort are further into their 30s and 40s.
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neighborhood characteristics (which are presumably pre-market factors) and the school-
to-work transition (measured in the first year post-schooling) when exploring what has
driven the documented racial gaps in the decomposition analysis. Since the school-to-work
transition is partly an outcome, it helps to capture the effect of unobserved pre-market
factors and the effect of unobservables in the labor market, such as discrimination against
Black men and differential exposure to the Great Recession between Black and white men,
as long as the unobservables are reflected in young men’s initial labor market experiences.
Table 2.1 summarizes Black-white gaps in their early career experience at the initial
stage (the first year), at the relatively stable stage (the sixth to eighth year), and over the
entire early career of eight years. On average, white men began their first post-schooling
job at 11 weeks, while it took Black men 34 weeks to be employed. This 23-week gap
means that compared to their white counterparts, an average Black man went through an
immediate non-employment spell right after school completion that was more than five
months longer.18
This difficulty faced by Black men in getting a foothold in the labor market is extremely
worrisome. Historically, most job mobility and wage growth happens in the first few years
of one’s career (Topel and Ward, 1992). If Black men are disconnected from employment
during this period, their career progression is delayed and possibly harmed permanently
(Kahn, 2010; Kondo, 2015; Schwandt and Wachter, 2019). Additionally, past research
suggests that poor labor market prospects induce criminal activity among young men and
having an arrest history generates future non-employment (Grogger, 1992; Grogger, 1998).
Considering the historically high incarceration rate over childhood and early adulthood of
this cohort, failing the school-to-work transition may have a particularly large and long-
18This measure of the school-to-work transition duration is constructed over the first eight years post-
schooling. For young adults who were never employed throughout all eight years, their transition duration
is capped at eight years and is therefore underestimated. In my sample, 2% of Black men and less than 1%
of white men were never employed in the entire eight years, suggesting the actual racial gap in transition
duration is likely larger than 23 weeks.
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lasting impact on Black men who did not immediately find a job and subsequently became
involved in criminal activity.19
Because Black men are less attached to employment, it is well documented that simply
comparing the earnings of employed Black and white men will likely underestimate the
true racial earnings gap (Heckman, Lyons, and Todd, 2000; Johnson, Kitamura, and Neal,
2000; Neal, 2004; Bayer and Charles, 2018). Table 2.1 confirms this pattern by looking at
annual earnings versus annual earnings excluding zeroes. In the first year post-schooling,
when zero earnings are excluded, average earnings of white men are 46% higher than Black
men (a log earnings gap of 0.46). When zero earnings are included (as in Figure 2.4), the
racial gap in the first year increases to 215% (a log earnings gap of 2.15). When I take
the average of annual earnings over the sixth to eighth years, white men earn 52% higher
earnings when zeroes are excluded and 145% when zeroes are included. To incorporate
this important Black-white difference in attachment, I always include zero earnings in the
decomposition analyses.20
Given the unstable nature of the first few years of one’s career, for the decomposition
analysis, I primarily focus on racial gaps in labor market outcomes measured at the rela-
tively later stage. Specifically, I take the average weeks worked per year and the average
annual earnings over the sixth to eighth years post-schooling. The racial gaps in these
outcomes are summarized in the second panel of Table 2.1. As the work trajectories in
Figures 2.2–2.4 show, both employment and earnings see more growth and fluctuations in
the first few years and mostly stabilize around the sixth to eighth year. Taking the average
19In results not presented here, I find that in the first eight years post-schooling, 41% of Black men in the
NLSY–97 have at least one arrest and 17% of Black men have at least one episode of incarceration. The
corresponding numbers are 25% and 7% for white men in the NLSY–97. The racial gaps also exist along
the intensive margin (e.g., number of arrests, months of incarceration) and are all statistically significant. My
decomposition analysis to date has been focusing on racial gaps in labor market outcomes. As I proceed, I
may incorporate criminal involvement as an additional outcome.
20In results not presented here, I impute missing earnings values either with zeroes or based on broad
earnings categories asked in the survey, and show that the basic patterns of racial gap hold.
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over three years, instead of looking at a single year (such as the eighth year), also reduces
potential measurement errors. As a robustness check, in the next section I also present de-
composition results focusing on racial gaps averaged over a longer period, from the second
to eighth year.
In sum, the early careers of young men in the NLSY–97 are characterized by a sub-
stantial and persistent racial gap in various employment and earnings measures. In the
following section, I apply semi-parametric decomposition methods to explore the drivers
of the documented racial labor market gaps in the NLSY–97.
2.3 Decomposition Method
I now describe the method that I apply to assess the contribution of individual skill,
family background, childhood neighborhood, and the school-to-work transition to the doc-
umented racial employment and earnings gaps in the NLSY–97. Some influential studies
that focus on understanding labor market racial gaps have relied on regression-based es-
timates, which impose strong assumptions on parametric (mostly linear) functional forms
(Neal and Johnson, 1996; CHJP, 2020).21 However, there is evidence showing that some
of the parametric assumptions widely imposed in classical regression specifications are not
supported by the data (Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzúa, 2006). Under the context of racial
wealth gaps, Barsky, Bound, Charles, and Lupton (2002) show that the classical Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973), which imposes strong functional
form assumptions, results in misleading conclusions regarding the explanatory power of
racial gaps in earnings on the racial wealth gaps.
In my main analysis, I rely on the semi-parametric decomposition method introduced
21CHJP (2020) is mainly based on a regression of children’s mean income ranks on their parents’ income
ranks, and they argue that this rank-rank relationship is actually close to linear for both Black and white
men. It is unclear whether children’s income (or income ranks) is also a linear function of individual skill,
childhood neighborhood characteristics, or other family background characteristics.
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by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996, hereafter DFL).22 This method relaxes the para-
metric functional forms that the classical Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition imposes on the
relationship between labor market outcomes (such as employment and earnings) and in-
dividual, family, and neighborhood characteristics. The DFL method also goes beyond
analyzing racial gaps at the mean and examining racial gaps across the distribution of the
outcomes. In a nutshell, this decomposition constructs the counterfactual distribution of
labor market outcomes that I use to answer questions like, “What employment or earnings
would white men in the NLSY–97 cohort have had if they had the same individual skill,
family background, childhood neighborhood, or the school-to-work transition as Black men
in the same cohort?” In the remaining part of this section, I describe the DFL method under
the specific context of understanding racial labor market gaps.23
Let fw(y) be the density of labor market outcome y (such as employment or earnings)
for white men and fb(y) for Black men. Let Z represent a vector of observed individual-,
family-, and neighborhood-level characteristics that have an impact on one’s labor market
outcome y. The counterfactual density of y for white men who had the observed charac-
teristics of Black men can be written as fw(y;Zb). Intuitively, this counterfactual holds
the relationship between y and Z as fixed for white men. The DFL method keeps this
relationship non-parametric, so no specific functional form is imposed on fw().
Using this counterfactual, I can conduct the following decomposition of the racial gap
in outcome y, where the first line in Equation 2.1 below represents the racial gap that can
be explained by Black-white differences in observed characteristics Z and the second line
22Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange (2012) applies the DFL method to study how the characteristics of young
Americans have changed from the NLSY–79 to the NLSY–97, and what it means for the labor market
prospects of the NLSY–97.
23Readers familiar with the method may wish to skim through this section.
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represents the unexplained residuals:
fw(y)− fb(y) = fw(y;Zw )− fw(y;Zb )
+ fw(y;Zb )− fb(y;Zb ). (2.1)
The DFL method constructs the counterfactual fw(y;Zb) by reweighting the joint dis-
tribution of (y,Z) for white men so that the reweighted distribution of Z for white men
matches the distribution of Z for Black men. To see how the weight is determined, the
counterfactual density fw(y;Zb) is written as the following integral of the conditional den-
sity fw(y | z) over the Z distribution of Black men:
fw(y;Zb ) =
∫
fw(y | z) dFb(z)
=
∫
fw(y | z) ψ(z) dFw(z),













where Pr(b | z) is the probability of being Black given on observed characteristics z, and
Pr(b) is the unconditional probability of being Black. Pr(b | z) can be estimated with a
probit model that includes the full vector of z, and Pr(b) can be estimated with the sample
fraction of Black men. Pr(w | z) and Pr(w) can be estimated similarly. When estimating
Pr(b | z) and Pr(w | z) with probit models, I impose parametric functional forms. This
makes the DFL method semi-parametric, not completely non-parametric.
Similar to propensity score matching, a practical issue in the DFL decomposition is
how to deal with extremely large weights. Intuitively, the weight ψ(z) will be large if the
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characteristics vector z is very rare among white men. In this case, Pr(z | w) will be very
small and Pr(z | b) will be very large, which drives up the weight ψ(z). In practice, I first
adjust the weight ψ(z) to have a mean of one and then cap the weight at the value of 20,
under the prior that any weights above 20 should be due to sampling errors. What this cap-
ping does is basically down-weight white men who share similar observed characteristics z
with Black men in the sample. By down-weighting these white men, the explanatory power
of z to the racial gaps in y is also adjusted down. I check robustness of my decomposition
results with different weight capping thresholds.24
Equivalently, in principle one can conduct an alternative decomposition using fb(y;Zw),
the counterfactual outcome for Black men if they had the observed characteristics of white
men. Conducting this reverse decomposition will introduce a common support problem,
which has been emphasized in earlier studies (Barsky et al., 2002; Heywood and Parent,
2012). The intuition is straightforward: it is relatively less difficult to find white men at
almost any point of the support of the Black distribution of Z, but it is sometimes quite
difficult to find Black men at some parts of the white distribution of Z. Barsky et al. (2002)
show that a lack of common support will likely introduce bias to the decomposition as
more extrapolation is required. This common support problem will be exacerbated when
the sample size is limited, which is especially relevant for the data of the NLSY–97.25 I
therefore stick to the decomposition in Equation 2.1 throughout my analysis.
In addition to the aggregate decomposition in Equation 2.1, the DFL method allows an
estimation of the contribution of different subsets of variables in Z to the racial gap in labor
24Note that Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange (2012) also caps the weights in a similar context, where they
apply the DFL decomposition and reweight the NLSY–79 sample to make it similar to the NLSY–97 sample.
My results are qualitatively robust to different choices of weight caps.
25Another distinction between the decomposition in Equation 2.1 and this reverse decomposition is
whether fw(), the earnings or employment function for white men, or fb(), the function for Black men,
is used. Under the context of racial labor market gaps, the literature usually uses fw() for the decomposition
analysis. A main reason is that the earnings or employment function received by white men is arguably more
similar to the hypothetical earnings or employment function in a labor market without discrimination (or
other institutional barriers) against Black men.
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market outcome y. This detailed decomposition helps answer questions such as, “What
labor market outcomes would white men in the NLSY–97 cohort have achieved if they had
the same family background and individual skill as Black men in the same cohort but kept
their original childhood neighborhood characteristics and the school-to-work transition?”
Let Z consist of four main subsets of variables: childhood neighborhood N, family
background F , individual skill S, and the school-to-work transition T . One of the possible
detailed decompositions can be written as
fw(y)− fb(y) = fw(y;Nw,Fw,Sw,Tw )− fw(y;Nb,Fw,Sw,Tw )
+ fw(y;Nb,Fw,Sw,Tw )− fw(y;Nb,Fb,Sw,Tw )
+ fw(y;Nb,Fb,Sw,Tw )− fw(y;Nb,Fb,Sb,Tw )
+ fw(y;Nb,Fb,Sb,Tw )− fw(y;Nb,Fb,Sb,Tb )
+ fw(y;Nb,Fb,Sb,Tb )− fb(y;Nb,Fb,Sb,Tb ). (2.2)
The first line represents the contribution of Black-white differences in childhood neigh-
borhood N. The contribution is the sum of a direct effect of childhood neighborhood N
on labor market outcome y and an indirect effect, which comes from any changes in the
distributions of F , S, and T that are attributed to the changes in N. In other words, this
is the unconditional effect of neighborhood on the racial gap in y. The second line rep-
resents the contribution of Black-white differences in family background F after holding
childhood neighborhood to be constant between Black and white men. It is important to
note that when holding childhood neighborhood constant between Black and white men,
any variations in family background that are implied by variations in childhood neighbor-
hood are also held to be constant between Black and white men. The third and fourth lines
can be interpreted in a similar fashion as a conditional contribution of individual skill and
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the school-to-work transition, respectively. The last line represents the racial gap in y that
remains unexplained after accounting for Black-white differences in all observed factors in
Z.
An important feature of the DFL decomposition is that the detailed decomposition is not
unique. As is shown in Equation 2.2, the contributions of different components of Z to the
overall racial gap depend on the sequential ordering by which the different components (N,
F , S, and T ) are added in to the decomposition. The components that are added earlier in
the sequence are given more credit in explaining the racial gap. The merit of any sequential
ordering depends on how the different components are causally related to the others. Under
a similar context, Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange (2012) argue that a natural ordering is the
one that follows the timing of variables.
In my empirical analysis, I explore different choices of orderings, but I always hold the
relative positions of family background, individual skill, and the school-to-work transition
as the following: Family background→ Individual skill→ School-to-work transition. The
inclusion of family background before individual skill is justified by research demonstrat-
ing that family investments play a crucial role in the formation of skills (summarized in
Cunha et al., 2006). I also always keep the school-to-work transition as the last component
after all “pre-market” factors (including childhood neighborhood). I hold no prior as to
where childhood neighborhood should be in the sequence relative to family background
and individual skill, and I explore different positions of childhood neighborhood with the
following orderings:
Neighborhood→ Family→ Skill→ Transition
Family→ Neighborhood→ Skill→ Transition
Family→ Skill→ Neighborhood→ Transition
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In the first ordering, which is the same as Equation 2.2, childhood neighborhood is
given the highest priority in the decomposition, while individual skill is given the lowest
priority. The following two orderings move down the priority of childhood neighborhood in
the sequence and move up family background and individual skill. In the second ordering,
the contribution of childhood neighborhood is estimated as conditional on Black-white dif-
ferences in family background. In the third ordering, the contribution of childhood neigh-
borhood is estimated conditional on Black-white differences in both family background
and individual skill.
Comparing the decomposition results across different orderings helps explain what
the unconditional explanatory power of childhood neighborhood, as documented in CHJP
(2020), actually represents. This is a direct examination of Heckman’s comments (Heck-
man, 2018) on the interpretation of CHJP’s findings. The difference between the estimated
explanatory power of neighborhood in the first and the second ordering tells us the extent
to which the unconditional neighborhood effect is an artifact of residential sorting of Black
and white men with different family background into different neighborhoods.
The difference between the second and the third ordering further tell us about the re-
lationship between childhood neighborhood and individual skill. In particular, if much of
the estimated explanatory power of childhood neighborhood in the second ordering goes
away as we move to the third ordering, it suggests either one (or both) of the following two
stories. First, there may be residential sorting at the individual level that cannot be fully
captured by the family variables in the NLSY–97, and the true effect of neighborhood in
explaining racial labor market gaps is limited. Second, if there is a true effect of neighbor-
hood, it is likely affecting racial gaps in labor market outcomes through the channel of in-
fluencing the skill accumulation process. On the other hand, if the estimated unconditional
explanatory power of neighborhood (as in the first ordering) stays quantitatively robust as
we move to the second and the third ordering, it shows that the neighborhood effect as
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documented in CHJP (2020) is not simply reflecting residential sorting of individuals and
families across neighborhoods (at least not sorting based on my included individual and
family variables in the NLSY–97 data).
In all three orderings, I include the school-to-work transition as the last component be-
cause it is presumably partly the outcome of both pre-market factors and what happened to
Black and white men when they left school. As I detail in the next section, I measure the
school-to-work transition with one’s weeks worked in the first year post-schooling. Condi-
tional on individual skill, family background, and childhood neighborhood, the estimated
contribution of the school-to-work transition to racial gaps observed at later stages (such
as the sixth to eighth years post-schooling) can capture either the effect of Black-white
differences in unobserved pre-market factors (such as certain non-cognitive skills that are
difficult to measure) or other unobservables that are reflected in how Black and white men
initiated their careers differently. An example of such an unobservable is discrimination
against Black men both inside and outside the labor market (Donohue and Heckman, 1991;
Pager, 2003; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Council of Economic Advisors, 2016). If
Black men had a harder time in finding the first job due to discrimination, then at least part
of the estimated contribution of transition T reflects the effect of discrimination. Another
potential example is differential exposure to the Great Recession between Black and white
men due to, for example, differences in residence at labor market entry and occupation and
industry choices that cannot be explained by observed individual skill, family background,
and childhood neighborhood.
The effect of any racial differences that cannot be fully captured by individual skill,
family background, childhood neighborhood, and the school-to-work transition are left in
the residuals. It is important to emphasize that the DFL decomposition focuses on how
much of the racial gaps in y can be explained by racial differences in N, F , S, and T (also
known as “quantities”), and it does not reveal the potential effect of racial differences in
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the returns paid to each one of these factors (also known as “prices”). Different prices paid
to Black and white men will be absorbed in the residuals. It might be of particular interest
to future decompose the residuals to see, for example, the specific contribution of racial
differences in skill prices.26
The counterfactuals in Equation 2.2 can be estimated in a similar way as fw(y;Zb) in
Equation 2.1. For example, write fw(y;Nb,Fb,Sw,Tw ), the counterfactual density of y for
white men when they had the same childhood neighborhood and family background as
Black men, as the following integral:
fw(y;Nb,Fb,Sw,Tw ) =
∫
fw(y | n, f ; Sw,Tw ) dFb(n, f )
=
∫
fw(y | n, f ; Sw,Tw ) φ(n, f ) dFw(n, f ).
Using Bayes’s rule, I can rewrite the weight φ(n, f ) as




Pr(b | n, f )




As explained earlier, Pr(b | n, f ) and Pr(w | n, f ) can be estimated with a probit model
that includes N and F as explanatory variables, and Pr(w) and Pr(b) can be estimated with
the sample share of white and Black men. The same procedure can be applied to estimate
other counterfactuals as well as the associated weights in this specific case and in other
cases with different orderings of N, F , S, and T .
26For example, by imposing a linear function form and focusing on the mean, the Oaxaca-Blinder decom-
position can be used to quantify the fraction of the residuals that is driven by different prices paid to Black
and white men for their N, F , S, and T . Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2018) proposes a decomposition method
based on re-centered influence function regressions that extends to general distributional statistics.
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2.4 Description of Racial Differences in Individual Skill, Family Back-
ground, and Childhood Neighborhood
A decomposition of the observed racial labor market gaps into the contributions of in-
dividual skill, family background, childhood neighborhood, and the school-to-work transi-
tion requires a detailed and careful definition of these factors. In this section, I first describe
which specific variables I include in each one of the four sets of factors and how I construct
these variables from the NLSY–97 and from linking its geocode file to external sources.
The set of individual skills include four variables that the literature has shown to have an
important impact on labor market outcomes. First, I control for formal schooling using the
highest grade completed.27 Second, I include the AFQT score, which has been extensively
used as a measure of cognitive skills (Neal and Johnson, 1996; Heckman, Stixrud, and
Urzúa, 2006; Urzúa, 2008; Lang and Manove, 2011).28 The cohort were 12–18 years old
when they took the test. I use the AFQT score constructed by the National Longitudinal
Survey (NLS)’s team, which adjusts for different test-taking ages. In particular, I include
dummy variables for the AFQT score deciles to allow for potential nonlinear effects.29
27I show robustness by controlling for schooling with dummy variables for educational groups: less than
high school, high school graduate, some college, and college graduate and above.
28The AFQT score is created based on four sections of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
(ASVAB) test. An important question is whether the test is racially biased. If so, the measured racial gap in
AFQT score is picking up biases in the test rather than racial differences in cognitive skills alone. A study led
by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) in 1991 examined the racial fairness of the test and concluded
that the AFQT score does not systematically underpredict the job performance of Blacks relative to whites
(Wigdor and Green Jr., 1991). It is largely an open question whether the result of this NAS study can be
extended to civilian population, and there is a debate of this question in the literature (Rodgers and Spriggs,
1996; Heckman, 1998).
29I show robustness using two alternative cognitive skill measures. First, I include the age-adjusted AFQT
score percentiles linearly. Second, I use the AFQT score constructed by Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange
(2012), which also adjusts for different test-taking ages. The aim of Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange (2012)
is to create comparable AFQT scores between the NLSY–97 and NLSY–79. For this purpose, the authors
create a crosswalk of scores between the two cohorts, which requires stronger assumptions and external data
sources. The AFQT score constructed by Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange (2012) is cardinal, while the score
constructed by the NLS is ordinal. See Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange (2012) for more details about how
they construct the score.
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Last, it has been shown that non-cognitive skills are also important predictors for ed-
ucational and labor market outcomes, even conditional on the effect of cognitive skills
(Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzúa, 2006; Urzúa, 2008). A recent series of papers focuses on a
specific type of non-cognitive skills, called social skills, showing that its importance seems
to be especially high in today’s labor market (Weinberger, 2014; Deming, 2017; Kahn and
Deming, 2017). However, there is a lack of consensus about how to measure non-cognitive
or social skills. In this chapter, I use the non-cognitive score and social score constructed
by Deming (2017), based on personality trait questions in the NLSY–97.30
I measure family background with the following five variables. First, I control for an-
nual parental income measured when children (i.e., the NLSY–97 respondents) were ages
12–16. Second, I control for the mother’s education level with her highest grade completed.
Third, I control for family structure with an indicator variable for living with both parents
at age 14. Fourth, I include an indicator variable for whether the mother is a teenage mom,
defined as being younger than 20 when giving birth to the child. Last, psychologists and
sociologists have measured parenting style along two dimensions: strictness and support-
iveness (Maccoby and Martin, 1983; Baumrind, 1991). Some recent work on parenting
completed by economists also adopt this measure (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2017; Doepke,
Sorrenti, and Zilibotti, 2019). In the NLSY–97, respondents are asked about how strict and
supportive their mother is, and the answers are used to classify mothers into four groups
following the literature: authoritative (strict, supportive), authoritarian (strict, not support-
ive), indulgent (not strict, supportive), or uninvolved (not strict, not supportive).31
30It is worth pointing out that the non-cognitive and social skill measures in the NLSY–97 are potentially
subject to large measurement errors. Unlike the AFQT score, which is measured for the NLSY–97 cohort at
presumably pre-market ages (12–18), the personality trait questions in the NLSY–97 were asked when the
cohort were either 17–21 or 23–27. This means that the non-cognitive and social skill measures are possibly
already influenced by one’s labor market experiences and contain more (likely non-classical) measurement
errors. As I present later, non-cognitive and social scores turn out to have minimal explanatory power to the
racial labor market gaps in my data, and my decomposition results are quantitatively similar when excluding
non-cognitive and social scores from the set of individual skill.
31Note that CHJP (2018) also consider basic family background information. They include parental income
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The measure of childhood neighborhood quality includes two series of variables. The
first series includes neighborhood quality measures at the county and higher levels, which I
construct by using the geocode file of the NLSY–97 to link respondents’ childhood county
of residence at age 12 to external data sources. Chetty and Hendren (2018b) construct a
county-by-county measure of neighborhood quality by comparing the income of children
from families who move to “better” counties when children are younger with those who
move when children are older.32 Under certain assumptions, this measure can be thought
of as a sufficient statistic for county neighborhood quality in terms of improving children’s
future income. The authors create this county-specific quality measure separately for men
and women from high-income and low-income families. For the purpose of this chapter,
I include a measure for men from high-income families and a measure for men from low-
income families.33
In addition to the county quality measures, I also link childhood county of residence in
the NLSY–97 to the 2000 Census to draw information on county socioeconomic conditions.
Specifically, this information includes population, median household income, poverty rate,
and the share of men with a college education. It is possible that at a more aggregate level,
neighborhood quality has an independent effect other than the effect of county quality. For
this reason, I also include commuting zone quality measures, similarly created by Chetty
and Hendren (2018b), and state socioeconomic conditions from the 2000 Census.
The second series of childhood neighborhood measures aims to capture within-county
neighborhood quality. First, I classify one’s neighborhood at age 12 into five groups by
in their main analysis and also include the mother’s education, family structure, and family wealth in some
specifications. I show robustness using alternative sets of family background variables, such as excluding
parental income.
32The county neighborhood quality measure is created by Chetty and Hendren (2018b) based on a sample
of children born between 1980 and 1986, and their income is measured at age 26 (from federal income tax
records).
33Low-income (high-income) families are families at the 25th (75th) percentile of the national family
income distribution. The reason to include separate measures is that a “good” neighborhood for a certain
group might not be a “good” neighborhood for another group.
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whether it is in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA), in a central city, and in an urban or
rural area.34 The five groups are MSA central city, MSA non-central city urban area, MSA
non-central city rural area, non-MSA urban area, and non-MSA rural area. Importantly,
this classification captures the high density of Black families living in MSA central cities
and the high density of white families living in MSA non-central city urban areas (i.e.,
suburban areas), which I document in the NLSY–97. Second, I include an indicator variable
for whether the respondent lived in a house or apartment owned by the family when the
respondent was 12–16. Other studies have documented that at the neighborhood-level,
homeownership rate is positively associated with neighborhood quality and housing price
(Coulson and Li, 2013), and at the family level, homeownership leads to more family
investment in local amenities and social capital (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999). I therefore
include homeownership as a proxy for neighborhood quality at a more local level.35
In theory, it is not obvious what is the most appropriate level of childhood neighbor-
hood classification. Given the complexity of how neighborhood can influence children’s
outcomes, there may not be a simple answer to this question that applies to different chil-
dren from different neighborhoods. In practice, due to the residential sorting of individu-
als and families, the more detailed neighborhood classification I choose (e.g., control for
neighborhood quality at the census tract level instead of the county level), the more likely
the neighborhood measures are capturing the characteristics of individuals and families liv-
ing in the neighborhood rather than the characteristics of neighborhood itself. In the most
extreme case, if neighborhood is classified at the dwelling level, then neighborhood and
family characteristics will have an almost perfect overlap and become indistinguishable
34According to the Census Bureau, the urban-rural distinction is defined on a block-by-block basis, based
on the population density (as well as some other characteristics) of each census block. So an MSA could
include both urban and rural areas.
35It is debatable whether homeownership more closely captures family- or neighborhood-level charac-
teristics. By assigning this variable to childhood neighborhood (rather than to family background), I give
childhood neighborhood more priority when evaluating the contribution of different factors to the overall
racial labor market gaps.
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from each other.
In past studies, the choice of neighborhood classification usually depends on the specific
research question and the data availability. For example, CHJP (2018) control for child-
hood neighborhood at the census tract or block level in their descriptive analysis, while
they switch to the commuting zone level when estimating the causal effect of moving to a
“better” neighborhood. As a comparison, my set of neighborhood quality measures alone
explains 20%–30% of the observed average racial gap in annual earnings between Black
and white men in the NLSY–97, while in CHJP’s sample, census tract fixed effects alone
explain 31% and census block fixed effects alone explain 44% of the observed average
racial gap in income ranks.
The last component in my decomposition is the school-to-work transition. As shown in
Figures 2.2–2.3 and in the top panel of Table 2.1, there are substantial racial gaps observed
at various margins of employment outcomes in the first year post-schooling. To capture
this, I measure the school-to-work transition flexibly with a vector of indicator variables for
whether the respondent worked for 0 weeks, 1–9 weeks, 10–19 weeks, ..., 40–49 weeks, or
50 weeks and above.36
Table 3.1 summarizes the Black-white differences in individual skill, family back-
ground, and childhood neighborhood characteristics. Across most of the selected variables,
there are large and statistically significant racial differences. For individual skill, Black men
have lower education attainment, measured cognitive skills, and measured social skills. The
Black-white difference in measured non-cognitive skills is indistinguishable from zero. In
terms of the magnitude of these differences, the racial gap in measured cognitive skills is
either about 27 percentiles, on average, (by the NLS’s measure) or close to one standard
36A sufficient statistic for the school-to-work transition is the number of weeks before finding the first
job, which is presented in Table 2.1. I do not use this measure because for some young men in my sample;
they either did not start to work until toward the end of the eight-year period or never worked in the first
eight years. For these men, the measure of actual transition duration has a time overlap with my outcome of
interest, racial labor market gaps observed in the sixth to eighth year.
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deviation (by Altonji et al.’s measure). As a comparison, the racial gap in measured social
skills is about one-fifth standard deviation.
For family background, Black men in the NLSY–97 are less likely to grow up in a
two-parent family, their parents have substantially lower income, and their mothers are less
educated and are more likely to be teenage moms.37 It is especially striking that only about
32% of Black men in the NLSY–97 lived with both parents at age 14, as compared to 63%
of white men in the NLSY–97. Regarding parenting style, more than 80% of both Black
and white mothers are reported by their child to be supportive. However, compared to white
mothers, a larger share (about 15 percentage points more) of Black mothers are reported to
be strict.
In terms of childhood neighborhood quality, Black men in the NLSY–97 are less likely
to grow up in “good” counties and “good” commuting zones, according to the neighbor-
hood quality measures constructed by Chetty and Hendren (2018b). Black men are also
less likely to grow up in counties and states with higher median household incomes, lower
poverty rates, and larger shares of college-educated men. In addition, substantially more
Black men have grown up in central cities, while more white men have grown up in sub-
urban areas (MSA, non-central city, urban areas). Seventy-five percent of white men lived
in a house or apartment owned by their families around ages 12–16, while only 41% of
Black men did. These patterns from Table 2 consistently suggest that there are large racial
differences in the NLSY–97 regarding the quality of childhood neighborhoods.
Given the observed racial differences in individual skill, family background, childhood
neighborhood, and the school-to-work transition, in the next section I evaluate how these
factors have contributed to the overall racial gaps in employment and earnings, averaged
over the sixth to eighth years post-schooling.
37If the respondent lives with a single parent, the parental income measure only includes the income of that
parent. Part of the substantial parental income gap between Black and white men is due to a larger share of
Black men living in single-parent families. I use the inverse hyperbolic sine to allow for zero income values.
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2.5 Decomposition Results
2.5.1 Decomposing Racial Gaps at the Mean
How have individual skill, family background, childhood neighborhood, and the school-
to-work transition contributed to the overall racial labor market gaps observed in the NLSY–
97? In this section, I start by explaining racial gaps at the mean using the semi-parametric
DFL decomposition. My main analysis uses the balanced sample of Black and white men
who have not been enrolled in formal schooling for at least eight years. As previously ex-
plained, I focus on racial gaps in employment and earnings averaged over the six to eight
years post-schooling, when the labor market outcomes have mostly stabilized.
Table 2.3 summarizes my main decomposition results. The three panels each feature a
DFL decomposition that includes the same four sets of explanatory factors but with differ-
ent orderings. As discussed extensively in Section 3, I hold the relative position of family
background, individual skill, and the school-to-work transition fixed and alter the position
of childhood neighborhood in the ordering. I also always keep the school-to-work tran-
sition as the last component because it is partly an outcome.38 Within each panel, I first
present the racial gap in employment (average weeks worked per year) and earnings (log
of average annual earnings including zeroes), and then I present the share of the gap that
can be explained by specific factors. The last column presents the share of the racial gap
that is left unexplained and is in the residuals.
Two key findings stand out. The first is the central role of individual skill. No mat-
ter which sequential ordering is used, individual skill has the largest explanatory power
to mean racial earnings gap. Measured racial differences in skills account for 42% of the
38The contribution of lower-order components is estimated after holding the higher-order components the
same between Black and white men. Intuitively, this means that higher-order components are given some
priority in claiming the explanatory power over the overall racial labor market gaps.
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racial earnings gap when conditional on childhood neighborhood and family background,
and 46% of the gap when only conditional on family background. This key role of in-
dividual skill is also observed in explaining the mean racial employment gap. Measured
racial skill differences account for 36% of the racial employment gap when conditional on
childhood neighborhood and family background and 43% of the gap when only conditional
on family background. Note that family background shows a similar explanatory power as
individual skill to the racial employment gap when family background is added as the first
component in the sequential ordering.
Given the central role of racial skill differences, a natural question is whether a specific
skill measure has driven this result. Recall that the set of skills includes highest grade com-
pleted, measured cognitive skills (AFQT score), and measured non-cognitive and social
skills. Although it is difficult to disentangle the effects of different skill measures, as they
can be endogenous to each other, I can explore, in a descriptive sense, which specific skill
measure has the dominant explanatory power.39
In Table 2.4, I contrast decomposition results where I include only highest grade com-
pleted in the set of individual skill (middle panel) to results where I include only AFQT
score as a measure of cognitive skills (bottom panel). As a benchmark, the top panel repli-
cates the main results in Table 2.3. Comparing across panels in Table 2.4, it is clear that
the explanatory power of individual skill is attributable primarily to measured cognitive
skills (AFQT score) rather than formal schooling. Conditional on childhood neighborhood
and family background, schooling accounts for only 3% of the racial employment gap and
4% of the racial earnings gap. The result barely changes when I add non-cognitive and
social scores to schooling.40 In stark contrast, conditional on childhood neighborhood and
39Urzúa (2008) shows that cognitive skills can grow as education attainment grows and people can make
endogenous schooling decision based on their underlying cognitive and non-cognitive abilities.
40Recall that the measures of non-cognitive and social skills constructed in the NLSY–97 (Deming, 2017)
are subject to potentially large measurement errors. In addition, the racial differences in measured non-
cognitive and social skills are also not as sizable as the racial differences in measured cognitive skills, as
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family background, AFQT score accounts for 31% of the racial employment gap and 36%
of the racial earnings gap. The share accounted for by measured cognitive skills is very
close to the share accounted for by the full set of individual skill (36% for employment,
42% for earnings). When only conditional on family background, the same pattern holds:
the predominant contribution of skills is primarily driven by racial differences in measured
cognitive skills.
When interpreting the central role of individual skill (especially cognitive skills), it is
important to emphasize that the skill measures themselves shall be seen as an outcome.
For example, cognitive skills in my data are measured when respondents were ages 12–18
and could be a function of a series of family investments, school influences, and/or neigh-
borhood impacts that happened in early childhood years. Using a simple linear regression,
Neal and Johnson (1996) show that young men in the NLSY–79 who have high AFQT
scores are from a more advantageous background (e.g., more highly educated parents, read-
ing materials at home) and a better school environment (e.g., lower student-to-teacher ratio,
lower student dropout rate). In a cohort close in age to the NLSY–97, CHJP (2020) show
low-poverty neighborhoods (census tracts) with low levels of racial bias among whites and
high rates of father presence among Blacks tend to have smaller racial income gaps. Con-
sidering the relative role of families and schools (or neighborhoods) in the skill formation
of children, past studies have established that family investments play a much more crucial
role than school and neighborhood influences (Cunha et al., 2006). Identifying the specific
mechanisms behind the racial skill differences in this cohort of young men is beyond the
scope of this chapter and is left for future research.
The primary explanatory power of AFQT score, as compared to schooling, in explain-
ing the racial labor market gaps in the NLSY–97, is consistent with our existing knowledge
shown in Table 3.1. It is therefore not surprising that adding non-cognitive and social scores or not barely
changes the decomposition results.
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based on previous cohorts of Americans. For example, using the data of the NLSY–79,
Neal and Johnson (1996) show that AFQT score (in a quadratic function) alone accounts
for about 60% of the wage gap between Black and white men, while schooling alone ac-
counts for about 20%. My finding provides the first evidence for the Millennial cohort
on the central role of cognitive skills in understanding the racial labor market gaps. It
also highlights the necessity of including some appropriately constructed measure of cog-
nitive skills when studying racial gaps, which is seldom available in “big data,” such as tax
records.41
This importance of incorporating a measure of cognitive skills leads to my second key
finding in Table 2.3, which examines how the explanatory power of childhood neighbor-
hood changes before and after accounting for racial differences in individual skill and fam-
ily background that persist within neighborhoods. As discussed earlier, CHJP (2018) stud-
ies a cohort close in age to the NLSY–97 using tax records, but a significant limitation of
their data is that they do not contain a direct measure of cognitive skills (such as the AFQT
score).42
A vast body of evidence has shown that there is persistent residential segregation by
race in the U.S., which has further limited the labor market prospects of Black Americans
(e.g. Kain, 1968; Massey and Denton, 1993; Cutler and Glaeser, 1997; Charles, 2003). An
important question about CHJP’s finding is to what extent the documented neighborhood
effects in their data reflect the residential sorting of Black and white families into different
neighborhoods, a point raised by (Heckman, 2018).43 The inclusion of rich individual and
41A potentially promising future research direction is to link tax records with survey datasets that have skill
measures, such as the AFQT score in the NLSY–97 and the high school test scores in the National Education
Longitudinal Study.
42Although the authors have education attainment in their data by linking tax records to the American
Community Survey, my finding in Table 2.4 shows that it is really racial differences in measured cognitive
skills, not differences in formal schooling, that have primary explanatory power.
43Since its release, the CHJP study has received tremendous attention from the press (e.g., New York Times
2018; Washington Post 2018) and has inspired constructive discussions among social scientists. Heckman
(2018) raises a series of comments regarding both the findings of CHJP and what future research needs to
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family variables (especially the skill measures) in the NLSY–97 dataset allows me to shed
light on this question within the framework of the DFL decomposition.
In the top panel of Table 2.3, the contribution of childhood neighborhood is estimated
unconditionally, as it is the first component in the ordering. In this case, my measures of
childhood neighborhood characteristics explain 9% of the mean racial employment gap and
19% of the mean racial earnings gap. As I move childhood neighborhood down in the se-
quential ordering and estimate its contribution either conditional on family background
(middle panel), or conditional on both family background and individual skill (bottom
panel), the explanatory power of neighborhood to the racial labor market gaps diminishes
substantially to small or zero. For the racial earnings gap, when conditional on family
background, the contribution of neighborhood goes down from 19% to 11%. When further
conditional on individual skill, the contribution of neighborhood further reduces to 7%.
For the racial employment gap, when conditional on family background, the contribution
of neighborhood goes down from 9% to –9%. The negative contribution of neighborhood
means that holding family background the same between Black and white men overcom-
pensates for Black disadvantage in childhood neighborhood characteristics. This finding
is not totally surprising given that the unconditional contribution of neighborhoods to the
racial employment gap is already low.44
This finding suggests that the observed unconditional effect of neighborhoods (as shown
in the top panel), at least at the level that I can observe, can result from residential sorting
of families and individuals. In sharp contrast, the estimated contribution of skills is gen-
address. In particular, he stresses the importance of reconciling different studies in the literature, which my
findings help to do. See Heckman (2018) for more.
44The negative contribution of a specific factor in the DFL composition is not uncommon. For example,
when studying how the labor market outcomes will change from the NLSY–79 to the NLSY–97, Altonji,
Bharadwaj, and Lange (2012) find that the cross-cohort improvement in AFQT score has a negative contri-
bution after conditioning on cross-cohort changes in family background characteristics. This is because the
improvement in AFQT score is smaller than what would be predicted given the observed changes in family
background across cohorts. In other words, the cross-cohort changes in family background overcompensate
for the cross-cohort changes in AFQT score in their data.
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erally robust whether conditional on childhood neighborhood or not (and it is always con-
ditional on family background). Meanwhile, the estimated unconditional contribution of
family background, which is 39% of the racial employment gap and 26% of the racial earn-
ings gap, is also much greater than the estimated unconditional contribution of childhood
neighborhood (9% for employment and 19% for earnings).
It is also worth pointing out that my finding here does not contradict the causal estimates
of neighborhood effects in a series of recent studies (Chetty, Hendren, and Katz, 2016;
Chyn, 2018; Chetty and Hendren, 2018a) but shows that the overall explanatory power of
neighborhoods to the racial labor market gaps may be limited in this cohort. Basically,
the causal neighborhood effects in these studies are estimated by comparing disadvantaged
families (many of whom are Black families) who moved to “good” neighborhoods with
disadvantaged families who stayed in their original neighborhoods or by comparing disad-
vantaged families who moved when children were younger with those who moved when
children were older. This comparison, however, does not fully address the question of how
the outcomes of the disadvantaged families who moved compare to families who were al-
ready living in the “good” neighborhoods. If, after moving, the Black families still fall
substantially behind white families already there, it indicates that the neighborhood effects,
though causal and significant, can actually have a limited power in explaining the overall
racial income gaps, which is what my findings here suggest.
That said, my findings do not rule out the possibility that childhood neighborhood can
have a true effect in explaining racial gaps in labor market outcomes. However, my finding
of the diminishing explanatory power of measured childhood neighborhood characteristics
does suggest that if there is a true neighborhood effect, it is mainly functioning through the
channel of skill formation. As discussed previously, understanding where the racial skill
gap comes from requires a formal investigation of the skill formation process, and the roles
of families, schools, and neighborhoods in this process. This is beyond the scope of this
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chapter.
In addition to the explanatory power of “pre-market” characteristics, for Black and
white men in the NLSY–97, the difference in how they initiated their careers in the very
first year post-schooling explains explains 13% of the racial employment gap and 14% of
the racial earnings gap observed in the sixth to eighth years post-schooling. This contribu-
tion of the school-to-work transition is estimated conditional on racial differences in family
background, individual skill, and childhood neighborhood. As discussed earlier, interpret-
ing this result requires extra caution. Given the descriptive nature of my analysis, I do not
attempt to tell how much of this estimated contribution of the school-to-work transition
reflects the causal impact of one’s initial work experience.45
My school-to-work transition measure should be thought as an index that could po-
tentially capture three effects. First, it could capture racial differences in unobserved pre-
market factors, such as non-cognitive skills that are difficult (if not impossible) to measure
in nature and/or are measured with potentially nontrivial errors in the NLSY–97. Second, it
could also pick up the effect of unobservables that are reflected in racial differences in ini-
tial work experience. For example, labor market discrimination against Black men, which
I do not incorporate directly in my decomposition, could be the reason why Black men
had a harder time finding the first job. The estimated contribution of the school-to-work
transition thus captures the effect of labor market discrimination. Meanwhile, if Black men
are more likely to be arrested due to racial discrimination in the criminal justice system
(Council of Economic Advisors, 2016), and this lowers their chance to successfully initiate
a career, then some of the estimated contribution of transition can also reflect non-labor
45The fundamental challenge in estimating the causal impact of one’s initial work experience on later labor
market performance is to distinguish heterogeneity from state dependence (Heckman, 1981). My analysis
can be seen as an attempt to control for heterogeneity with observed characteristics in individual skill, family
background, and childhood neighborhood. In ongoing analysis, I am linking measures of local labor market
conditions (such as unemployment rates) at the time of school-exit to the NLSY geocode files. This will
allow me to purge more exogenous variations in young men’s initial work experiences.
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market discrimination.46 Third, my estimated contribution of transition could contain the
causal impact of initial work experience on later labor market outcomes.
Comparison to the Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition
After describing my main findings regarding racial labor market gaps at the mean, in
this section I compare my semi-parametric DFL decomposition results to the linear Oaxaca-
Blinder (hereafter OB) decomposition results. This comparison serves two purposes. First,
some well-cited studies on either the previous cohort (Neal and Johnson, 1996) or this
cohort (CHJP, 2018) are based on linear regressions, which are similar in principle to con-
ducting an OB decomposition. Replicating my analysis using the OB decomposition will
help better compare my findings to these studies. Second, by imposing stronger functional
forms, I will be able to gain power and obtain more precise estimates.47
In Table 2.5, the top three panels are replicates of the DFL decomposition results from
Table 2.3, and the bottom two panels are the OB decomposition results: one which includes
all four sets of factors and one which includes only childhood neighborhood. The OB de-
composition is based on linear regressions with all explanatory factors added together, and
is order independent. For this reason, in an OB decomposition, the estimated contribution
of neighborhood when it is estimated together with the other factors (second last panel) is
not the same as when it is estimated on its own (last panel).48
46Other examples of such unobservables include racial differences in labor market networks and exposure
to the Great Recession.
47Given the sample size of the NLSY–97, imposing more functional form restrictions to gain statistical
power may be a reasonable decision to make. Note that the OB decomposition focuses on the mean. In
my ongoing analysis, I am extending this exercise to racial gaps in general distributional statistics using the
re-centered influence function method proposed by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 2018.
48To draw a direct comparison to my DFL decomposition, I use the regression coefficients estimated among
white men for the OB decomposition. The key counterfactual estimated as in Table 2.5 for both the DFL and
OB decomposition is therefore, “On average, what labor market outcomes would white men in the NLSY–
97 have had if they had the same individual skill, family background, childhood neighborhood, and/or the
school-to-work transition as Black men while holding the employment or earnings function unchanged?” As
discussed in Section 3, due to the concern of overlapping support, I did not conduct the reverse decomposition
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Regarding the relative contributions of individual skill, family background, and child-
hood neighborhood to the overall racial labor market gaps at the mean, the OB decom-
position tells a qualitatively similar story. Racial differences in skills play a key role by
explaining 20% of the mean racial employment gap and 30% of the mean racial earnings
gap. Family background has a similar explanatory power as individual skill to the racial
employment gap, but in terms of explaining the racial earnings gap, individual skill is the
leading factor. When all four factors are added together in an OB decomposition (as the
second last panel in Table 2.5 shows), the contribution of neighborhood is estimated condi-
tional on racial differences in individual skill, family background, and the school-to-work
transition. In this case, childhood neighborhood explains 7% of the racial employment gap
and 9% of the racial earnings gap.
As a comparison, when added alone in an OB decomposition (as in the last panel),
childhood neighborhood accounts for 24% of the racial employment gap and 22% of the
racial earnings gap. Consistent with what we have seen in the DFL decomposition, uncon-
ditionally, childhood neighborhood explains a meaningful share of the racial labor market
gaps, but this explanatory power diminishes substantially when conditional on racial differ-
ences that persist within neighborhoods. It is worth pointing out that the analysis in CHJP
(2018) is mainly based on linear regressions, and it is therefore more comparable to an OB
decomposition. Interestingly, under the OB decomposition, the unconditional explanatory
power of my measures of neighborhood (which is 24% for employment and 22% for earn-
ings) is larger than what it is under the DFL decomposition (which is 9% for employment
and 19% for earnings). This shows that my choice of neighborhood measures can achieve
an explanatory power in the NLSY–97 that is close to what census tract fixed effects can
achieve in CHJP’s sample.49
by assigning the characteristics of white men to Black men.
49Census tract fixed effects on its own explain about 31% of the observed racial income gap in the data of
CHJP (2018).
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Although the results are qualitatively similar between the DFL and the OB decomposi-
tions, there are quantitative differences that are worth discussing. The main difference is
that in the OB decomposition, the estimated contribution of the school-to-work transition is
larger than in the DFL decomposition. The school-to-work transition explains 32% of the
racial employment gap and 22% of the racial earnings gap in the OB decomposition, while
the shares explained by the school-to-work transition are 13% and 14%, respectively, in
the DFL decomposition. At the same time, the shares explained by individual skill, family
background, and childhood background are generally lower in the OB decomposition than
in the DFL decomposition. This is partly because in the DFL decomposition, the effects
of individual skill, family background, and childhood neighborhood are always estimated
unconditional on the school-to-work transition (because transition is always the last com-
ponent in the sequential ordering), while in the OB decomposition the effects are estimated
conditional on the school-to-work transition.
Robustness Checks
Last in this section, I present two robustness checks on my main results in Table 2.3.
Considering my key finding of the central role of cognitive skills, the first robustness check
tests whether my finding is robust to the use of alternative measures of cognitive skills.
Considering my choice of sample construction and the examination of the early career pe-
riod, the second robustness check tests whether my finding is robust to alternative samples
and alternative periods of analysis.
Table 2.6 presents the results of my first main robustness check, where I consider two
alternative measures of cognitive skills. Recall that in my main analysis, I measure cog-
nitive skills with dummy variables for the deciles of the AFQT score constructed by the
NLS. The first alternative measure is a linear AFQT score percentile (which ranges from 1
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to 100) constructed by the NLS. Unlike the decile dummies, this measure does not allow
for the potential non-linear relationship between AFQT score and labor market outcomes.
The second alternative measure is the AFQT score constructed by Altonji, Bharadwaj, and
Lange (2012). As mentioned in Section 4, this measure is built on more assumptions. But
its main advantage is that it is cardinal and potentially contains more information on racial
skill differences than the ordinal measure constructed by the NLS. For example, in the sam-
ple of the NLSY–97, the AFQT score distribution is left-skewed. This means that the actual
skill difference between the 1st and 9th percentile of the AFQT score distribution could be
larger than the actual skill difference between the 91st and the 99th percentile.
The first panel in Table 2.6 replicates my main result, the middle panel presents the
result using the linear AFQT percentile constructed by the NLS, and the bottom panel
presents the result using the AFQT score constructed by Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange
(2012). Looking across panels, the estimated contribution of individual skill is highly sta-
ble. When using the linear AFQT percentile, the estimated contribution is slightly lower,
which is likely because it imposes a more restrictive functional form than the decile dum-
mies. When using the AFQT score constructed by Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange (2012),
the estimated contribution of skills is even higher. When conditional only on family back-
ground, it accounts for 47% of the racial employment gap and 51% of the racial earnings
gap. As discussed above, one possible reason is that Altonji et al.’s score captures more
information on racial skill gaps that are not contained in the NLS’s measure. As a result of
the increased explanatory power of individual skill, the explanatory power of the school-
to-work transition goes slightly down (as it is estimated conditional on individual skill).
Table 2.7 presents my second main robustness check. Specifically, I first present de-
composition results using labor market outcomes summarized over the second to eighth
years post-schooling. In my analysis in Table 2.3, I focus on labor market outcomes sum-
marized over the sixth to eighth years, when the employment and earnings trajectories in
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the NLSY–97 had mostly stabilized. Looking at the second to eighth years can help us
understand the explanatory power of different factors to the racial gaps observed through
full early career trajectories.
The middle panel of Table 2.7 shows the result for this alternative outcome, and as a
comparison, the top panel replicates the main result from Table 2.3.50 The first noticeable
difference between the two panels is that when looking at racial gaps through the full tra-
jectories (i.e., the second to eighth years), the overall explanatory power of the four factors
is lower, especially for the racial earnings gap. Recall from Figures 2.2–2.4 that one’s labor
market status fluctuates and experiences growth in the very first few years beyond school-
ing completion. It is therefore possible that compared to the more stable later stage (i.e., the
sixth to eighth years), the full early career trajectories are influenced by more unobserved
factors that were not included in my measures of individual skill, family background, child-
hood neighborhood, and the school-to-work transition.
Although the overall explanatory power of the four observed factors decreases, the
primary role of individual skill still holds as previously shown. Across different orderings,
racial differences in skills explain up to 38% of the racial employment gap and up to 39%
of the racial earnings gap. Unconditionally, childhood neighborhood explains 15%–18%
of the racial labor market gaps, but when conditional on family background and individual
skill, its explanatory power substantially reduces to small or zero, which is also consistent
with my main findings in Table 2.3.
In the bottom panel of Table 2.7, I present decomposition results using an unbalanced
sample of Black and white men in the NLSY–97 who completed schooling at least two
years previously, and I summarize labor market outcomes over the second to eighth years.
50Compared to labor market outcomes averaged over the sixth to eighth years, the racial employment gap
averaged over the second to eighth years is larger (7.55 weeks per year versus 6.47 weeks per year), and
the racial earnings gap is smaller (1.18 log points versus 1.45 log points). This is because throughout the
early career years, Black men caught up relative to white men in the number of weeks worked but fell further
behind in earnings.
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As a comparison, my main analysis uses a balanced sample of young men who completed
schooling at least eight years previously. This alternative sample is unbalanced because
part of the sample has not reached the eighth year post-schooling, and when averaging em-
ployment or earnings over the second to eighth years, it is averaged over different numbers
of years for different people.51 Despite this drawback, there are two possible advantages of
using this unbalanced sample. The first advantage is its larger sample size: the unbalanced
sample includes 1,210 white men and 534 Black men, and the balanced sample (which
I use for the main analysis) includes 796 white men and 367 Black men. Relatedly, the
second advantage is that the unbalanced sample might be less subject to potential sample
selection issues.
Here I compare the bottom panel with the middle panel of Table 2.7, as both panels
focus on labor market outcomes averaged over the second to eighth years. The results
using the unbalanced sample are generally consistent with the results using the balanced
panel. Racial skill differences still play an important role in explaining racial labor market
gaps, and the estimated contribution of childhood neighborhood still reduces to zero when
conditional on family background and individual skill. The only meaningful difference is
that family background turns out to have the largest explanatory power in magnitude. But
it is important to keep in mind that the contribution of individual skill is always estimated
conditional on family background. Given this, when individual skill is estimated only
conditional on family background (and not on childhood neighborhood), its explanatory
power (33% for employment and 35% for earnings) is smaller than, but close to, that of
family background (45% for employment and 39% for earnings).
In results not presented here, I also conduct robustness checks regarding the choice of
family background variables, the choice of measures of schooling, different ways to cap
51For example, some people in this unbalanced sample have only one year of observation, and some have
eight years of observations. The pattern of how observations are distributed across early career years is similar
between Black and white men.
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the propensity score weights, and the use of earnings measures with imputation for missing
values. In general, the main findings from Table 2.3 are stable across these variations.
2.5.2 Decomposing Racial Gaps across the Distribution
So far I have focused on understanding racial employment and earnings gaps at the
mean. The average racial gap is an important and informative statistic, but in practice, pub-
lic policies are sometimes tailored to serve more specific groups, such as the low-income
population. In this section, I go beyond the mean and explore the contribution of individ-
ual skill, family background, childhood neighborhood, and the school-to-work transition to
the racial gap observed across the employment or earnings distribution. This is facilitated
by the DFL method, which estimates the whole counterfactual distribution of labor market
outcomes in a semi-parametric manner. However, it is important to keep in mind through-
out this section that the sample size of the NLSY–97, to some extent, limits my ability to
examine racial gaps across the employment or earnings distribution in a precise way.
I start by visually presenting the actual and counterfactual distributions for Black and
white men in the NLSY–97. Figure 2.5 plots the employment distributions, and Figure
2.6 plots the earnings distributions. In each panel of the two figures, I present two actual
distributions (solid line for white men and long-dashed line for Black men) and a counter-
factual distribution (short-dashed line). The counterfactual distribution in the upper panel
of each figure is for white men if they had the same childhood neighborhood characteris-
tics as Black men. The counterfactual distribution in the bottom panel of each figure is for
white men if they had the same full set of individual skill, family background, childhood
neighborhood, and the school-to-work transition as Black men.52 The vertical lines repre-
52For the simplicity of display, I do not plot other possible counterfactuals, such as the counterfactual
distribution for white men if they had the same childhood neighborhood and family background as Black
men.
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sent the 25th percentile of the employment distributions for white men (solid line) and for
Black men (long-dashed line).
Comparing the actual distributions of average weeks worked between Black (long-
dashed line) and white men (solid line) in Figure 2.5 shows clearly that the racial employ-
ment gap is largely driven by fewer Black men working for close to full-year employment
(50 or more weeks a year). As previously shown in Table 2.1, in the sixth to eighth years
post-schooling, 60% of white men in my sample worked for at least 50 weeks per year,
while only 38% of Black men did so.53
In the upper panel of Figure 2.5, when moving from the actual earnings distribution
for white men to the counterfactual distribution when white men had the same childhood
neighborhood as Black men (short-dashed line), the distribution shifts to the left but to a
very limited degree. This suggests that only a small share of the large gap between Black
and white employment distributions can be attributed to childhood neighborhood. The
racial gap between the 25th percentile of the white employment distribution (solid vertical
line) and the 25th percentile of the Black employment distribution (long-dashed vertical
line) is about 15 weeks per year. If childhood neighborhood on its own explains a large
share of this gap, we should expect the counterfactual (short-dashed vertical line) to be
much lower than the actual 25th percentile of the white distribution (solid vertical line) and
closer to that of the Black distribution (long-dashed vertical line). Figure 2.5 shows the
opposite: the counterfactual is only slightly shifted to the left of the actual 25th percentile
of the white distribution. Note that what I present visually here is consistent with the top
panel in Table 2.3, where I focus on the mean.
The starkest comparison in Figure 2.5 is between the two counterfactual employment
53As 90% of white men and 78% of Black men worked for at least 26 weeks per year over the sixth to
eighth years post-schooling, for the convenience of display, I only show the upper part of the employment
distribution (26 weeks or more). The DFL decomposition is still conducted over the whole employment
distribution.
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distributions. Although holding childhood neighborhood the same between Black and
white men only slightly narrows the racial gaps across the employment distribution, further
incorporating family background, individual skill, and the school-to-work transition pushes
the counterfactual employment distribution for white men (short-dashed line) leftward to
a marked extent. In particular, there is no longer a dominating share of white men (com-
pared to Black men) concentrated close to full-year employment. When focusing on the
racial gap at the 25th percentile, it is clearly shown that accounting for racial differences in
all four factors shifts the counterfactual (short-dashed vertical line) a long way toward the
actual 25th percentile of the Black distribution (long-dashed vertical line). This relatively
limited explanatory power of childhood neighborhood and the large overall explanatory
power when incorporating family- and individual-level factors again are consistent with
what was previously shown for the mean racial gap.
A similar visual pattern holds in Figure 2.6, where I plot the actual and counterfactual
distributions for average earnings over the sixth to eighth years post-schooling.54 In the
upper panel, accounting for racial differences in childhood neighborhood shifts the coun-
terfactual white earnings distribution (short-dashed line) only slightly. In the lower panel,
where I further account for racial differences in family background, individual skill, and
the school-to-work transition, the counterfactual white earnings distribution is substantially
closer to the actual Black employment distribution (long-dashed line). This is consistent
with what Table 2.3 indicates for racial earnings gap at the mean.
The visual presentation in Figures 2.5–2.6 intuitively shows the overall explanatory
power of family background, individual skill, and the school-to-work transition over child-
hood neighborhood on the racial gaps across the employment and earnings distribution.
54There is a mass of zeroes at the left end of the earnings distribution for both Black and white men (and
the mass is larger for Black men). As there are almost no observations for a wide range of values above
zeroes, for the convenience of display, I only show the upper part of the earnings distribution (log earnings
above eight). The DFL decomposition is still conducted over the whole earnings distribution.
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The next step is to explore in more detail what each of these factors has contributed at
different parts of the distribution. Tables 2.8–2.9 summarize the detailed decomposition
results for employment and earnings, respectively. As mentioned above, considering my
sample size, from here on I focus my attention on racial gaps at the 25th percentile, the
median, and the 75th percentile of the distribution. Since the racial employment gap is
zero at the 75th percentile (as more than a quarter of both Black and white men on average
worked for a full year over the sixth to eighth years post-schooling), I do not including the
decomposition result for this particular outcome.
The first thing to note is that, for both employment (Table 2.8) and earnings (Table 2.9),
the racial gap at the 25th percentile is significantly larger than racial gaps at the median or
the 75th percentile. For example, young men at the 25th percentile of the Black employ-
ment distribution worked 15 fewer weeks per year than young men at the 25th percentile
of the white employment distribution. The gap is about 6 weeks per year at the median. A
similar pattern is observed for the racial earnings gaps.
I first focus on employment in Table 2.8. Two key findings previously observed at the
mean (as in Table 2.3) are consistently observed for at the 25th percentile. First, individual
skill plays a central role by explaining up to 52% of the racial employment gap. Second,
the estimated contribution of childhood neighborhood is zero when conditional on family
background and individual skill. Similarly to what I have previously shown at the mean,
the negative contribution of childhood neighborhood (as long as it is estimated conditional
on family background) is because holding family background the same between Black and
white men overcompensates for racial differences in childhood neighborhood. In addi-
tion, observed racial differences in the four factors together account for 82% of the racial
employment gap. A distinctive result at the 25th percentile is that the school-to-work tran-
sition now has a greater explanatory power. Conditional on the three pre-market factors, the
school-to-work transition explains 25% of the racial employment gap at the 25th percentile,
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as compared to 13% at the mean (Table 2.3).
As noted above, the racial employment gap at the median is much smaller than the gap
at the 25th percentile. Table 2.8 shows that the observed factors’ overall explanatory power
to the gap at the median is also substantially lower. The four factors together account for
about 40% of the gap, much of which is attributable to the contribution of the school-to-
work transition. Notably, when only conditional on family background, individual skill
explains 28% of the racial employment gap, which is much larger than the explanatory
power of family background or childhood neighborhood. Comparing between the decom-
position results at the 25th percentile and the median of the employment distribution, it
appears that both individual skill and family background are making a greater contribution
to racial gap at the lower part of the employment distribution.
I then turn to earnings. Table 2.9 presents the decomposition results for the racial earn-
ings gap at the 25th percentile, the median, and the 75th percentile. The two key findings
at the mean are again consistently observed at different parts of the earnings distribution.
First, individual skill turns out to be the primary contributor, and it explains up to 29% of
the racial gap at the 25th percentile and up to 38% of the racial gap at the 75th percentile.
Second, although childhood neighborhood shows a meaningful explanatory power uncon-
ditionally, its explanatory power diminishes to zero when conditional on family background
and individual skill.
When comparing the contribution of a specific factor across different parts of the earn-
ings distribution, it appears that both family background and individual skill are making a
balanced contribution to racial gaps at the lower and upper part of the earnings distribution.
In contrast, the school-to-work transition shows a substantially larger explanatory power to
the racial gap at the lower part of the earnings distribution. At the 25th percentile, 31% of
the racial earnings gap can be attributed to the school-to-work transition. At the median,
20% of the gap can be attributed to the school-to-work transition. At the 75th percentile,
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the explanatory power of transition is even smaller. What does this quantitatively large
role of transition for more disadvantaged young men imply? It suggests that helping dis-
advantaged Black men to get a foothold in the labor market, which might be facilitated
through innovative training programs, is a potentially important pathway to reduce racial
labor market gaps at later career stages.55
To summarize, my key findings from Table 2.3, the central role of skills and the small or
zero contribution of neighborhoods once conditional on family background and individual
skill, are similarly observed when I conduct the decomposition across the employment and
earnings distribution. In addition to what Table 2.3 shows for the mean, individual skill and
family background appear to have a greater explanatory power to racial gap at the lower
part of the employment distribution, and the school-to-work transition appears to have a
greater explanatory power to racial gap at the lower part of the earnings distribution.
2.6 Conclusion
Millennials are playing an increasingly important role in various aspects of economic,
social, and political life in the United States, but our knowledge to date of this cohort is
still limited. In this chapter, I analyze the early careers of this cohort of young men, with a
special focus on the racial gaps between Black and white men. I show a substantial racial
gap in employment and earnings that largely persists through the first eight years beyond
schooling completion. The data I use, the NLSY–97 and its restricted geocode file, allows
me to conduct a coherent decomposition analysis to explore how individual-, family-, and
neighborhood-level factors have contributed to the racial labor market gaps.
55Although the effect of traditional government training programs has been shown to be modest on average
and limited among youths (see a review by Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins, 1997), there are recent
examples of job training programs designed and led by non-government organizations that show encouraging
results for helping disadvantaged youths initiate a career. One example is Year Up, which involves potential
employers in the training program (Fein and Hamadyk, 2018).
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My key finding is that racial skill differences play a central role in explaining the racial
gaps in employment and earnings observed in the early careers of Millennial men. This
is primarily driven by racial differences in measured cognitive skills rather than by dif-
ferences in formal schooling. Additionally, I find that conditional on racial differences in
family background and individual skill, the explanatory power of my measures of child-
hood neighborhood characteristics is small or zero. I also show that the observed racial
differences in the factors that I control for explain the vast majority of the racial employ-
ment and earnings gaps in the NLSY–97. Given the descriptive nature of my findings,
one must be cautious in drawing immediate policy implications. However, combining my
findings with existing studies suggests lessons that may help guide future polices.
Despite the dramatic changes in both the characteristics of young men and the overall
structure of the U.S. labor market, cognitive skills turn out to be the key driver of racial la-
bor market gaps among Millennial men, as in previous cohorts. This suggests that although
market demand for skills might have evolved over the past few decades, cognitive skills are
still rewarded in today’s labor market, and are particular drivers of racial gaps.56
Meanwhile, while the average skill level among young Americans has gone up across
cohorts (Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange, 2012), evidence shows that racial skill gaps, by
various measures, have either stayed stagnant or grown larger from 1980s to early 2000s
(Neal, 2006). The stagnant or growing racial skill gaps, together with my finding of the
importance of skills in explaining the racial labor market gaps among this cohort of men,
strongly suggest that attention needs to be paid to understanding the skill accumulation
process and more importantly, Black disadvantage in this process. Specifically, potentially
effective pathways to reduce racial labor market gaps include public programs that foster
56Recent studies have documented declines in the returns to cognitive skills across cohorts (Castex and
Dechter, 2014; Deming, 2017). Hellerstein, Luo, and Urzúa (2019) show that this finding is dependent on
how the distribution of cognitive skills has changed across cohorts. Once holding the skill distribution fixed
at the level of the previous cohort, the estimated returns to cognitive skills do not go down.
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skill accumulation among Black men. For example, existing evidence based on previous
cohorts suggests that family investments in young children have especially high returns
(Cunha et al., 2006). Identifying the mechanisms behind the racial skill differences among
Millennials will be important for designing policies for this cohort and beyond.
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1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
The 8th Year
White men Black men
Notes: The upper panel specifies what the corresponding calendar years are for the
first year post-schooling. The lower panel specifies the corresponding calendar years
for the eighth year post-schooling. The sample is a balanced panel of young men who
have completed schooling for eight years. Sample weights are used.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Post-Schooling Year
Weeks Worked
Black men White men
Notes: The left panel shows any employment in a year, and the right panel shows
the number of weeks worked in a year. Any employment is defined as working
for at least one week.
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Post-Schooling Year






1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Post-Schooling Year
Worked for 50+ Weeks
Black men White men
Notes: The left panel shows employment for at least 26 weeks in a year (i.e., half
year), and the right panel shows employment for at least 50 weeks in a year (i.e.,
full year).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Post-Schooling Year
Log Earnings
Black men White men
Notes: The left panel shows annual earnings, and the right panel shows the inverse
hyperbolic sine of annual earnings, which I label as “log earnings” for simplicity.
Earnings are adjusted to 2013 dollars.
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25 30 35 40 45 50
Counterfactual with All Black Observables
Black White, NBHD = Black White
Notes: The solid line represents the employment (average weeks worked per year) distribution for white
men, and the long-dashed line represents the employment distribution for Black men. The short-dashed
line represents the counterfactual employment distribution for white men if they had the same charac-
teristics as Black men. The upper panel shows the counterfactual with Black childhood neighborhood,
and the lower panel shows the counterfactual with Black observables in all four sets of factors. The ver-
tical lines are the corresponding 25th percentile of the actual and counterfactual distributions. For the
convenience of display, I only show the upper part of the employment distribution. The decomposition
is still conducted over the whole employment distribution.
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8 9 10 11 12 13
Counterfactual with All Black Observables
Black White, NBHD = Black White
Notes: The solid line represents the earnings distribution for white men, and the long-dashed line
represents the earnings distribution for Black men. The short-dashed line represents the counterfactual
earnings distribution for white men if they had the same characteristics as Black men. The upper panel
shows the counterfactual with Black childhood neighborhood, and the lower panel shows the counter-
factual with Black observables in all four sets of factors. The vertical lines are the corresponding 25th
percentile of the actual and counterfactual distributions. For the convenience of display, I only include
log earnings above eight in this figure. The decomposition is still conducted over the whole distribution.
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Table 2.1: Early Career Experiences of Black and White Men in the NLSY–97
White Black White-Black Gap p-value
Initial Stage (the 1st Year)
Weeks before the first job 10.53 31.83 –21.29 0.00
Any employment 0.96 0.85 0.10 0.00
Worked for ≥ 26 weeks 0.85 0.65 0.19 0.00
Worked for ≥ 50 weeks 0.48 0.34 0.14 0.00
Weeks worked 41.41 32.30 9.11 0.00
Log annual earnings (excl. zeroes) 10.40 9.94 0.46 0.00
Log annual earnings 9.43 7.28 2.15 0.00
Annual earnings (excl. zeroes) 23,305 18,786 4,520 0.02
Annual earnings 21,142 13,752 7,391 0.00
Later Stage (Averaging the 6th–8th Years)
Weeks worked per year 44.18 37.72 6.47 0.00
Worked for ≥ 26 weeks per year 0.90 0.78 0.12 0.00
Worked for ≥ 50 weeks year 0.60 0.38 0.21 0.00
Log average annual earnings (excl. zeroes) 11.19 10.67 0.52 0.00
Log average annual earnings 10.57 9.12 1.45 0.00
Average annual earnings (excl. zeroes) 45,108 32,643 12,466 0.00
Average annual earnings 41,664 27,068 14,597 0.00
Summarizing the Early Career (the 1st–8th Years)
Number of non-employment (NE) spells 1.74 2.67 –0.93 0.00
Average duration of NE spells (months) 6.61 10.05 –3.45 0.00
Cumulative weeks worked 346.84 285.11 61.73 0.00
Log average annual earnings (excl. zeroes) 10.99 10.44 0.56 0.00
Log average annual earnings 10.74 9.57 1.17 0.00
Average annual earnings (excl. zeroes) 36,827 24,484 12,343 0.00
Average annual earnings 34,548 20,566 13,982 0.00
1 The sample is a balanced panel of 796 white men and 367 Black men who have completed schooling
for at least eight years. Sample weights are used.
2 Earnings are adjusted to 2013 dollars. Inverse hyperbolic sine is used to include zero values.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Characteristics of Black and White Men in the NLSY–97
White Black White-Black Gap P-value
Individual Skill
Highest grade completed 13.17 12.08 1.09 0.00
AFQT percentile (NLS) 52.88 26.19 26.69 0.00
AFQT score (Altonji et al. 2012) 169.85 139.72 30.13 0.00
Non-cognitive score –0.12 –0.06 –0.06 0.46
Social score –0.03 –0.23 0.20 0.01
Family Background
Log parental income at ages 12–16 11.04 9.07 1.96 0.00
Mother’s highest grade completed 13.07 12.54 0.53 0.00
Living with both parents at age 14 0.63 0.32 0.31 0.00
Mother is not a teenage mom 0.86 0.74 0.12 0.00
Mother’s parenting style
Strict, supportive 0.41 0.55 –0.14 0.00
Strict, not supportive 0.09 0.10 –0.01 0.60
Supportive, not strict 0.40 0.29 0.11 0.01
1 The sample is a balanced panel that includes 796 white men and 367 Black men who
have completed formal schooling for at least eight years. Sample weights are used.
MSA stands for metropolitan statistical area.
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(Continued) Descriptive Characteristics of Black and White Men in the NLSY–97
White Black White-Black Gap P-value
Childhood Neighborhood
Living in house or apartment owned by family 0.75 0.41 0.34 0.00
Residence type
MSA, central city 0.20 0.36 –0.16 0.00
MSA, non-central city, urban area 0.34 0.23 0.11 0.00
MSA, non-central city, rural area 0.21 0.19 0.01 0.68
Non-MSA, rural area 0.17 0.13 0.04 0.24
Neighborhood Quality (Chetty and Hendren 2018b)
County quality for low-income families 0.07 –0.29 0.36 0.00
County quality for high-income families 0.05 –0.05 0.09 0.00
Commuting zone quality for low-income families 0.06 –0.27 0.33 0.00
Commuting zone quality for high-income families 0.02 –0.10 0.11 0.00
County Socioeconomic Conditions
Log population 12.20 12.43 –0.23 0.06
Log median household income 10.97 10.89 0.08 0.00
Poverty rate 0.11 0.15 –0.04 0.00
Male college rate 0.24 0.23 0.01 0.19
State Socioeconomic Conditions
Log population 15.80 15.78 0.02 0.74
Log median household income 10.98 10.95 0.04 0.00
Poverty rate 0.12 0.13 –0.01 0.00
Male college rate 0.26 0.25 0.01 0.00
1 The sample is a balanced panel that includes 796 white men and 367 Black men who have completed
formal schooling for at least eight years. Sample weights are used. MSA stands for metropolitan
statistical area.
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Table 2.3: Contribution of Individual, Family, and Neighborhood Factors
Racial Gap Share Explained by Residuals
DFL Ordering NBHD Family Skill Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 9% 21% 36% 13% 21%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 19% 18% 42% 14% 7%
DFL Ordering Family NBHD Skill Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 39% –9% 36% 13% 21%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 26% 11% 42% 14% 7%
DFL Ordering Family Skill NBHD Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 39% 43% –16% 13% 21%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 26% 46% 7% 14% 7%
1 NBHD stands for neighborhood; DFL stands for the DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux method. The three
panels use different orderings of family background, individual skill, childhood neighborhood,
and the school-to-work transition.
2 The number of weeks worked per year is averaged over the sixth to eighth years. The annual
earnings are averaged over the sixth to eighth years and are in the inverse hyperbolic sine. The
sample includes 796 white men and 367 Black men who have completed formal schooling for at
least eight years. Sample weights are used.
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Table 2.4: Explanatory Power of Schooling and Cognitive Skills
Racial Gap Share Explained by Residuals
Full Skill Set NBHD Family Skill Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 9% 21% 36% 13% 21%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 19% 18% 42% 14% 7%
Family NBHD Skill Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 39% –9% 36% 13% 21%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 26% 11% 42% 14% 7%
Family Skill NBHD Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 39% 43% –16% 13% 21%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 26% 46% 7% 14% 7%
Only Formal Schooling NBHD Family Skill Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 9% 21% 3% 13% 54%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 19% 18% 4% 12% 47%
Family NBHD Skill Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 39% –9% 3% 13% 54%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 26% 11% 4% 12% 47%
Family Skill NBHD Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 39% 5% –11% 13% 54%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 26% 4% 10% 12% 47%
Only Measured Cognitive Skills NBHD Family Skill Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 9% 21% 31% 8% 30%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 19% 18% 36% 10% 17%
Family NBHD Skill Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 39% –9% 31% 8% 30%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 26% 11% 36% 10% 17%
Family Skill NBHD Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 39% 41% –18% 8% 30%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 26% 40% 7% 10% 17%
1 NBHD stands for neighborhood. The top panel uses the full skill set, which includes highest grade
completed, cognitive (AFQT) score in decile dummies, and non-cognitive and social scores. The
middle panel includes only schooling (highest grade completed) in the skill set. The bottom panel
includes only cognitive (AFQT) scores in decile dummies in the skill set. The sample includes 796
white men and 367 Black men and is consistent across panels. Sample weights are used.
2 The number of weeks worked per year is averaged over the sixth to eighth years. The annual
earnings are averaged over the sixth to eighth years and are in the inverse hyperbolic sine.
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Table 2.5: Comparison of DFL and Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition
Racial Gap Share Explained by Residuals
DFL Ordering NBHD Family Skill Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 9% 21% 36% 13% 21%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 19% 18% 42% 14% 7%
DFL Ordering Family NBHD Skill Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 39% –9% 36% 13% 21%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 26% 11% 42% 14% 7%
DFL Ordering Family Skill NBHD Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 39% 43% –16% 13% 21%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 26% 46% 7% 14% 7%
Oaxaca-Blinder NBHD Family Skill Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 7% 22% 20% 32% 19%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 9% 17% 30% 22% 22%
Oaxaca-Blinder NBHD
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 24% 76%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 22% 78%
1 NBHD stands for neighborhood; DFL stands for the DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux method. The top
three panels are replicated from Table 2.3. The bottom two panels are results from classical OB
decomposition, one with all four factors and one with only childhood neighborhood.
2 The number of weeks worked per year is averaged over the sixth to eighth years. The annual
earnings are averaged over the sixth to eighth years and are in the inverse hyperbolic sine.
3 The sample includes 796 white men and 367 Black men who have completed formal schooling
for at least eight years. Sample weights are used.
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Table 2.6: Robustness of Different Measures of Cognitive Skills
Racial Gap Share Explained by Residuals
AFQT decile dummies (NLS) NBHD Family Skill Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 9% 21% 36% 13% 21%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 19% 18% 42% 14% 7%
Family NBHD Skill Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 39% –9% 36% 13% 21%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 26% 11% 42% 14% 7%
Family Skill NBHD Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 39% 43% –16% 13% 21%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 26% 46% 7% 14% 7%
AFQT percentile (NLS) NBHD Family Skill Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 9% 21% 34% 16% 20%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 19% 18% 37% 16% 10%
Family NBHD Skill Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 39% –9% 34% 16% 20%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 26% 11% 37% 16% 10%
Family Skill NBHD Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 39% 42% –17% 16% 20%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 26% 42% 6% 16% 10%
AFQT score (Altonji et al. 2012) NBHD Family Skill Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 9% 21% 42% 11% 16%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 19% 18% 47% 11% 5%
Family NBHD Skill Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 39% –9% 42% 11% 16%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 26% 11% 47% 11% 5%
Family Skill NBHD Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 39% 47% –13% 11% 16%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 26% 51% 7% 11% 5%
1 NBHD stands for neighborhood. The top panel uses dummies for AFQT deciles constructed
by the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) team. The middle panel uses the (linear) AFQT
percentile constructed by the NLS. The bottom panel uses the AFQT score constructed by
Altonji et al. (2012). The sample includes 796 white men and 367 Black men. Sample
weights are used.
2 The number of weeks worked per year is averaged over the sixth to eighth years. The annual
earnings are averaged over the sixth to eighth years and are in the inverse hyperbolic sine.
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Table 2.7: Robustness of Different Outcomes and Different Samples
Racial Gap Share Explained by Residuals
Balanced Sample: 6th–8th Years NBHD Family Skill Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 9% 21% 36% 13% 21%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 19% 18% 42% 14% 7%
Family NBHD Skill Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 39% –9% 36% 13% 21%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 26% 11% 42% 14% 7%
Family Skill NBHD Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.47 39% 43% –16% 13% 21%
Log avg annual earnings 1.45 26% 46% 7% 14% 7%
Balanced Sample: 2nd–8th Years NBHD Family Skill Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 7.55 15% 18% 21% 18% 27%
Log avg annual earnings 1.18 18% 13% 29% 8% 32%
Family NBHD Skill Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 7.55 32% 1% 21% 18% 27%
Log avg annual earnings 1.18 23% 8% 29% 8% 32%
Family Skill NBHD Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 7.55 32% 39% –17% 18% 27%
Log avg annual earnings 1.18 23% 38% –1% 8% 32%
Unbalanced Sample: 2nd–8th Years NBHD Family Skill Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.26 24% 22% 16% 17% 21%
Log avg annual earnings 1.02 23% 18% 20% 10% 29%
Family NBHD Skill Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.26 45% 1% 16% 17% 21%
Log avg annual earnings 1.02 39% 2% 20% 10% 29%
Family Skill NBHD Transition
Avg weeks worked per year 6.26 45% 33% –17% 17% 21%
Log avg annual earnings 1.02 39% 35% –13% 10% 29%
1 NBHD stands for neighborhood. The top panel uses the balanced sample and focuses on outcomes
averaged over the sixth to eighth years. The middle panel keeps the balanced sample but focuses
on outcomes averaged over the second to eighth years. The bottom panel uses the unbalanced
sample that includes men who have completed schooling for at least two years and focuses on
outcomes averaged over the second to eighth years.
2 The balanced sample includes 796 white men and 367 Black men. The unbalanced sample in-
cludes 1,210 white men and 534 Black men. Different sample weights are used for the two sam-
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Table 2.8: Contribution to Racial Gaps across the Employment Distribution
Racial Gap Share Explained by Residuals
DFL Ordering NBHD Family Skill Transition
25th percentile 14.67 7% 18% 32% 25% 18%
Median 6.00 0% 6% 6% 28% 61%
DFL Ordering Family NBHD Skill Transition
25th percentile 14.67 34% –9% 32% 25% 18%
Median 6.00 11% –6% 6% 28% 61%
DFL Ordering Family Skill NBHD Transition
25th percentile 14.67 34% 52% –30% 25% 18%
Median 6.00 11% 28% –28% 28% 61%
1 NBHD stands for neighborhood; DFL stands for the DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux
method. The three panels include all four sets of factors with different orderings.
The decomposition is conducted for racial employment gaps at the 25th percentile
and at the median. The sample includes 796 white men and 367 Black men who
have completed formal schooling for at least eight years. Sample weights are used.
2 The number of weeks worked per year is averaged over the sixth to eighth years.
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Table 2.9: Contribution to Racial Gaps across the Earnings Distribution
Racial Gap Share Explained by Residuals
DFL Ordering NBHD Family Skill Transition
25th percentile 1.29 15% 8% 18% 31% 28%
Median 0.67 9% 7% 14% 20% 51%
75th percentile 0.41 21% 10% 32% 0% 36%
DFL Ordering Family NBHD Skill Transition
25th percentile 1.29 23% 1% 18% 31% 28%
Median 0.67 20% –5% 14% 20% 51%
75th percentile 0.41 33% –2% 32% 0% 36%
DFL Ordering Family Skill NBHD Transition
25th percentile 1.29 23% 29% –10% 31% 28%
Median 0.67 20% 20% –11% 20% 51%
75th percentile 0.41 33% 38% –8% 0% 36%
1 NBHD stands for neighborhood; DFL stands for the DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux
method. The three panels include all four sets of factors with different orderings.
The decomposition is conducted for racial employment gaps at the 25th percentile,
the median, and the 75th percentile. The sample includes 796 white men and 367
Black men who have completed formal schooling for at least eight years. Sample
weights are used.
2 Annual earnings are averaged over the sixth to eighth years and are in the inverse
hyperbolic sine.
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Chapter 3: Have Early Career Racial Gaps Changed Across Two Cohorts
of American Men?
3.1 Introduction
The second chapter of my dissertation examines the observed racial labor market gaps
in the cohort of Millennials using the data of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1997 (NLSY–97). In this chapter, I extend the analysis and make a cross-cohort compari-
son of the racial labor market gaps observed in the early careers of Millennials and Baby
Boomers. In particular, I ask how the underlying forces behind racial labor market gaps
have changed across the two cohorts of young American men. This analysis is facilitated
by two similarly constructed NLSY datasets, the NLSY–79 and the NLSY–97, which are
nationally representative samples of young Americans born in 1957–1964 and 1980–1984,
respectively.1
I track the two cohorts of young men from early adulthood to their mid-30s and docu-
ment the racial gaps in their early career employment and earnings trajectories. The school-
ing and work history files are similarly constructed for the NLSY–79 and the NLSY–97
cohorts, facilitating a valid cross-cohort comparison. Methodologically, I follow the sec-
ond chapter and extend it to the NLSY–79 cohort. In my main analysis, I focus on racial
gaps in weeks worked per year and annual earnings observed over the sixth to eighth years
1Throughout this chapter, I refer to the NLSY–79 as the “older” cohort and the NLSY–97 as the “younger”
cohort.
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post-schooling, when the labor market outcomes of young men in the two cohorts reach
a relatively stable stage. Following the second chapter, I also examine what underlying
factors explain the documented racial labor market gaps in the two cohorts by applying the
semi-parametric decomposition method first introduced by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux
(1996).
In the decomposition, I mainly examine three pre-market factors that the literature em-
phasizes as important determinants of racial gaps in labor market outcomes: skills and
education, family background, and childhood neighborhood characteristics.2 Harnessing
the richness of the NLSY datasets and following the literature, I measure these factors in as
detailed a way as possible. To keep the decomposition results comparable between the two
cohorts, in my main analysis I follow Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange (2012) and include
only the individual, family, and neighborhood variables that are similarly constructed or
can be appropriately concorded.3 I also examine the role of the school-to-work transition,
conditioning on racial differences in these pre-market factors.
The first question of interest is how much of the observed racial employment and earn-
ings gaps can be explained by pre-market racial differences in education and skills, family
background, and childhood neighborhood, measured at as detailed a level as the data allow.
2Much of the literature on racial gaps in the U.S. labor market uses data of older cohorts of Americans,
such as the NLSY–79. This literature is enormous, and the discussed explanations range from pre-market
factors, such as skills and education (Neal and Johnson, 1996; Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzúa, 2006; Urzúa,
2008), family background (Thompson, 2018), and childhood neighborhood (Chetty et al., 2020) to the school-
to-work transition (Schwandt and Wachter, 2019) and discrimination (Donohue and Heckman, 1991; Pager,
2003; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Council of Economic Advisors, 2016).
3Some variables included in the decomposition analysis in the second chapter of this dissertation are not
available for the NLSY–79. The variables included in this chapter are therefore a subtest of the variables
included in the second chapter. In this chapter, the set of individual education and skills variables is the
same as the second chapter, including highest grade completed, AFQT score (as a measure of cognitive
skills), non-cognitive and social test scores. The set of family variables here includes family income, family
structure, and mother’s education, while the second chapter includes two extra variables: mother’s parenting
style, and whether mother is a teenage mom. The set of neighborhood variables here includes a series of
socioeconomic conditions of county and state of childhood residence, and whether an individual lives in
central cities, suburban areas, or rural areas. In some of my analysis, I also present the results when the extra
variables are included in the NLSY–97. I discuss variable definitions in details in the next section.
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In the NLSY–79 cohort, the decomposition shows that around 80% of the observed racial
gaps in employment and earnings can be explained by measured racial differences in these
three pre-market factors. In the NLSY–97 cohort, a smaller but still important share, about
50%, of the racial employment and earnings gaps can be explained by measured racial
differences in the three pre-market factors of the younger cohort. The Oaxaca-Blinder de-
compositions reveal a similar pattern.
Why is a greater share of the racial labor market gaps in the NLSY–97 cohort un-
explained than in the NLSY–79 cohort? The decomposition results imply that the early
career experiences of this younger cohort are more subject to the influences of unobserv-
able factors. I present suggestive explanations of what these unobservable factors might
be.4 First, some pre-market factors can be hard to measure, and the variables I use may
not be sufficiently detailed. Focusing solely on the NLSY–97 data, which includes a richer
set of variables measuring family background and childhood neighborhood, I show that ac-
counting for racial differences in additional family and neighborhood variables does further
explain some of the observed racial labor market gaps in the NLSY–97 cohort. In particular,
the unconditional explanatory power of measured childhood neighborhood characteristics
increases from 1%–9% to 10%–15% when I add more neighborhood variables that are only
available in the NLSY–97 data. This finding is qualitatively consistent with the empirical
findings of Chetty et al. (2020) and the second chapter of this dissertation.
Second, Black men in both NLSY cohorts initiated their careers with significantly
worse employment and earnings outcomes (in the first year post-schooling) compared
to their white counterparts, and past studies have shown that poor outcomes early in the
4One important unobservable factor, which I did not explore directly in this chapter, is racial discrimina-
tion against Black men in the labor market. There are indirect ways through which labor market discrimi-
nation affects my decomposition results. For example, due to discrimination, Black men may receive lower
labor market returns to the same skills they own. Any racial differences in labor market returns will be left in
unexplained residuals of the decomposition. I leave it for future research to formally investigate how racial
discrimination has evolved overtime in the U.S. labor market.
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school-to-work transition has a long-lasting impact on later labor market outcomes (Kahn,
2010; Schwandt and Wachter, 2019). Some of the unexplained racial labor market gaps
could be due to Black young men not having a successful school-to-work transition, and
the importance of a successful transition could be larger in the younger cohort. Condition-
ing on racial differences in the aforementioned pre-market characteristics, I further show
that in the NLSY–97 cohort, racial differences in the school-to-work transition, measured
as the number of weeks worked in the first year post-schooling, explain 10% of the racial
gaps in employment and earnings observed six to eight years post-schooling.5 In con-
trast, this conditional explanatory power of the school-to-work transition is not found in
the NLSY–79.
In addition to the overall explanatory power of pre-market characteristics, a second
question of interest is whether any specific factor is of particular importance in explaining
the observed racial labor market gaps. In their influential paper, Neal and Johnson (1996)
use the NLSY–79 data and show that simply controlling for racial gaps in cognitive skills,
as measured by the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score, eliminates 60% of
the racial wage gaps between Black and white men.6 This result has greatly shaped our
understanding to date of the central role of skills in explaining racial gaps in the U.S. labor
market. My DFL decomposition confirms this finding and shows that in the NLSY–79
cohort, racial differences in skills and education alone explain 60%–70% of the racial gaps
in employment and earnings observed in the sixth to eighth year post-schooling. I also
5When further including county unemployment rate (UR) in the year of labor market entry as an additional
measure of the school-to-work transition, the total explanatory power of transition reaches 16% of the racial
employment and earnings gaps. The data of county UR are available only for the NLSY–97 sample years.
6Urzúa (2008) takes a more structural approach and makes an important distinction between measured
cognitive skills (AFQT score) and underlying cognitive ability. The model in Urzúa (2008) specifies the
observed (AFQT) test score as a function of both underlying (cognitive) ability and family background (e.g.
family income or parental education). The author shows that cognitive ability explains about 40% of the
racial gaps in wages and earnings in the NLSY–79, which is somewhat smaller than the explanatory power
of AFQT score documented in Neal and Johnson (1996). This is because the racial gap in the AFQT score,
according to the model, also picks up racial differences in family background, which have a direct effect on
labor market outcomes.
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show that in the NLSY–97 cohort, the share of the racial employment and earnings gaps
explained by education and skills alone is about 30%. In both cohorts, the explanatory
power of education and skills is primarily driven by measured racial gaps in cognitive
skills (AFQT score) rather than by highest grade completed or measures of social and non-
cognitive skills.
Why has the explanatory power of education and skills decreased across cohorts? One
reason is that from the NLSY–79 to the NLSY–97 cohort, racial gaps in cognitive skills
(measured by AFQT score) have fallen to a great extent, although the gaps in the younger
cohort remain quantitatively substantial and statistically significant.7 However, even though
the overall explanatory power of observed pre-market factors is lower in the younger co-
hort, education and skills still remain the central observable explanatory factor of the racial
labor market gaps.8
The last question I explore is where the racial gaps in education and skills come from
and whether the mechanisms have changed across cohorts. I explore the relationship be-
tween education and skills with family and neighborhood characteristics by exploiting the
sequentially nature of the DFL decomposition. Specifically, in both cohorts, I compare
the unconditional explanatory power of racial differences in education and skills with the
explanatory power after conditioning on measured racial differences in family background
and childhood neighborhood characteristics.
In the NLSY–79 cohort, the unconditional explanatory power of education and skills
goes away almost entirely after conditioning on family and neighborhood characteristics.
7Another plausible reason is changing returns to skills. If the returns to cognitive skills have declined
across cohorts, the share of the racial labor market gaps explained by racial skills gaps could decline as well.
Imposing a linear functional form and assuming a single skill price, past research shows that the wage returns
to cognitive skills have declined from the NLSY–79 to the NLSY–97 cohort (Castex and Dechter, 2014;
Deming, 2017). However, when these restrictions are relaxed, Hellerstein, Luo, and Urzúa (2019) shows that
the returns to cognitive skills have not declined across cohorts.
8This is consistent with the findings of the second chapter of this dissertation, which focus on the NLSY–
97 cohort.
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Conversely, in the NLSY–97 cohort, the explanatory power of education and skills de-
creases only a modest amount and largely remains. This suggests that in the older cohort,
the documented crucial role of education and skills in explaining racial labor market gaps
mainly comes from racial differences in the family and neighborhood characteristics that
the NLSY data allow me to measure, while in the younger cohort, factors beyond these
family and neighborhood characteristics play a greater role.9
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I describe the NLSY
datasets and how I create the concordance of variables between the two cohorts. I then
show the racial differences observed in pre-market characteristics, including skills and ed-
ucation, family background, and childhood neighborhood, and present the early career la-
bor market trajectories for Black and white men in both cohorts. Section 3 discusses the
semi-parametric decomposition results. Section 4 concludes.
3.2 Comparing Two Cohorts of Young American Men
3.2.1 Data: NLSY–79 and NLSY–97
The main datasets I use throughout this chapter are the 1979 and 1997 cohorts of the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youths (NLSY–79 and NLSY–97). With proper sample
weights, the NLSY–79 and the NLSY–97 are nationally representative of young Americans
born 1957–1964 and 1980–1984, respectively. My analysis uses Black and white men from
both the main sample and the minority subsample.10
The NLSY dataset fits the purpose of my analysis in three important ways. First, it
includes a monthly diary of school enrollment and a weekly diary of work status, which
9I use the age-adjusted AFQT score constructed by Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange (2012). Part of the
differences in the decomposition results between the two NLSY cohorts, especially those concerning the role
of skills, could be due to potential imperfections of the score adjustment process.
10I do not include the economically disadvantaged white subsample or the military subsample of the
NLSY–79.
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I use to define the exact time at which a young man completes schooling and to track his
employment and earnings outcomes year by year. I define schooling completion following
the literature (Light and McGarry, 1998; Neumark, 2002).11 In my main analysis, I keep a
balanced panel of young men who completed schooling at least eight years (or 96 months)
prior and track their labor market outcomes through the first eight years post-schooling.
Second, the NLSY records rich information on individual, family, and neighborhood
characteristics, which is of critical importance to my decomposition analysis. In particular,
it includes a measure of cognitive skills (AFQT score) that has been shown by past stud-
ies as a key determinant in understanding racial gaps in the U.S. labor market (Neal and
Johnson, 1996).
Third, and most importantly, the NLSY–79 and the NLSY–97 surveys are designed
and administrated in a similar way that much of the key variables from the two cohorts
are comparable either directly or after some concordance, facilitating a valid comparison
between the two cohorts. In my main analysis, I use the individual and family variables
constructed by Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange (2012) and Deming (2017) and create mea-
sures of neighborhood characteristics using the restricted-use geocode files.
3.2.2 Sample Decisions and Variable Definitions
To make sure that the early career trajectories are comparable between the two NLSY
cohorts, I construct the samples following two principles. First, the school enrollment diary
starts in 1980 for the NLSY–79 cohort and in 1997 for the NLSY–97 cohort. For young
men who completed schooling before the enrollment diary started, the exact school-exit
time cannot be identified. To minimize this issue without losing too much sample size, I
11Specifically, I identify the first month when a young man was no longer enrolled in school and define the
next 12 months as the first year post-schooling. My findings are robust if I define the first post-schooling year
as the first calendar year that a young man is completely out of school.
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therefore exclude NLSY–79 respondents who were older than 18 as of 1980.12 For both
cohorts, I also exclude young men who were already out of school when the enrollment
diary started or were still enrolled in school as of the most “recent” wave.13
Second, as of the most recent wave of the NLSY–97 cohort in 2015, the respondents
were around ages 30–34. I focus my analysis of the NLSY–79 cohort to survey years
1979–1996, so in the most “recent” wave of 1996, the NLSY–79 respondents were in an
age range (31–34) close to the NLSY–97 cohort. To keep the restricted samples nationally
representative, I apply the custom sample weights created by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
I construct measures of education and skills and family background following the lit-
erature. Specifically, my measures of education and skills include four variables: highest
grade completed, AFQT score (as a measure of cognitive skills), non-cognitive test score,
and social test score. The AFQT score is measured at different ages for the two NLSY
cohorts and for people in the same cohort (ages 15–23 in the NLSY–79 cohort and ages
12–18 in the NLSY–97 cohort). The test format also changed from a paper-based test
in the NLSY–79 to a computer-based adaptive test in the NLSY–97. Altonji, Bharadwaj,
and Lange (2012) carefully adjusts for different test-taking ages and test format changes
between the two cohorts, and I use their adjusted AFQT score.
Unlike the AFQT score for cognitive skills, there is no consistent measure of non-
cognitive or social skills in the NLSY–79 and NLSY–97 cohorts. Deming (2017) selects
survey questions and/or tests from the two cohorts that seem to measure similar skills and
creates standardized non-cognitive and social test scores. Without a better and convenient
way to handle this incomparability issue, I use the test scores from Deming (2017). It is
important to note that my decomposition results are quantitatively robust with or without
including the non-cognitive and social test scores.
12All NLSY–97 respondents were younger than 18 as of 1997.
13In other words, my sample includes young men who completed schooling after the enrollment diary
started and before the most “recent” wave.
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My set of family background includes three variables constructed by Altonji, Bharad-
waj, and Lange (2012): parental income measured at the first wave of each cohort, mother’s
highest grade completed, and family structure (whether the respondent lives with both par-
ents) during childhood.14 In some of my empirical analysis, I include two more family
variables that are only available in the NLSY–97 data: whether the respondent’s mother is
a teenage mom and the mother’s parenting style (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2017).
I construct measures of childhood neighborhood characteristics using the restricted-use
geocode files for the NLSY. For the NLSY–79 cohort, I link county of residence at age 14
with county socioeconomic conditions created from the 1980 Census, and for the NLSY–
79 cohort, I link county of residence at age 12 with the 2000 Census. The socioeconomic
variables include county population, median household income, poverty rate, and the share
of men with a college education.15 I also include the same variables but at the state level. To
capture some of the within-county variations in neighborhood quality, I further account for
whether childhood residence is in a central city, whether it is in a metropolitan statistical
area (MSA), and whether it is in a urban or rural area.16 In some cases, I also include
neighborhood variables that are only available in the NLSY–97 data: homeownership status
at the first survey and a set of neighborhood quality measures at the county and commuting
zone levels created by Chetty and Hendren (2018b).17
14Family structure is measured at age 14 for the NLSY–79 cohort and at the first wave (ages 12–16) for the
NLSY–97 cohort.
15Residence at age 14 is reported for the NLSY–79 and residence at age 12 is reported for the NLSY–97.
This difference will not create major incomparability between the two cohorts (for the purpose of constructing
neighborhood measures) if residence does not change much from age 12 to 14. In the geocode files of the
NLSY–97, residence at the time of the first survey (in 1997, when the respondents were 12–16) is also
reported. As suggestive evidence, I find that state of residence does not change for 96% of the NLSY–97
respondents from age 12 to the time of the first survey, and county of residence does not change for 93% of
the NLSY–97 respondents over the same time period.
16This residence type information is measured at the first wave (ages 14–17) for the NLSY–79 cohort and
at age 12 for the NLSY–97 cohort.
17Chetty and Hendren (2018b) creates neighborhood quality measures separately for men and women from
high- and low-income families. I use the two measures created for men from high-income families and men
from low-income families.
84
The final sample includes 444 white men and 271 Black men from the NLSY–79 cohort
and 825 white men and 396 Black men from the NLSY–97 cohort. These young men have
completed schooling for at least eight full years and have a complete list of the aforemen-
tioned variables of education and skills, family background, and childhood neighborhood
characteristics.
3.2.3 Racial Gaps in Pre-Market Factors: Education and Skills, Family
Background, and Childhood Neighborhood
How have the racial gaps in pre-market education and skills, family background, and
childhood neighborhood characteristics changed across cohorts? Altonji, Bharadwaj, and
Lange (2012) create an index of skills for young Americans of the two NLSY cohorts and
shows that the racial skill gap has fallen, on average, between Black and white men from the
NLSY–79 cohort to the NLSY–97 cohort.18 In Table 3.1, I compare Black and white men in
each cohort along the series of pre-market characteristics discussed in the previous section
and test whether the racial gap in each factor has changed significantly across cohorts.
Among the four variables measuring education and skills, the racial gaps in highest
grade completed and AFQT score percentile are statistically significant in both cohorts,
and the racial gap in social test score is statistically significant only in the NLSY–97 cohort.
From the NLSY–79 cohort to the NLSY–97 cohort, the starkest change is a decrease in the
racial gap in AFQT score. On average, the racial AFQT score gap has fallen significantly,
by more than 10 percentiles. This finding is consistent with the findings of Altonji, Bharad-
waj, and Lange (2012), which are largely driven by the cross-cohort change in AFQT score.
The racial gap in social test score has increased significantly, but the magnitude of change
18The authors construct the skill index based on a set of skill measures (including schooling, AFQT score,
parental education, family structure, and school-to-work transition measures) and its relationship with wages
in the NLSY–79. The authors also show how the skill distribution has changed across cohorts. See Altonji,
Bharadwaj, and Lange (2012) for details.
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is arguably modest (about 0.35 standard deviations). The racial gap increases slightly in
highest grade completed and decreases slightly in non-cognitive test score. Both changes
are indistinguishable from zero.
For family background characteristics, the racial gaps in all three variables are statis-
tically significant within each NLSY cohort. Comparing across cohorts, the racial gap in
parental income has increased significantly, while the racial gap in mother’s education has
fallen (but the change is not statistically significant). Young men of both races are less
likely to grow up in a two-parent family in the NLSY–97 cohort than in the NLSY–79 co-
hort, but the racial gap in childhood family structure stays almost unchanged between the
two cohorts.
In both cohorts, Black men tend to grow up from counties and states with a larger pop-
ulation, lower median household income, higher poverty rate, and lower share of men with
college education. Some of these racial gaps in neighborhood socioeconomic conditions
appear to have fallen from the NLSY–79 cohort to the NLSY–97 cohort (such as county
median household income and poverty rate). During their childhood, Black men are more
likely to live in central cities and white men are likely to live in suburban areas (MSA,
non-central city, urban areas). This racial difference seems to have also decreased across
cohorts.
3.2.4 Racial Gaps in Early Career Trajectories
In this section I show how the racial gaps in early career trajectories have evolved across
the two NLSY cohorts. I focus on employment and earnings outcomes in the first eight
years after a young man completed schooling. In Table 3.2, I summarize the early career
outcomes in three periods: the transition stage, defined as the first year post-schooling; the
later stage, defined as the sixth to eighth years; and the entire first eight years. I specifically
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look at the sixth to eighth years because this is when employment and earnings outcomes
of young men reached a relatively stable stage.
In both cohorts, Black men fell substantially behind their white counterparts in the
transition stage along multiple margins of employment and earnings. It took Black men
30 more weeks to get the first job in the NLSY–79 cohort, and it took Black men 22 more
weeks in the NLSY–97 cohort. The decrease in the racial gap is quantitatively meaningful
but is statistically insignificant partly due to the sample size. In the first year post-schooling
of both cohorts, Black men were less likely than white men to have any job, to work for
half a year (≥ 26 weeks), or to work for a full year (≥ 50 weeks). Black men worked for
13 fewer weeks in the first year in the NLSY–79 cohort and 9 fewer weeks in the NLSY–97
cohort. The racial gaps in all of these employment outcomes have fallen across cohorts, but
only some of the declines can be distinguished from zero. The racial gap in annual earnings
are large and significant in both cohorts, but the change from the NLSY–79 cohort to the
NLSY–97 cohort is minimal.
Have these racial gaps converged or persisted through the sixth to eighth years, and
how have the trends changed across cohorts? For Black and white men in both cohorts,
weeks worked per year and annual earnings increased from the transition stage to the sixth
to eighth years, and the increase was greater for Black men. As a result, the racial gaps
in weeks worked and earnings diminished over the first eight years post-schooling. In the
NLSY–79 cohort, the racial gap in weeks worked per year fell from 13 weeks in the first
year to 6 weeks, on average, in the sixth to eighth years. In the NLSY–97 cohort, the racial
gap in weeks worked per year fell from 9 weeks to 7 weeks. The convergence in weeks
worked between Black and white men is smaller in the younger cohort than in the older
cohort, but the cross-cohort difference is not statistically distinguishable from zero.
For a large share of young men in the NLSY–97 sample, their early career years over-
lapped with the Great Recession, as shown in Figure 3.4. Because Black men have been
87
documented to suffer more from economic downturns than their white counterparts (Schwandt
and Wachter, 2019), it is plausible that the Great Recession suppressed the potential for this
younger cohort of Black men to catch up in employment outcomes in their first few years
out of school.
Although the racial labor market gaps at two snapshots (the first year and the sixth
to eighth years) have not changed by a statistically detectable amount, the shapes of em-
ployment and earnings trajectories could have exhibited more apparent changes. Figures
3.1–3.3 plot various employment and earnings outcomes year by year through the first
eight complete years post-schooling. The starkest pattern is that employment and earnings
trajectories have flattened from the NLSY–79 cohort to the NLSY–97 cohort.
In the NLSY–79 cohort, young men of both races experienced clear upward-sloping
career trajectories, as their employment and earnings outcomes gradually improved, espe-
cially in the first four to five years after completing schooling. In the NLSY–97 cohort,
the employment and earnings outcomes of both races either stayed largely stable through
the first eight years post-schooling or experienced flatter upward-sloping trajectories than
young men in the NLSY–79 cohort. This latter evidence is consistent with the anecdotal
observation that the Millennial cohort have struggled to gain a foothold in the labor market
and to climb up the career ladder (The Atlantic, 2015; Forbes, 2016).
Another important pattern from Figures 3.1–3.3 is that the employment and earnings
trajectories had more fluctuations and steeper growth in the first few years and started
to enter a relatively stable stage around the fourth and fifth years. In the decomposition
analysis in the next section, I primarily focus on racial gaps in employment and earnings
outcomes measured over the sixth to eighth years post-schooling (as shown in the middle
panel of Table 3.2).
Last, the bottom panel in Table 3.2 summarizes racial labor market gaps over the full
first eight years post-schooling. In both cohorts, Black men experienced more and longer
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non-employment spells, worked fewer weeks cumulatively, and earned more. From the
NLSY–79 cohort to the NLSY–97 cohort, the racial gaps in employment outcomes have
fallen, while the racial gap in earnings have increased. The cross-cohort changes summa-
rized over full eight years are not statistically significant.
3.3 Decomposition Results
In my main analysis, I apply the semi-parametric decomposition method introduced by
DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996, hereafter DFL). The second chapter of my disser-
tation has a detailed discussion of the method, and I refer readers who are interested in
methodological details to the second chapter and/or the relevant section in Altonji, Bharad-
waj, and Lange (2012), who also applies the DFL method.19
The DFL decomposition shows how much of the racial employment and earnings gaps,
which I measure at the sixth to eighth years, can be explained by racial differences in
quantities of underlying characteristics. I perform the decomposition separately for the
two NLSY cohorts, and I mainly focus on three pre-market characteristics: education and
skills, family background, and childhood neighborhood characteristics. In some cases I
also examine the explanatory power of racial differences in the school-to-work transition,
which I measure as weeks worked in the first year post-schooling, and I always estimate
the explanatory power of transition after conditioning on racial differences in the three
pre-market characteristics.
3.3.1 Overall Explanatory Power of Observable Pre-Market Factors
My first empirical finding concerns how much of the observed racial labor market gaps
can be attributed to pre-market racial differences in education and skills, family back-
19Following Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange (2012), I restrict the influence of outliers by imposing a cap to
the DFL propensity weights.
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ground, and childhood neighborhood altogether. Table 3.3 summarizes the result. Column
1 presents the raw racial gaps in employment (weeks worked) and earnings, as in the middle
panel of Table 3.2. Column 2 presents the share of the raw racial gap that are explained by
measured racial differences in the three pre-market factors together, and column 3 presents
the share that remains unexplained.
In the NLSY–79 cohort, the DFL decomposition shows that 86% of the racial employ-
ment gap and 77% of the racial earnings gap are explained by racial differences in education
and skills, family background, and childhood neighborhood. This means that the vast ma-
jority of the racial labor market gaps observed sixth to eighth years post-schooling in the
older cohort can be attributed to Black disadvantages at the individual, family, and neigh-
borhood levels observed before labor market entry. In the NLSY–97 cohort, the overall
explanatory power of the same set of pre-market characteristics has decreased to 48% of
the racial employment gap and 55% of the racial earnings gap.
The classical Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, which imposes a restricted linear func-
tional form, shows a similar pattern. In the NLSY–79 cohort, 93%–95% of the racial em-
ployment and earnings gaps can be explained by measured racial differences in the three
pre-market characteristics, and this share has decreased to 40%–55% in the NLSY–97 co-
hort.
The reduction in the overall explanatory power of observed pre-market characteristics is
consistent with a broad convergence between Black and white men in these characteristics.
As shown in Table 3.1, the Black-white gaps have fallen along various individual, family,
and neighborhood variables, including measured cognitive skills (AFQT score), mother’s
education, childhood residence type, and childhood county/state median household income
and poverty rate. Under the assumption that the returns to the pre-market characteristics
are constant across cohorts, a convergence in these characteristics will mechanically lead
to a lower overall explanatory power of these characteristics in the younger cohort. Note
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that the racial gaps in social test score and parental income have increased across cohorts.
But the decomposition result indicates that the divergence in these two variables has been
dominated by the convergence in other variables in terms of explaining racial labor market
gaps in the two cohorts.
As the racial gaps in observed pre-market characteristics have converged across co-
horts, the racial employment and earnings gaps in the sixth to eighth years post-schooling
have not fallen accordingly. This suggests that in the younger cohort, racial differences
in unobservable factors have played a more important role in shaping racial gaps in early
career labor market outcomes.20 What could such unobservable factors be? I discuss three
potential possibilities in the following subsection.
Exploring Hard-to-Measure Variables Using the NLSY–97 Data
One reason for unobservable factors is there can be racial differences in pre-market
characteristics that are rewarded in the labor market but are hard to measure. If these
characteristics have become more important in the younger cohort than in the older cohort,
a larger share of the observed racial labor market gaps in the younger cohort will be left
unexplained in my decomposition analysis. For example, a series of recent studies have
argued that the effect of childhood neighborhood on adulthood outcomes happens at a very
local level, such as census tract or census block (Chetty, Hendren, and Katz, 2016; Chetty
and Hendren, 2018a; Chetty et al., 2020). It is possible that the neighborhood measures in
my main decomposition analysis (as in Table 3.3) are not detailed enough to capture the
full effect of racial differences in neighborhood characteristics.
20In principal, another potential reason why a larger share of the racial gaps in the NLSY–97 cohort are left
unexplained is model misspecification. However, the DFL decomposition imposes relatively little parametric
restriction on the relationship between labor market outcomes and underlying characteristics, and there is
no obvious reason to believe why model misspecification is a larger issue in the NLSY–97 cohort than in
the NLSY–79 cohort. Also, the consistent results between the DFL decomposition and the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition suggest that model specification is not a main concern in this context.
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Luckily, when solely focusing on the NLSY–97 cohort, I am able to incorporate a richer
set of neighborhood variables that are available in the NLSY–97 cohort but not in the
NLSY–79 cohort. As described earlier, these variables include homeownership status in
1997 and a set of neighborhood quality measures at the county and commuting zone levels
(Chetty and Hendren, 2018b). Examining how adding these variables affects the decom-
position results in the NLSY–97 cohort will help me understand how much a concern the
measurement issue is. Additionally, the NLSY–97 cohort also includes a few more family
background variables that are not available in the NLSY–79 cohort: whether mother is a
teenage mom and the mother’s parenting style.
In Table 3.4, the top two panels replicate the main result of Table 3.3, and the bottom
panel presents the result for the NLSY–97 cohort when the extra family and neighborhood
variables are included. Two important patterns are revealed. First, when childhood neigh-
borhood characteristics are added alone in the decomposition (and neither education and
skills nor family background variables are added), the explanatory power goes up by a
meaningful degree when the extra variables in the NLSY–97 cohort are included. This is
shown in column 6 of Table 3.4.
When the extra variables are not included in the NLSY–97 cohort, measured racial
differences in childhood neighborhood alone explains 1% of the racial employment gap
and 9% of the racial earnings gap. After adding the extra neighborhood variables in the
NLSY–97 cohort, the explanatory power goes up to 11% for employment and 15% for
earnings. The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition shows a similar pattern. In contrast, the extra
family variables do not add explanatory power to the existing family variables as much as
the extra neighborhood variables do to the existing neighborhood variables. This finding
means that the extra neighborhood variables in the NLSY–97 cohort do capture some of the
unobserved racial differences in childhood neighborhood, while the extra family variables
do not.
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In addition to the sole explanatory power of family or neighborhood variables, the over-
all explanatory power of all pre-market characteristics in the DFL decomposition stays
almost unchanged with the extra family and neighborhood variables. Under the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition, the overall explanatory power increases by a very limited degree,
from 55% to 62% for employment and from 49% to 57% for earnings. This lack of change
in the overall explanatory power of all pre-market factors is because much of the racial dif-
ferences in these extra neighborhood variables are already reflected in the racial differences
in the existing education and skills and family background variables. For example, some
of the explanatory power of racial differences in childhood neighborhood characteristics,
when added alone, is capturing the underlying characteristics of individuals and families
who live in different neighborhoods rather than the effect of neighborhoods per se. When
the decomposition already accounts for racial differences in education and skills and family
background, it is not surprising that adding extra neighborhood variables does not increase
the overall explanatory power much.
The main takeaway of Table 3.4 is that the extra neighborhood variables in the NLSY–
97 cohort do seem to capture some of the unobserved racial differences at the neighborhood
level, but adding these variables does not increase the overall explanatory power of pre-
market by a meaningful degree. To explain the large unexplained racial employment and
earnings gaps in the NLSY–97 cohort, we need to explore other factors. Possible examples
include better measures of non-cognitive and social skills and more detailed measures of
neighborhood characteristics at the census track level.21 In the next section, I examine one
of the possible factors, the school-to-work transition.
21I am applying to gain access to the census track geocode files of the NLSYs. With access to these data, I
will be able to measure neighborhood at a more detailed level.
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Role of the School-to-Work Transition
As shown in Table 3.2, compared to white men, Black men in both cohorts fell sub-
stantially behind in their very first year post-schooling. It has been documented widely in
the literature that performance in the school-to-work transition has a long-lasting impact
on future labor market outcomes (Neumark, 2002; Kahn, 2010), especially for minority
and economically disadvantaged groups (Schwandt and Wachter, 2019).22 If Black disad-
vantage in the school-to-work transition persists through early careers, it may help explain
some of the unexplained racial labor market gaps observed in the sixth to eighth years.
Figures 3.1–3.3 reveals some suggestive patterns. In the NLSY–79 cohort, the Black-
white gap in the transition (defined as the first year post-schooling) shows some conver-
gence over the first four to five years, especially in employment outcomes. In the NLSY–97
cohort, there was much less convergence, and the initial racial gaps either largely persisted
or grew over the early career years. Although this is not a causal estimate, it does suggest
that the impact of the school-to-transition seems to be especially relevant for the NLSY–97
cohort and accounting for racial differences in the transition process may help explain the
residual racial gaps in employment and earnings over the sixth to eighth years.
In the DFL decomposition, I estimate the explanatory power of racial differences in
the school-to-work transition conditioning on measured racial differences in education and
skills, family background, and childhood neighborhood characteristics. Table 3.5 presents
the results, where I try different measures of the school-to-work transition. I first measure
transition with a series of indicator variables for the number of weeks worked in the first
year post-schooling (1–9 weeks, 10–19 weeks, ..., 40–49 weeks, 50 weeks or more).
To measure the school-to-work transition with more exogenous variations, I also use the
22Rinz (2019) shows that exposure to the Great Recession has cost Black workers 1.33 years of their
average earnings and has cost white workers 0.94 years of their average earnings. But the estimates are based
on all workers, not new workers who just entered the labor market.
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geocode files to link a young man’s state of residence in the year that he completed school-
ing (and entered the labor market) with state average UR from Local Area Unemployment
Statistics (LAUS). The UR at entry state-year provides a different and presumably more ex-
ogenous measure of one’s school-to-work transition status. In the NLSY–97 cohort, when
the LAUS data have more detailed data at the county level, I also construct UR at entry
county-year as another measure of transition.23
In the NLSY–97 cohort, racial differences in transition, as measured by weeks worked
in the first year post-schooling, accounts for close to 10% of the racial labor market gaps,
conditioning on measured racial differences in education and skills, family background,
and childhood neighborhood characteristics. When county UR is used as the measure of
transition, it accounts for 7%–8% of the racial gaps in employment and earnings, condi-
tioning on the three pre-market factors. When first-year weeks worked and county UR are
included together, the explanatory power of transition goes up to about 16%. Using state
UR, which is a less accurate measure, does not achieve an explanatory power as close as
that of county UR.
In the NLSY–79 cohort, conditioning on racial differences in the pre-market character-
istics, accounting for racial differences in transition adds no extra explanatory power, no
matter if I measure transition with weeks worked or state UR. In particular, as shown in the
top panel of Table 3.5, the explanatory power of transition turns out to be negative in the
DFL decomposition, as racial differences in the three pre-market factors have already more
than fully accounted for racial differences in the school-to-work transition.24
Taking the results of the two cohorts together, it is clear that racial differences in the
school-to-work transition do help explain some of the racial labor market gaps that cannot
23County-level UR data in LAUS go back to the year 1990 and are unavailable for most of the NLSY–79
sample years.
24In other words, the negative estimate means that given the measured racial differences in education and
skills, family background, and childhood neighborhood characteristics, we would have predicted the racial
transition gap to be even larger than it actually was in the NLSY–79 data.
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be explained by the three pre-market characteristics in the NLSY–97 cohort. When inter-
preting the role of transition, it is important to keep in mind that the transition measures I
use, weeks worked in the first year post-schooling or county (state) UR at entry time, could
be subject to selection, even after controlling for education and skills, family background,
and childhood neighborhood characteristics.
For example, the fact that Black men completed schooling (and entered the labor mar-
ket) at a location and time with higher UR can be due to complicated reasons beyond
simply bad luck. Past research has documented that Black workers tend to live in places
with fewer job opportunities, and the relocation of firms from central cities to suburban
rings has paralleled the declining Black employment rate in central cities (Hellerstein and
Neumark, 2012; Miller, 2018). The observed Black underperformance in the school-to-
work transition could be, at least partially, due to barriers to geographic mobility, a lack of
resources to freely choose their school-leaving time, and eventually a lack of access to job
opportunities. It could also be due to discrimination against Black men in the hiring process
and at the workplace, which further discourages Black men from searching for work.
Labor Market Discrimination against Black Men
Racial discrimination has long existed in various facets of the U.S. labor market (the
literature is surveyed by Altonji and Blank (1999)). For a more recent cohort close in age
to the NLSY–97 cohort, Chetty et al. (2020) shows descriptively that Black men who grow
up in places with greater racial bias among whites end up earning less as adults.25
Although I do not include a direct measure of discrimination in my decomposition anal-
ysis, there are at least three channels through which discrimination affects my results. First,
25The authors employ two measures of racial bias. The first is a test for implicit racial bias, available at the
county level from the Race Implicit Association Database. The second is the Racial Animus Index created
by Stephens-Davidowitz based on Google searches, available at the media market level (more aggregate than
county).
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if Black men receive lower labor market returns (such as less working time and/or lower
wages) to the same pre-market characteristics due to discrimination, the racial differences
in labor market returns will be left in the unexplained residuals in the decomposition. If
labor market discrimination has become a more serious issue for the younger cohort than
for the older cohort, it could explain, at least partially, why a greater share of the racial
labor market gaps in the NLSY–97 cohort are left unexplained by racial differences in the
pre-market characteristics.
Second, labor market discrimination can have a feedback effect on skill investment
decisions. If it is anticipated that their skills will not be rewarded fairly in the labor market,
Black men and Black families may underinvest in education and skills prior to labor market
entry. As a result, some of the observed racial gaps in education and skills could be partially
due to the feedback effect of labor market discrimination.
Third, as discussed in the previous section, discrimination could also contribute to racial
differences in the school-to-work transition. It may have taken Black men more time to get
the first job because they faced discrimination in the hiring process. And, as discussed
above, part of the reason why Black men entered the labor market with a worse location
and timing could be that discrimination prevented or discouraged them from searching for
jobs at places with more opportunities.
3.3.2 Central Role of Education and Skills
In addition to the overall explanatory power of pre-market characteristics, my second
main finding concerns the role of education and skills in explaining racial gaps in employ-
ment and earnings. Neal and Johnson (1996) show that in the NLSY–79 cohort, skills,
especially cognitive skills measured by AFQT score, play the central role of explaining
racial wage gaps. The second chapter of this dissertation shows that in the NLSY–97 co-
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hort, education and skills remain the key explanatory factor of racial gaps in labor market
outcomes, and their explanatory power largely persists even after controlling for racial dif-
ferences in family background and childhood neighborhood characteristics.
The focus and contribution of my analysis here is to make a comparison across cohorts
and examine how the role of education and skills (as well as family background and child-
hood neighborhood) has changed from the NLSY–79 cohort to the NLSY–97 cohort. In the
last three columns of Table 3.3, I present the share of the racial employment and earnings
gaps that can be explained by racial differences in each one of the three pre-market factors.
Two patterns are worth discussion.
First, as a confirmation of past studies (Neal and Johnson, 1996; the second chapter
of this dissertation), education and skills, among all measured pre-market factors, turn out
to play a key role in explaining the racial gaps in employment and earnings within each
cohort. In the NLSY–79 cohort, racial differences in education and skills alone explain
66%–67% of the racial employment and earnings gaps in the DFL decomposition. As
a comparison, family background alone explains 51%–67% and childhood neighborhood
alone explains 16%–40% of the racial labor market gaps in the DFL decomposition. In
the NLSY–97 cohort, racial differences in education and skills alone explain 27%–30% of
the racial labor market gaps, while family background and neighborhood characteristics
each explain 20%–34% and 1%–9% of the racial gaps alone, respectively. The Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition reveals a similar pattern: education and skills show an explanatory
power that is either the largest, or close to the largest, among the three observed pre-market
factors.26
A further question is whether the central role of education and skills is driven by for-
26When added together in the decomposition, the overall explanatory power of the three pre-market factors
is lower than the sum of the sole explanatory power of these factors when added alone. This is because
education and skills, family background, and childhood neighborhood characteristics are generally positively
correlated with each other.
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mal schooling (measured by highest grade completed) or cognitive skills (measured by the
AFQT score).27 Table 3.6 shows the explained share of racial labor market gaps when
only highest grade completed or AFQT score is included in the DFL decomposition. When
highest grade completed is added alone, it accounts for 17%–28% of the racial gaps in the
NLSY–79 cohort and 12%–14% of the racial gaps in the NLSY–97 cohort, which are less
than half of the explanatory power when the full skill set is included. When AFQT score
is added alone, it achieves an explanatory power that is at least close to the full skill set in
both the NLSY–79 and the NLSY–97 cohorts. The results show clearly that the key role of
education and skills in explaining racial labor market gaps in both cohorts mainly comes
from measured racial gaps in cognitive skills.
The second key pattern from the last three columns of Table 3.3 is that racial differences
in education and skills explain a greater share of the racial labor market gaps in the NLSY–
79 cohort than in the NLSY–97 cohort. A similar falling explanatory power is also observed
for family background and childhood neighborhood characteristics, so this pattern does not
seem to be unique to education and skills.
There are at least two possible reasons why the explanatory power of education and
skills has fallen across cohorts. First, as discussed above in Table 3.1, the racial gap in cog-
nitive skills, measured by AFQT score percentile, has fallen substantially and statistically
significantly from the NLSY–79 cohort to the NLSY–97 cohort. If the returns to cognitive
skills were to stay stable across cohorts, a smaller racial gap in cognitive skills would lead
to a lower explanatory power of education and skills in the younger cohort. Recall that
in Table 3.1, the racial gap has increased insignificantly for highest grade completed and
significantly for social test score. Because the explanatory power of education and skills
is primarily driven by AFQT score, rather than by highest grade completed or social test
27In both cohorts, racial differences in measured non-cognitive and social skills alone explain a negligible
share of the racial gaps in employment and earnings; therefore I did not present the results for non-cognitive
or social skills in Table 3.6.
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score, the falling racial gap in AFQT score is playing the dominant role here.
Second, if labor market returns to education and skills were to decrease across cohorts,
the explanatory power of education and skills would have also decreased (assuming that
the racial differences in education and skills have remained unchanged). However, existing
evidence on how returns to education and skills have changed in the U.S. labor market is
mixed and still preliminary. Castex and Dechter (2014) finds that the returns to education
have increased and the returns to cognitive skills have decreased from the NLSY–79 cohort
to the NLSY–97 cohort. Deming (2017) further shows that the returns to non-cognitive
skills and social skills have increased between the two cohorts. That said, Hellerstein, Luo,
and Urzúa (2019) shows that the former two studies rely on a strong assumption of constant
skill prices and the assumption does not hold in the NLSY–97 cohort. When relaxing this
assumption, there is no conclusive evidence on a cross-cohort decline in the returns to
cognitive skills.28
Exploration of the Relationship between Skills and Family and Neighbor-
hood Factors
It is important to understand the relationship between education and skills and racial
differences in family background and childhood neighborhood characteristics. The vari-
ables of education and skills in the NLSY datasets are measured over childhood and/or
early adulthood, and the observed racial differences in education and skills could have al-
ready been exposed to family and neighborhood influences.29
28Although there is a lack of strong supportive evidence for changing returns to education and skills across
cohorts, it is worth noting that I also cannot rule out the possibility that the importance of other factors, such
as family background, childhood neighborhood, or labor market discrimination, has changed across cohorts.
This topic merits a formal exploration in future research.
29The AFQT score is measured at ages 15–18 in my final sample of the NLSY–79 cohort and ages 12–18 in
the NLSY–97 cohort. Note that I use the score constructed by Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange (2012), which
carefully concords the two cohorts to make the AFQT scores comparable. According to Deming (2017), the
non-cognitive score is constructed from two tests (one conducted at ages 14–17 and one at ages 15–18) in
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To examine how much of the explanatory power of education and skills comes from
racial differences in family background and childhood neighborhood, I exploit the sequen-
tial nature of the DFL decomposition. Intuitively, under the DFL decomposition, each
factor can be added in a sequential manner, and the explanatory power of factors added
later is estimated conditioning on racial differences in the factors added earlier. For ex-
ample, if I add family background and childhood neighborhood in the sequence before
education and skills, then the explanatory power of education and skills will be estimated
after conditioning on racial differences in family and neighborhood characteristics.
In Table 3.7, I explore three different sequential orderings, where I add education and
skills as the first factor, the second factor, and the last factor. Meanwhile, I always add
family background before childhood neighborhood in the sequence, under the assumption
that family background is determined before (so more exogenous than) childhood neigh-
borhood in the skill accumulation process.30
In the NLSY–79 cohort, the explanatory power of education and skills falls from 66%-
67% to 24%–39% when conditioning on racial differences in family background, and it fur-
ther falls to close to zero when conditioning on racial differences in both family background
and childhood neighborhood characteristics.31 Compared to the NLSY–79 cohort, the ex-
planatory power of education and skills in the NLSY–97 cohort falls by a much smaller
degree when conditioning on family and neighborhood characteristics. When added alone,
the NLSY–79 cohort and is constructed from two sets of questions (one asked at ages 17–21 and one at ages
23–27) in the NLSY–97 cohort. Social score is constructed from two sets of questions (one aims to measure
sociability in high school, and one aims to measure sociability at age 6 and as an adult) in the NLSY–79
cohort and is constructed from a set of questions asked at ages 23–27 in the NLSY–97 cohort. As discussed
earlier, there is no evidence that the non-cognitive and social scores are not directly comparable between the
two NLSY cohorts. The findings in this chapter are quantitatively robust when excluding non-cognitive and
social scores from the analysis.
30As discussed earlier, the neighborhood-level characteristics that I include capture both the average char-
acteristics of individuals and families living in the neighborhood and the effect of neighborhood per se.
Adding family variables before neighborhood variables in the sequence will help isolate the true effect of
neighborhood.
31The overall explanatory power of all three pre-market factors does not change with the specific sequential
ordering.
101
education and skills account for 27%–30% of the racial employment and earnings gaps
in the NLSY–97 cohort. After conditioning on racial differences in family background,
the explanatory power of education and skills falls slightly to 21%–25%. After further
conditioning on racial differences in childhood neighborhood, the explanatory power of
education and skills again falls only slightly to 17%–25%.
The different results between the two cohorts mean that the relationship between edu-
cation and skills with family and neighborhood characteristics has changed substantially.
In the older cohort, the documented central role of education and skills in shaping racial
labor market gaps comes almost completely from racial differences in family background
and childhood neighborhood characteristics. From a policy perspective, this suggests that a
promising pathway to reduce racial gaps in labor market outcomes is family- and neighborhood-
based programs that aim to reduce Black disadvantages in family and neighborhood char-
acteristics as measured in the NLSY datasets, such as family income, family structure, and
socioeconomic conditions of childhood county of residence.
On the other hand, in the younger cohort much of the explanatory power of educa-
tion and skills persists even after accounting for measured racial differences in family and
neighborhood characteristics. Note that family and neighborhood characteristics together
account for about 30% of the racial employment and earnings gaps in the NLSY–97 cohort,
as shown in the bottom two rows of Table 3.7.
3.3.3 Decomposition of Racial Gaps across the Distribution
My analysis until now has focused on racial employment and earnings gaps observed
at the mean. In this section, I briefly present the DFL decomposition results of racial gaps
observed at different parts of the employment and earnings distributions.32 Specifically, I
32The DFL method estimates the whole counterfactual distributions of employment or earnings for white
men if they had the same pre-market characteristics as Black men. In principle, the method can be used to
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focus on racial gaps measured at the 25th percentile, the median, and the 75th percentile of
the employment and earnings distributions.
Table 3.8 replicates the structure of Table 3.3 but with racial gaps at different parts of
the distribution instead of the mean. The employment distribution (average weeks worked
per year in the sixth to eighth years) is highly right-skewed, and more than 25% of both
Black and white men worked for 52 weeks, on average, over the sixth to eighth years in
both the NLSY–79 and the NLSY–97 cohorts. As a result, the racial employment gap is
zero at the 75th percentile, and I do not include it in Table 3.8.
The basic patterns observed at the mean hold qualitatively at different parts of the dis-
tributions. First, the overall explanatory power of education and skills, family background,
and childhood neighborhood together is higher in the NLSY–79 cohort than in the NLSY–
97 cohort. In particular, racial differences in the three pre-market factors more than fully
account for racial gaps at the 25th percentile and the median of the employment distribution
in the NLSY–79 cohort. The only exception is that racial differences in pre-market factors
together account for 48% of the racial gap at the 75th percentile of the earnings distribution
in the NLSY–97 cohort, which is greater than the overall explanatory power of pre-market
factors in the NLSY–79 cohort (38%).
Second, education and skills still have the highest, or close to highest, explanatory
power among all pre-market characteristics. In particular, racial differences in education
and skills alone more than fully explain the racial employment gaps at the 25th percentile
and the median in the NLSY–79 cohort. Third, the sole explanatory power of education and
skills, as well as that of family or neighborhood characteristics, has fallen from the NLSY–
79 cohort to the NLSY–97 cohort. The only exception is, again, at the 75th percentile
of the earnings distribution, where education and skills alone explain 54% of the gap in
the NLSY–97 cohort and 38% of the gap in the NLSY–79 cohort, and family background
decompose racial gaps at any part of the employment or earnings distribution.
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characteristics alone explain 33% of the gap in the NLSY–97 cohort and 25% of the gap in
the NLSY–79 cohort.
3.4 Conclusion
How have the racial labor market gaps among young men changed across cohorts,
and how have the underlying drivers of racial gaps changed? In this chapter, I answer
these questions with the help of two similarly constructed and nationally representative
samples of young Americans, the NLSY–79 and the NLSY–97 cohorts. I find that racial
gaps in employment and earnings observed at specific time points in the first eight years
post-schooling are not statistically distinguishable between the two cohorts. However, the
shapes of employment and earnings trajectories have changed dramatically across cohorts
for both races.
Using a semi-parametric decomposition, I further show that compared to the NLSY–79
cohort, measured racial differences in pre-market education and skills, family background,
and childhood neighborhood in the NLSY–97 cohort explain a lower share of the racial
labor market gaps observed over the sixth to eighth years post-schooling. This finding
suggests that racial differences in unobservable factors have played a more important role
in shaping racial labor market gaps in the younger cohort.
I provide some speculative evidence on what the unobservable factors can be. I show
that Black disadvantage in the school-to-work transition, measured with weeks worked
in the first year post-schooling or county UR in the year of labor market entry, explains
a quantitatively important share of the racial labor market gaps in the NLSY–97 cohort.
In contrast, I find that more detailed measures of childhood neighborhood characteristics
add little extra explanatory power to the existing pre-market factors. I argue that racial
discrimination in the labor market can be an important source of the unobservable factors.
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More research needs to be done to understand how labor market discrimination against
Black men has evolved across cohorts and the potential consequences on racial gaps in
labor market outcomes.
Among observable pre-market factors, I show that education and skills appear to have
played the central role in explaining racial labor market gaps in both cohorts, which is
consistent with the findings of Neal and Johnson (1996) and the second chapter of this
dissertation. The explanatory power of education and skills in the NLSY–79 cohort comes
almost fully from racial differences in measured family and neighborhood characteristics,
while much of the explanatory power of education and skills in the NLSY–97 cohort cannot
be attributed to family and neighborhood characteristics as they are measured in the data.
This suggests that in addition to family- and neighborhood-based programs, polices that
aim at reducing racial labor market gaps need to pay more attention to Black disadvantage
in the accumulation of education and skills. In future work, I plan to further investigate
what has contributed to the observed racial gap in education and skills in the younger
cohort and what it implies for designing more effective public policies to reduce racial
labor market gaps for future cohorts to come.
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Figure 3.2: Career Trajectories: Worked Half Year and Full Year
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Figure 3.3: Career Trajectories: Annual Earnings
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years. Sample weights are used.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Characteristics of Black and White Men in the NLSY–79 and NLSY–
97 Cohorts
NLSY–79 NLSY–97 97–79
White Black W-B White Black W-B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Education and Skills
HGC 13.46 12.80 0.66† 13.13 12.08 1.05† 0.39
AFQT percentile 58.61 22.93 35.68† 51.06 25.76 25.31† –10.37†
Social score 0.03 0.20 –0.18 –0.05 –0.22 0.17† 0.35†
Non-cognitive score 0.07 –0.06 0.13 –0.12 –0.07 –0.05 –0.18
Family Background
Log parental income 11.56 10.85 0.72† 10.96 8.94 2.01† 1.30†
Mother’s HGC 12.07 11.13 0.94† 13.03 12.45 0.59† –0.35
Living with both parents 0.85 0.56 0.28† 0.62 0.32 0.31† 0.02
Childhood Neighborhood
Residence Type
MSA, central city 0.06 0.36 –0.30† 0.21 0.36 –0.15† 0.14†
MSA, non-central city, urban 0.58 0.39 0.20† 0.33 0.22 0.12† –0.08
MSA, non-central city, rural 0.04 0.00 0.04† 0.20 0.19 0.01 –0.03
Non-MSA, rural 0.19 0.17 0.02 0.18 0.15 0.03 0.01
County Conditions
Log population 12.26 12.60 –0.35† 12.14 12.35 –0.21 0.13
Log median HH income 10.93 10.78 0.15† 10.95 10.87 0.08† –0.07†
Poverty rate 0.11 0.17 –0.06† 0.11 0.16 –0.04† 0.02†
Male college rate 0.19 0.18 0.01 0.24 0.23 0.01 0.00
State Conditions
Log population 15.75 15.65 0.10 15.79 15.76 0.03 –0.07
Log median HH income 10.91 10.85 0.07† 10.98 10.94 0.04† –0.03
Poverty rate 0.12 0.14 –0.03† 0.12 0.13 –0.01† 0.02†
Male college rate 0.20 0.19 0.01† 0.26 0.25 0.01† 0.00
1 HGC stands for highest grade completed. AFQT stands for the Armed Forces Qualification
Test. MSA stands for metropolitan statistical area. HH stands for household. The NLSY–79
sample includes 444 white men and 271 Black men, and the NLSY–97 sample includes 825
white men and 396 Black men. Both samples are balanced panels of men who have completed
formal schooling for at least eight years. Section 2 explains how the samples are constructed.
Sample weights are used.
2 † indicates a p-value below 0.05.
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Table 3.2: Early Career Outcomes of Black and White Men in the NLSY–79 and NLSY–97
Cohorts
NLSY–79 NLSY–97 97–79
White Black W-B White Black W-B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Transition Stage (1st Year)
Weeks before finding 1st job 11.89 41.97 –30.08† 10.68 32.78 –22.10† 7.98
Any employment 0.95 0.76 0.19† 0.96 0.85 0.11† –0.08†
Worked for ≥ 26 weeks 0.80 0.54 0.26† 0.85 0.65 0.20† –0.06
Worked for ≥ 50 weeks 0.57 0.29 0.28† 0.48 0.35 0.13† –0.15†
Weeks worked 40.81 27.68 13.13† 41.41 32.23 9.18† –3.95
Log annual earnings 9.47 7.38 2.08† 9.35 7.21 2.14† 0.06
Later Stage (6th–8th Year)
Weeks worked per year 47.10 41.33 5.78† 44.20 37.30 6.90† 1.12
Log average annual earnings 10.93 9.56 1.37† 10.55 9.01 1.54† 0.17
Summarizing First 8 Years
Number of NE spells 1.68 2.30 –0.62† 1.77 2.66 –0.89† –0.28
Avg. months of NE spells 6.99 9.51 –2.52 6.47 10.14 –3.66† –1.14
Cumulative weeks worked 363.92 297.75 66.17† 347.15 282.56 64.59† –1.58
Weeks worked per year 45.54 37.29 8.25† 43.50 35.40 8.10† –0.15
Log average annual earnings 11.04 10.01 1.03† 10.73 9.48 1.25† 0.22
1 NE stands for non-employment. The NLSY–79 sample includes 444 white men and 271 Black
men, and the NLSY–97 sample includes 825 white men and 396 Black men. Both samples are
balanced panels of men who have completed formal schooling for at least eight years. Section
2 explains how the samples are constructed. Sample weights are used.
2 † indicates a p-value below 0.05.
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Table 3.3: Explanatory Power of Observed Pre-Market Factors
Share Explained by
Racial Gap Share Explained by Unexplained Each Factor
Pre-Market Factors Residuals When Added Alone
Skills Family NBHD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NLSY–79
DFL
Weeks worked per year 5.78 86% 14% 66% 51% 40%
Log avg annual earnings 1.37 77% 23% 67% 67% 16%
Oaxaca-Binder
Weeks worked per year 5.78 95% 5% 78% 31% 31%
Log avg annual earnings 1.37 93% 7% 77% 33% 35%
NLSY–97
DFL
Weeks worked per year 6.90 48% 52% 27% 34% 1%
Log avg annual earnings 1.54 55% 45% 30% 20% 9%
Oaxaca-Binder
Weeks worked per year 6.90 55% 45% 28% 31% 11%
Log avg annual earnings 1.54 49% 51% 30% 23% 13%
1 DFL stands for the DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux decomposition, and NBHD stands for neighbor-
hood. The top panel uses the NLSY–79 sample, including 444 white men and 271 Black men.
The bottom panel uses the NLSY–97 sample, including 825 white men and 396 Black men.
Both samples are balanced panels of men who have completed formal schooling for at least
eight years. Sample weights are used.
2 The number of weeks worked per year is averaged over the sixth to eighth years. The annual
earnings are averaged over the sixth to eighth years and then take the inverse hyperbolic sine.
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Table 3.4: Explanatory Power of Additional Pre-Market Factors in NLSY–97
Share Explained by
Racial Gap Share Explained by Unexplained Each Factor
Pre-Market Factors Residuals When Added Alone
Skills Family NBHD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NLSY–79
DFL
Weeks worked per year 5.78 86% 14% 66% 51% 40%
Log avg annual earnings 1.37 77% 23% 67% 67% 16%
Oaxaca-Binder
Weeks worked per year 5.78 95% 5% 78% 31% 31%
Log avg annual earnings 1.37 93% 7% 77% 33% 35%
NLSY–97
DFL
Weeks worked per year 6.90 48% 52% 27% 34% 1%
Log avg annual earnings 1.54 55% 45% 30% 20% 9%
Oaxaca-Binder
Weeks worked per year 6.90 55% 45% 28% 31% 11%
Log avg annual earnings 1.54 49% 51% 30% 23% 13%
NLSY–97 (with more variables)
DFL
Weeks worked per year 6.90 49% 51% 27% 35% 11%
Log avg annual earnings 1.54 49% 51% 30% 21% 15%
Oaxaca-Binder
Weeks worked per year 6.90 62% 38% 28% 34% 24%
Log avg annual earnings 1.54 57% 43% 30% 26% 18%
1 DFL stands for the DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux decomposition, and NBHD stands for neighborhood.
The top two panels replicate Table 3.3 with the NLSY–79 sample and the NLSY–97 sample. The
bottom panel uses the same NLSY–97 sample but adds family and neighborhood variables that
are available only in the NLSY–97 cohort, including whether the respondent’s mother is a teenage
mom, homeownership status, and neighborhood quality measures created by Chetty and Hendren
(2018b). Sample weights are used.
2 The number of weeks worked per year is averaged over the sixth to eighth years. The annual
earnings are averaged over the sixth to eighth years and then take the inverse hyperbolic sine.
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Table 3.5: Role of School-to-Work Transition Conditional on Pre-Market Factors
Racial Gap Share Explained by Racial Differences in
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NLSY–79
Weeks worked State UR Weeks &
in 1st Year at Entry State UR
Weeks worked per year 5.78 –10% –26% –26%
Log avg annual earnings 1.37 –19% –12% –26%
NLSY–97
Weeks worked State UR Weeks & County UR Weeks &
in 1st Year at Entry State UR at Entry County UR
Weeks worked per year 6.90 9% 2% 10% 7% 16%
Log avg annual earnings 1.54 8% 1% 9% 8% 16%
1 DFL stands for the DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux decomposition, and UR stands for unemployment
rate. The top panel uses the NLSY–79 sample and the bottom panel uses the NLSY–97 sample.
Sample weights are used.
2 Column 2 measures the school-to-work transition with a flexible vector of weeks worked in the
first year post-schooling. Column 3 instead uses UR in one’s state of residence at the labor market
entry year. Column 4 includes both of these two measures. In the bottom panel (NLSY–97), I add
two more columns that replace state UR with county UR. County-level UR data, provided by the
Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) program, go back to 1990 and is unavailable for
most of my NLSY–79 sample years. In all columns, transition measures are added after family
background, childhood neighborhood, and education and skills in the DFL decomposition.
3 The number of weeks worked per year is averaged over the sixth to eighth years. The annual
earnings are averaged over the sixth to eighth years and then take inverse hyperbolic sine.
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Table 3.6: Explanatory Power of Formal Schooling versus Measured Cognitive Skills
Racial Gap Share Explained by Racial Differences in
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NLSY–79
Full Skill Set Highest Grade Completed AFQT score
Weeks worked per year 5.78 66% 28% 107%
Log avg annual earnings 1.37 67% 17% 83%
NLSY–97
Full Skill Set Highest Grade Completed AFQT score
Weeks worked per year 6.90 27% 14% 28%
Log avg annual earnings 1.54 30% 12% 30%
1 AFQT stands for the Armed Forces Qualification Test. The top panel uses the NLSY–
79 sample, including 444 white men and 271 Black men. The bottom panel uses the
NLSY–97 sample, including 825 white men and 396 Black men. Both samples are
balanced panels of men who have completed formal schooling for at least eight years.
Sample weights are used. Column 2 replicates Table 3.3 and uses the full set of skill
measures, which includes highest grade completed, AFQT score, and non-cognitive and
social test scores. Column 3 includes only the highest grade completed in the skill set.
Column 4 includes only AFQT score in the skill set. In all three columns, only skill
measures are included in the DFL decomposition, while family background, childhood
neighborhood, and transition variables are not included.
2 The number of weeks worked per year is averaged over the sixth to eighth years. The an-
nual earnings are averaged over the sixth to eighth years and then take inverse hyperbolic
sine.
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Table 3.7: Sequential DFL Decomposition Results
Share Explained by
Racial Gap Each Factor Unexplained
in Sequential Ordering Residuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NLSY–79
Sequential Ordering I Skills Family NBHD
Weeks worked per year 5.78 66% 25% –5% 14%
Log avg annual earnings 1.37 67% 24% –14% 23%
Sequential Ordering II Family Skills NBHD
Weeks worked per year 5.78 51% 39% –5% 14%
Log avg annual earnings 1.37 67% 24% –14% 23%
Sequential Ordering III Family NBHD Skills
Weeks worked per year 5.78 51% 27% 8% 14%
Log avg annual earnings 1.37 67% 12% –2% 23%
NLSY–97
Sequential Ordering I Skills Family NBHD
Weeks worked per year 6.90 27% 28% –7% 52%
Log avg annual earnings 1.54 30% 14% 10% 45%
Sequential Ordering II Family Skills NBHD
Weeks worked per year 6.90 34% 21% –7% 52%
Log avg annual earnings 1.54 20% 25% 10% 45%
Sequential Ordering III Family NBHD Skills
Weeks worked per year 6.90 34% –3% 17% 52%
Log avg annual earnings 1.54 20% 11% 25% 45%
1 NBHD stands for neighborhood, and DFL stands for the DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux
decomposition. The top panel uses the NLSY–79 sample and the bottom panel uses
the NLSY–97 sample. Sample weights are used.
2 The number of weeks worked per year is averaged over the sixth to eighth years.
The annual earnings are averaged over the sixth to eighth years and then take the
inverse hyperbolic sine.
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Table 3.8: Explanatory Power of Pre-Market Factors across the Distribution
Share Explained by
Racial Gap Share Explained by Unexplained Each Factor
Pre-Market Factors Residuals When Added Alone
Skills Family NBHD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NLSY–79
Employment Distributions
25th percentile 8.33 164% –64% 112% 60% 40%
Median 1.33 300% –200% 150% 50% 25%
Earnings Distributions
25th percentile 0.65 34% 66% 75% 57% 4%
Median 0.70 45% 55% 58% 27% –1%
75th percentile 0.56 38% 62% 38% 25% –8%
NLSY–97
Employment Distributions
25th percentile 15.00 31% 69% 27% 33% 0%
Median 6.00 11% 89% 8% 11% 0%
Earnings Distributions
25th percentile 1.45 23% 77% 15% 17% 3%
Median 0.68 24% 76% 20% 20% –3%
75th percentile 0.41 48% 52% 54% 33% –7%
1 NBHD stands for neighborhood. The top panel uses the NLSY–79 sample, including 444 white
men and 271 Black men. The bottom panel uses the NLSY–97 sample, including 825 white
men and 396 Black men. Both samples are balanced panels of men who have completed formal
schooling for at least eight years. Sample weights are used.
2 The number of weeks worked per year is averaged over the sixth to eighth years. The annual
earnings are averaged over the sixth to eighth years and then take the inverse hyperbolic sine.
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Chapter 4: Have the Returns to Cognitive Skills Really Declined in the
U.S.?
4.1 Introduction
Understanding how human capital differences across workers affect their labor market
outcomes is an essential goal of empirical research in labor economics. The early focus on
modeling and estimating the return to education (e.g. Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974) gave
rise to consideration of how underlying dimensions of skill, such as cognitive ability, affect
the accumulation and estimation of returns to education (e.g. Griliches, 1977). In more
recent decades, the focus has partly shifted to understanding and estimating the returns to
these dimensions of skill themselves (e.g. Neal and Johnson 1996; Heckman, Stixrud, and
Urzúa, 2006; Urzúa, 2008), rather than just treating them as a nuisance factor in estimating
the returns to education. And amidst all of this, researchers have turned to understanding
how dramatic changes in the structure of the U.S. labor market over the past few decades
has change the returns to schooling and underlying skills (e.g. Autor, Dorn, and Hanson,
2013; Beaudry, Green, and Sand, 2016; Autor, 2019).
One of the large challenges to estimating the labor market return to any specific type of
skill is that researchers only ever observe proxies for underlying skills of individuals, and
these proxies may suffer from substantial measurement error (Griliches, 1986). Establish-
ing how the return to a specific skill may have evolved over time is even more challenging,
as measurement issues are compounded by the fact that the observed proxies for those skills
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themselves often change over time.
Two influential studies, both using data from the two cohorts of the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), provide empirical evidence suggesting that the wage
returns to cognitive skills have declined for young workers in the U.S. over the past 40
years (Castex and Dechter, 2014; Deming, 2017). In both of these studies, the authors use
information from the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) to measure cognitive skills
across the two NLSY cohorts. Casual observation might suggest that because AFQT test
scores are collected and utilized for both NLSY cohorts, measurement issues with using
AFQT as a proxy for cognitive ability should be the same across cohorts, alleviating con-
cerns that might have arisen if different cognitive ability test scores had been used. Castex
and Dechter (2014) argue that returns to education have increased while returns to cogni-
tive ability have decreased. Deming (2017) concludes that returns to cognitive skills have
declined, but that returns to social skills have increased. Both papers use the empirical con-
clusions that they make from the NLSY data to try to better understand why these returns
have changed, and although the two papers have different emphases, both end up conclud-
ing that technological change has fundamentally altered the relationship between skills and
labor market outcomes such that cognitive ability is less productive, and thus the returns to
cognitive skill has fallen.
In this paper, we revisit the question of whether the returns to cognitive ability have
changed. First, we point out that if technology is indeed driving the changing wage return
to cognitive ability, it should also be driving investments in cognitive ability, an implication
that the previous papers have not considered formally. These changing investments in
cognitive ability should cause a shift in the population distribution of cognitive ability over
time. We examine the theoretical implications of this in the first section of the paper by
specifying and simulating a simple model of skill accumulation with changing technology,
demonstrating that we can rationalize both a change in the wage return to cognitive ability
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and a change in the the underlying distribution of cognitive ability. We then introduce a
Yitzhaki (1996) decomposition to demonstrate the relationship between the distribution of
cognitive ability and the estimation of its wage return in the labor market in the typical
setting of a linear regression where the log of wages is regressed on a measure of cognitive
ability.
In the second section of the paper, we document (as in Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange,
2012) the change in distribution over time in what we call the AAFQT, a measure of cogni-
tive ability derived from the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) that has been collected
and concorded in the two cohorts of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).
Empirically, we show that the changing distribution of AAFQT over the cohorts, while
somewhat more complex than our simple model suggests, is consistent with a model of
changing investments in cognitive skill in the wake of a fall in the productivity of cognitive
ability.
We then perform the Yitzhaki decomposition of the ordinary least squares (OLS) esti-
mates of the returns to cognitive skill separately for each NLSY cohort, using the typical
log linear functional form relationship between wages and cognitive skill. We recover the
OLS estimates of the wage return for each cohort, but we also demonstrate how the OLS
estimates are affected by the distribution of AAFQT via an analysis of the weights from
Yitzhaki’s formulation. We show that the changing distribution of AAFQT over time plays
a key role in the empirical finding of declining OLS returns to AAFQT. Given this finding,
we end with a discussion of whether the observed changes in the test score measure may
be driven by measurement error, rather than by true changes in the distribution of cognitive
ability.
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4.2 The Conceptual Framework
Consider a general process generating a labor market outcome, Y , of the form:
Y = ϕ(A,H) (4.1)
where A denotes technology, H represents human capital. For sake of clarity, we omit other







This basic setting has, for decades, formed the basis of much of what labor economists
study. While an individual’s human capital, H, was initially specified as a univariate
measure–often years of schooling (e.g. Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974)–more recently it has
been thought of as a multi-dimensional measure of skills, consisting (depending of data
availability) of years of schooling and a vector of skills (often cognitive skills and some-
times non-cognitive skills and social skills).
Given the implications of technological change for the labor markets (Acemoglu, 2002),
in this paper we examine whether the relationship between skills and labor market out-








Without data on A, researchers have turned to time variation as a source of identification
for equation (4.3). Castex and Dechter (2014) and Deming (2017) estimate versions of
this expression using this approach. As the relevant labor market outcome they use hourly
wages where the data are drawn from the 1979 and 1997 cohorts of the National Longi-
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tudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). Both papers provide empirical evidence suggesting that
the wage returns to dimensions of human capital have changed across the cohorts. On
conceptual grounds, however, it is necessary to consider the potential endogeneity of skills
before interpreting the sign of expression (4.3) as evidence of this claim. In addition, just
the presence of (potentially non-classical) measurement error in proxies for skill can lead
to incorrect conclusions.
Consider first the role of skill formation and assume a structural association between
A and H, H = H(A). In a dynamic setting, this could be the result of individual’s human
capital investments responding to technology. To simply the analysis, we assume H is













































∂A2 = 0 (linearity), the sign of (4.3) is determined by the









which illustrates how technology and human capital accumulation determine the way skill
premium evolves with technological change.1
1On top of the analysis here, selection into occupation amplifies the difficulties of empirically identifying
the sign of (4.3). To see this, consider a two-sector Roy model. Let A1 and A2 be the respective technologies
in each sector. Individuals self-select into 1 or 2. Let D2 be a dummy indicating sector 2 has been selected.
Thus, the outcome becomes:
Y = ϕ(A1,H)+D2 [ϕ(A2,H)−ϕ(A1,H)] , (4.5)
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4.2.1 A simple illustrative model
To better illustrate the economic forces driving the relationship between technology
and human capital investments, we consider an adaptation of the “q” theory of investment
(Tobin and Brainard, 1976) to our setting. We emphasize at the outset that our goal here is
not to fully fit the model to the data we use, but rather to point out in a simple framework
that if cognitive ability is the result of an investment process, technological change will
affect the population distribution of cognitive ability and its return in the labor market. Let
It denote human capital investments, Ht the stock of human capital, and It = (dHt/dt)/Ht .
Let q(I) denote the cost of adding human capital (q′(I)> 0,q′′(I)> 0,q(0) = 0,q′(0) = 1),
ρ the discount factor, r the marginal productivity of human capital (in units of output), and






The optimal I∗ must satisfy r−q(I
∗)
ρ−I∗ = q
′(I∗) (Uzawa, 1969). Assuming a quadratic cost
function and a discount factor of 0.04, a 10% decrease in the marginal productivity of
human capital r (from r = 1.1 in period 1 to r = 1 in period 2) would drive down opti-
mal investments I∗ from 1.8% to 1.6%. This could be the result of technological change
generating the mapping from A to H described above.
Assuming in the initial condition that H0 follows a beta distribution B(5,1.5), Figure
4.1 depicts the distribution of the stock human capital under two regimes (period 1 and
period 2) with ten years of endogenous investments. After the change in productivity, the
distribution of human capital shifts leftward in period 2.
and the sign of (4.3) now depends on how ability and technology alter the occupational decision-making and
potential outcome gains. Accounting for selection demands becomes essential. Despite the fact that Deming
(2017) acknowledges the issue, the literature has overlooked its implications.
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4.2.2 The Yitzhaki Decomposition
Despite these complexities, the evidence on the sign of expression (4.3) comes from
Least Squares results obtained from linear regression models of the form:
Y = E[Y |H,A]+ ε = α(A)+β (A)H + ε. (4.6)
In order to estimate the equation, one must choose Y , and one must find measures of A and
H. Deming (2017) and Castex and Dechter (2014) estimate versions of this equation where
they specify log wages as Y , they use time as a proxy for A, and they use a measure of
cognitive skill that is derived from Altonji et al. (2012). They both report a decreasing βA
between NLSY–79 and NLSY–97, both concluding the returns to (cognitive) ability have
decreased over time.
In light of expression (4.4), we explore the potential channels behind this conclusion,
by implementing a Yitzhaki decomposition (Yitzhaki, 1996). Let BA(h) = E(Y |A,H = h)
be the regression curve and bA(h) be its slope, i.e. the unit treatment effect evaluated at h
given A. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimate of the linear relationship between Y







Therefore, βOLS can be decomposed into unit treatment effects bA(h) and how they are







2Theil (1950) and Sen (1968) exploit this formulation.
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where FA,H(h) is the cumulative density function of H evaluated at h, σ2A,H is the associated







 (EA(H|H > h)−EA(H|H ≤ h)) (4.8)
wA(h) are non-negative and solely depend on the distribution of H. FA,H(h)(1−FA,H(h))
reaches its peak when FA,H(h) = 0.5, i.e. at the center of the distribution of H, and therefore
so does the term in the first set of parentheses in (4.8).
Looking at the second expression in parentheses in (4.8), one sees that larger differences
in the conditional expectations on either side of a given h contribute more to the OLS
weights. This dispersion is essential for understanding how OLS operates. In particular,
what it means is that left(right)-skewed distributions will tend to put higher (lower) weight
on h’s toward the bottom of the distribution. Note, however, that if the unit treatment effects
bA(h) are constant, the weighting scheme of the Yitzhaki decomposition doesn’t matter in
practice. This will turn out to be important to our analysis later on.
We can implement the Yitzhaki decomposition in the context of our example. Given
the evolution of the stock of human capital and assuming W = w×er×H , we can reproduce
what a linear regression of log wages on human capital (lnW = α +βH) would yield in
each period. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 present the Yitzhaki slopes and weights, respectively. We
see how the increase in r affects both the weights and slopes at the same time. In this
specific simulation case (and in particular, given the specific wage function), we see the
slopes are constant in both periods and are lower in period 2 across the H distribution,
and the weights shift leftward. The changes in slopes and weights together make the OLS
estimator of the effect of human capital on wages fall by 9.1% from period 1 to period 2.
This example is quite simple, of course, and changing the model in various ways–for
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example by changing the structure of the cost function to be something more complex
than a simple quadratic function–will yield different investment decisions that will yield
different distributions of cognitive ability, different Yitzhaki weights and unit slopes, and
thus different wage returns.
Another issue of a more practical nature is measurement error. As true ability or
skill might be difficult to observe, one could conceptualize any ability measure, H∗, as
H∗ = H + u. In this context, β OLSA would be biased and wA(h) and bA(h) would incor-
rectly characterize the true weights and unit treatment effects, respectively. Nonetheless,
under classical measurement error one could still identify whether the returns to skills are
increasing or decreasing across different values of A. For example, and anticipating our
discussion, as casual observation might suggest that the because test scores, H∗, are col-
lected and utilized for both NLSY cohorts, any measurement issues with using H∗ as a
proxy for cognitive ability, if they exist at all, should be the same across cohorts. But as we
document below, a serious examination of how measured test scores have changed across
the NLSY cohorts, and how those changes have affected estimated wage returns to cogni-
tive ability, suggests that casual observation is likely wrong. As a result, one needs to be
cautious in drawing firm conclusions about whether or not the return to cognitive ability
has really changed. And therefore, one needs to be cautious in developing (and testing)
theories for the economic processes that can drive a decline in the return. We discuss the
data, including the imperfect proxies for cognitive skills, next.
4.3 NLSY–79, NLSY–97, and their imperfect proxies for cognitive skills
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) has been hugely important in shap-
ing our understanding of the U.S. labor market in the past 40 years. In particular, a tremen-
dous amount of work has been done using NLSY–79, a nationally representative sample of
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the cohort of American youths aged 14 to 22 when first surveyed in 1979. Compared to
NLSY–79, less research has been conducted on NLSY–97, a younger cohort of American
youth aged 12-16 when first surveyed in 1997. Now that the NLSY–97 cohort are all firmly
in their thirties, it has become increasingly important to invest further in understanding the
various dimensions of the labor market experiences of this cohort. Drawing comparisons
between the labor market experiences of two NLSY cohorts, when conducted appropriately,
will also help us understand how the U.S. labor market has evolved over time.
Given the recent availability of education, migration and especially labor market data
of the NLSY–97 cohort, there has been an emerging series of papers that compare the
two NLSY cohorts along different dimensions (Dillion and Smith 2020; Johnson and
Schulhofer-Wohl 2019; Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange, 2012; Castex and Dechter, 2014;
Deming, 2017). Among them, Altonji, Bharadwaj and Lange (2012), Castex and Dechter
(2014), and Deming (2017) focus on the labor market outcomes of the two cohorts of
young Americans and their findings together have shaped the narrative of changing skills
and changing returns to skills in the U.S. labor market. Given the importance and influence
of the three papers, we reconsider their findings in this paper.
As one of the earliest papers that conduct cross-cohort comparisons of the NLSY–79
and the NLSY–97, Altonji, Bharadwaj and Lange (2012) compare the distribution of skills
between the two cohorts and study its implication for wage inequality. They carefully
document the challenges associated with making cross-cohort comparisons using NLSY
and construct the samples and variables in a way that best allows for concordance between
the two cohorts. Based on a number of assumptions, they conclude that the skill distribution
has widened from NLSY–79 to NLSY–97. In particular, they find that the distribution of
AFQT score, as a measure for cognitive skills, has widened from NLSY–79 to NLSY–97.
Since Altonji, Bharadwaj and Lange (2012), there have been two influential papers that
study how the wage returns to skills have changed across the two NLSY cohorts of young
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adults in their early careers. Castex and Dechter (2014) focus on estimating changes in
the skill price of AFQT, while Deming (2017) focuses on changes in the price of measures
of social skills but he also estimates the changes in the skill price of AFQT. Both papers
estimate conventional linear hedonic wage functions with constant skill prices. Despite the
differences in choices of samples and model specifications, both papers find that the OLS
estimate of wage returns to AFQT has declined from NLSY–79 to NLSY–97. 3
The AFQT score has been widely used by researchers as a measure of cognitive skills
(see, e.g. Neal and Johnson 1996; Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzúa, 2006; Urzúa, 2008).
The score is constructed based on four sections of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
Battery (ASVAB), a test adopted by the U.S. military for determining various aspects of
enlistment (Defense Manpower Data Center, 2006).4 Individuals selected to participate in
both the 1979 and 1997 NLSY cohorts also took the ASVAB. Indeed, the administration of
the ASVAB was facilitated by the U.S. military in order to create an estimate of the youth
population test distribution so that the scores of military recruits could be normed against
the population. However, there were two fundamental differences in the test format and
in the administration of the test across the two cohorts. First, while the NLSY–79 respon-
dents took a paper-based test, the NLSY–97 respondents took a computer-based tests that
incorporates Item Response Theory (IRT), so that not all respondents answer all questions.
Second, the NLSY–79 respondents were ages 15-23 when they took the test, while the
NLSY–97 respondents were 12-18.
Altonji et al. (2012) were the first to conduct an in-depth cross-cohort analysis of the
3Unlike Castex and Dechter (2014) and Deming (2017), Weinberger (2014) compares two samples of
high school seniors from 1972 and 1992 seven years after graduation and concludes that the returns to high
school math score, as a measure for cognitive skills, have increased across these two cohorts. Although the
two cohorts analyzed by Weinberger do not overlap perfectly with the two NLSY cohorts, this finding stands
in direct contrast to the documented “decline” in the returns to AFQT. Weinberger’s finding has received
much less attention than that in the other two papers, but the contradictory findings do provide additional
motivation for our analysis.
4See Appendix for an introduction of the background of the ASVAB, its relationship with the NLSY
cohorts, as well as other essential details about the AFQT score.
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characteristics of the two NLSY cohorts. In order to compare AFQT test scores across
the cohorts, they created adjusted AFQT scores for the NLSY–97 respondents. Creating
the adjusted scores was done in two steps. First, because the item-specific responses to
the computer-based ASVAB for the NLSY–97 respondents are the property of the military,
Altonji et al. relied on a concordance created by Segall (1997) that translates the computer-
based IRT test scores (also known as “thetas”) for the NLSY–97 cohort into paper-based
scores. Altonji et al. then took Segall’s paper-based AFQT scores for just the 16-year-olds
in both cohorts who took the exams, and assuming rank invariance in test scores across
test-taking age, assigned to respondents of different test-taking ages the AFQT test scores
of 16-year-olds of the same rank. So, for example, the adjusted AFQT scores assigned
to a 14-year-old test-taker with the median score in that age group is assigned to be the
median AFQT of the 16-year-olds in that same NLSY cohort. We refer to these Altonji
et al. adjusted AFQT scores as AAFQT scores, to make it clear that the adjustment has
occurred.
It is these AAFQT scores that Altonji et al. use in their cross-cohort comparison of the
NLSY cohorts. When Altonji et al. wrote their paper, the NLSY–97 cohort was still mostly
in very early adulthood, and so while it was too soon to meaningfully and directly compare
labor market outcomes of the two cohorts, Altonji et al. carefully documented how the
observed characteristics of the two cohorts during their youth had changed, and considered
the implications of those changes on wage inequality. One of the important changes Altonji
et al. document is that there was a marked shift in the AAFQT distribution across the two
cohorts.
Figure 4.4 plots the distributions of AAFQT scores for just the white non-Hispanic men
in the two NLSY cohorts. (We limit our analysis to white non-Hispanic men in the core
samples to abstract from compositional changes in the population and potential differential
measurement issues across demographic groups.) The first notable finding, as highlighted
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by Altonji et al., is that both the mean and the median of AAFQT scores are higher in the
younger (NLSY–97) cohort. Perhaps more strikingly, the skewness of the distribution is
much more pronounced for the younger cohort (0.91) than for the older cohort (0.54), with
fewer scores for the younger cohort falling in the low-ish range of 125 to 150 (or so). 5
In a later section, we return in detail to the question of whether cognitive ability has
truly changed across the cohorts, but for now we treat the changing distribution of AAFQT
as measuring the true change in cognitive ability. And we demonstrate that the changing
distribution has important consequences for understanding the changing estimated returns
to cognitive skill, as measured by AAFQT.
4.4 The Wage Return to Cognitive Skill
Many studies have used some version of NLSY AFQT test scores to estimate the labor
market returns to cognitive skills. Castex and Dechter (2014) and Deming (2017) are the
first studies to use AAFQT scores to measure the changing returns to cognitive skills across
cohorts.
In Table 4.1, we report the results of regressions that specify and parameterize Equa-
tions (4.1) and (4.3) similar to those used in Castex and Dechter (2014) and Deming (2017).
In particular, we estimate equations where we the labor market outcome of interest is the log
of a wage measure, and we estimate a log-linear relationship between wages and AAFQT.
lnW ti = α
t +β tAAFQT ti + γ
tX ti + ε
t
i
where W ti is an the average hourly wage of individual i from cohort t observed between the
5This divergence across cohorts is similarly observed among non-Hispanic white men who took the test
at age 16 (see Appendix Figure 4A.1). A similar divergence is also observed for other demographic groups,
including white non-Hispanic women, and indeed it is consistent with Altonji et al.’s finding for AFQT scores
when pooling together all genders, races, and ethnicities (see Appendix Figures 4A.3 and 4A.2).
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ages of 25 and 33.6
The results in Table 4.1 confirm the basic results of Castex and Dechter and Deming.
Columns (1) and (4) of Table 4.1 report estimates of Equation (4.9) for the NLSY–79 and
NLSY–97 cohorts respectively. The estimated (log) wage return to an additional AFQT
point falls from 0.53 for the NLSY–79 cohort to 0.36 for the NLSY–97 cohort, a large and
statistically significant drop of 0.17, or 47 percent. In columns (2) and (6) we add to the
specification years of schooling. Including years of schooling in the specification reduces
the estimated coefficients on AFQT, but the differential between the estimated coefficients
across the cohorts is actually slightly larger at -0.22, representing an even larger increase
in percentage terms. Adding controls for the measures of non-cognitive and social skills
that Deming used, as reported in columns (3) and (6), has little additional effect on the
estimated returns to AFQT. 7
In the remainder of the paper, we focus exclusively on the univariate relationship be-
tween AAFQT and the log of wages, excluding from our analysis consideration of years
of schooling or other dimensions of skill. Columns (1) and (4) of Table 4.1 thus form
our baseline. We do this for four basic reasons. First, the finding that OLS wage returns
to AAFQT declined across the cohorts is robust to the inclusion of those other variables.
Second, years of schooling may be an mediating factor between AAFQT and labor market
outcomes (Neal and Johnson 1996; Heckman, 1998). Third, to the extent that AAFQT
may be mismeasured, the same can be said of the other skills measures, and considering
measurement issues in multiple variables is very complex. Fourth, we examine nonpara-
metric relationships between AAFQT and log wages, and in doing so we need to maintain
6Following Deming, we limit our sample in both cohorts to labor market outcomes between the ages of
25 and 33. We report results from weighted regressions, use the custom sample weights created by the BLS
to keep the samples nationally representative.
7The finding of declining estimated wage returns to AFQT in Table 4.1 is robust to measuring wages
for men of the same calendar age, it is robust to dropping calendar years when the national unemployment




In the next section, we turn to a detailed analysis of what exactly is driving the OLS
estimate of the decline in the return to AAFQT across the cohorts. To do this, we hearken
back to an old method for understanding how OLS estimates are constructed.
4.4.1 Implementing the Yitzhaki Decomposition
In practice, we deal with discrete X . (In particular, in our application, X is AAFQT
scores.) One can discretize the construction of the OLS estimate as follows:
First, rank observations in increasing order of X , so x1 < x2 < · · · < xn. Let Ni be the
number of duplicate observations for xi and let N be the sum of all observations: N =
N1 + · · ·+Nn.
Then, let ∆xi = xi+1− xi and let bi = ∆ȳi/∆xi. Thus, we can think of bi as the pairwise
slope or estimated “unit treatment effect”.






































It is important to emphasize that these “Yitzhaki” weights are solely a function of X ; Y ’s
role in the construction of the OLS estimates comes only through its role in the calculation
of the pairwise slopes.
Often, weighted least squares (WLS) is utilized instead of OLS. We show in the Ap-
pendix that it is straightforward to extend the Yitzhaki decomposition to WLS. Just as can
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be done in weighted least squares, each observation in the sample is just “blown up” appro-
priately by its sample weight, and then the mechanics of the OLS Yitzhaki decomposition
follows. For the remainder of the paper so as not to confuse sample weights with Yitzhaki
weights, we refer to OLS throughout, but to be clear, we do apply sample weights when
estimating linear regressions and when performing Yitzhaki decompositions.
Consider again the simple univariate regression equation representing the relationship
between log wages and AFQT scores:
lnW ti = α
t +β tAFQT ti + ε
t
i (4.9)


























Thinking about the OLS estimates as weighted sums of unit treatment effects, it be-
comes clear that one can examine the changing OLS returns to AFQT across the NLSY–79
and NLSY–97 cohorts by examining whether the change is mechanically driven by chang-
ing Yitzhaki weights, changing pairwise slopes, or both. In particular, because the Yitzhaki
weights are only a function of AAFQT scores, one can specifically examine how much the
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changing distribution of AAFQT scores between the two cohorts is affecting the construc-
tion of the OLS estimates.
4.4.2 Understanding the Declining OLS Wage Returns to AAFQT
We begin by graphing in Figure 4.5 the OLS estimates of the wage returns to AAFQT
in each cohort, as well as the underlying data. It is clear from Figure 4.5 that the OLS
return to AAFQT is lower in the NLSY–97 cohort than in the NLSY–79 cohort, and that
the result does not appear to be driven by any particular outliers.
In Figure 4.6, we graph the pairwise slopes of the Yitzhaki decomposition. These
pairwise slopes come from taking the difference in the average log wages between adjacent
AAFQT scores from Figure 4.5. In order to make the graph more readable, we collapse
AAFQT scores into bins that each contain 3 consecutive AAFQT points, and we report
the average of the pairwise slopes in each 3-point bin. One can see that it is difficult to
discern any particular pattern across the AAFQT distribution or between the cohorts. This
is not problematic–the pairwise slopes themselves presumably consist of a lot of random
variation in wages across individuals.
The more important component of the Yitzhaki decomposition to consider is the Yitzhaki
weights. In Figure 4.7, therefore, we graph the Yitzhaki weights for each NLSY cohort sep-
arately, again calculating and reporting average weights using bin sizes of 3 AAFQT points.
Note that the Yitzhaki decomposition tells us that if we multiple each point in Figure 4.6
by its corresponding point in Figure 4.7, and then sum these, we recover the OLS estimate.
In Figure 4.8 we present a version of the weights that is smoothed with local linear
regression. It is clear (especially in the smoothed graph in Figure 4.8) that the Yitzhaki
weights differ between the two cohorts, and in particular that lower AAFQT scores receive
more weight in the construction of the OLS estimate for the NLSY–97 cohort than for the
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NLSY–79 cohort. It is worth considering carefully why this is happening.
Looking back at Figure 4.4, and noting the construction of the Yitzhaki weights in
Equation (4.8), the increased left-skewness of the AAFQT distribution in the NLSY—97
yields larger weights on low AAFQT scores for the NLSY–97 cohort than for the NLSY79
cohort. This is true for very low AAFQT scores, but it is even true for values of the AAFQT
score in the mid-low range where the density of AAFQT scores is lower in the NLSY–97
cohort.
But just seeing that the Yitzhaki weights are left-shifted in the NLSY–97 relative to the
NLSY–79 does not alone explain why, mechanically, the estimated OLS returns to AAFQT
are lower in the NLSY–97. To understand this, one needs to understand how the Yitzhaki
weights work together with the pairwise slopes. To get an intuitive sense of this, in Figure
4.9, we again graph the Yitzhaki weights, but we also include for each cohort the pairwise
slopes, but smoothed with local linear regression.
The local linear regression results reveal that the gradient of the relationship between
AAFQT and log wages remained relatively upward sloping and constant through much of
the AAFQT distribution for the NLSY–79 cohort (except perhaps at the very top and very
bottom–places where local linear regression performs less well and where there are few ob-
sevrations), leading to what appears to be a fairly linear and positive relationship between
AAFQT and log wages for the NLSY–79 cohort. In contrast, the gradient for the NLSY–97
cohort appears much less constant; in particular, it has flat spots at various points in the
distribution, especially for AAFQT scores between around 100 and 150 (which is approxi-
mately the median score in NLSY–97), and then again between around 170 and 190 (in the
range of the 70th to 80th percentiles). Note that these regions of AAFQT scores are also re-
gions that receive a lot of weight for the NLSY–97 cohort in the Yitzhaki representation of
the OLS estimate, providing suggestive evidence that the lower OLS estimate of the wage
return to AAFQT in the NLSY–97 cohort is being driven mainly by these flat spots in the
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local linear regression.
To better understand how the different parts of the AAFQT distribution contribute to
the OLS estimates of the wage returns to AAFQT, in Figure 4.10, we graph the progressive
sum of the Yitzhaki equation from Equations (4.10) and (4.11), starting with the lowest
AAFQT score until the entire sum is calculated and we recover the OLS estimate. That is,
for each AAFQT score xk from x1 to xn−1, we calculate for each of the two NLSY cohorts






i, k = 1, . . . ,n−1 (4.12)
and graph the result.
Although the results in Figure 4.10 are order-dependent so that, for example, starting
from the highest AAFQT score and working out way down to the lowest would yield a dif-
ferent figure, we think the figure is still informative. In particular, the figure shows that the
contributions of the very lowest AAFQT scores to the OLS estimates were not very differ-
ent in the two cohorts, but that the progressive sums from the Yitzhaki decomposition begin
to permanently diverge at an AAFQT score of around 125 (less than the 10th percentile), at
which point the Yitzhaki sum for the NLSY–79 cohort rises quickly and continuously until
it reaches its final level of 0.053. In contrast, the the Yitzhaki sum for the NLSY–97 cohort
stays virtually constant until around an AAFQT score of 150 (the 25th percentile), then it
rises quickly, only to actually fall again before recovering and rising to its final level of
0.036. This is (not surprisingly) consistent with Figure 4.9, where the flat portion of the lo-
cal linear regression for the NLSY–97 cohort plays a large role in depressing the NLSY–97
OLS estimate relative to the NLSY–79 estimate.
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4.5 Counterfactual OLS Estimates
Given the different OLS estimates of the wage returns to AAFQT for the NLSY–79
and NLSY–97 cohorts, we can ask the following counterfactual question: Would the esti-
mated OLS returns to AAFQT have changed between the two cohorts if the distribution of
AAFQT had not changed?
To answer this counterfactual question, we reframe it in terms of the mechanics of the
Yitzhaki decomposition by equivalently asking: Would the the estimated OLS returns to
AAFQT have changed between the two cohorts if the Yitzhaki weights had been held fixed
across the cohorts but the observed pairwise slopes had still been realized? 8
We answer this question by decomposing the observed difference between β 79OLS and




























The first term in parentheses in the top decomposition is the counterfactual difference in
the OLS estimates, holding fixed the AAFQT distribution (and the corresponding Yitzhaki
weights) at the NLSY–79 level. Graphically, the components of this counterfactual decom-
position can be represented by Figure 4.11, where we overlay the Yitzhaki weights from
NLSY–79 onto the (smoothed representation) of the observed pairwise slopes from the two
cohorts.
Alternatively, the second term in parentheses in the bottom decomposition is the coun-
terfactual difference in the OLS estimates, holding fixed the AAFQT distribution (and the
corresponding Yitzhaki weights) at the NLSY–97 level. Graphically, the components of
8We believe we are the first to use the Yitzhaki decomposition to consider this kind of counterfactual
comparison across cohorts.
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this counterfactual decomposition can be represented by Figure 4.11, where here we over-
lay the Yitzhaki weights from NLSY–97 onto the (smoothed representation) of the observed
pairwise slopes from the two cohorts.
As a reminder, the actual OLS estimates in Table 4.1 Columns (1) and (4) demonstrate




OLS−β 97OLS = 0.54−0.34 = 0.20
Using the top decomposition in Equation (4.13), this decline can be decomposed as:
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The term in the first set of parentheses is the counterfactual change in returns holding the
Yitzhaki weights at NLSY–79 levels. This counterfactual indicates that the OLS return to
AAFQT scores actually went up by 0.25 points, a substantial increase of 47%.
Alternatively, if we fix the Yitzhaki weights at NLSY–97 levels, we find this:
β
79
OLS−β 97OLS = ∑
i



























The term in the second set of parentheses above is the counterfactual change in returns
holding weights at NLSY–97 levels. Hence, when using NLSY–97 weights, the estimated
return to AAFQT falls by 0.25 points, somewhat larger even than the observed OLS esti-
mate.
This finding highlights the critical role that the changing composition of AAFQT scores
across the two cohorts has played in the narratives that there has been a decline in the return
to cognitive ability.
We note that Castex and Dechter (2014) use AAFQT scores directly in their analysis, as
we have done here. Deming (2017), on the other hand, does not. He standardizes AAFQT’s
in both cohorts to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. It should be clear
from the analysis we have done here that standardizing and equating the distributions across
the two cohorts is not a benign transformation–in particular, it sets the Yitzhaki weights to
be the the same across the two cohorts in a context where the weights end up playing a key
role in determining the OLS estimates.
Although in Section 4.2 we developed a model to motivate the changing distribution of
cognitive skill and its effect on wage returns, in the next section we delve into whether we
can really be sure that the returns to cognitive skill have changed. In particular, we consider
the role of measurement error.
4.6 The Measurement of Cognitive Ability
Consideration of the economic underpinnings of rising returns to cognitive ability rests
on the assumption that estimated rising returns actually reflect reality, and are not a result
of issues in the measurement of cognitive ability.
There has long been concern about whether test scores correctly measure the under-
lying skills they are meant to capture, and there have been various proposed econometric
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approaches to correcting for measurement error (see, e.g., Griliches and W. Mason, 1972,
for an early treatment of this issue). In this section, we delve into three related questions:
(1) whether AAFQT is a mismeasured proxy for cognitive skill; (2) if so, at what stage
much of the measurement error may have been introduced; (3) and whether it is possible to
easily correct for any measurement error.9
Our substantive interest remains focused on whether or not the wage return to cognitive
skill has changed. Given our previous finding that the answer to this question is strongly
dependent on the changing distribution of AAFQT across the cohorts, and given that we
have no true measure of cognitive skill for either cohort, we emphasize measurement issues
within the context of the changing distributions of AAFQT across the NLSY cohorts.10
The first thing to note about the increased (left) skewness of AAFQT scores in the
NLSY–97 relative to those for the earlier cohort is that, as we show in Appendix Figure
4A.4, it is not being driven by one specific section of the adjusted ASVAB scores (adjusted
by Segall to turn the IRT-based scores into paper-based scores) that Altonji et al. used
to create AAFQT. Indeed, it is especially pronounced in both Numerical Operations and
Paragraph Comprehension–both of which also are parts of the AFQT and may well reflect
different underlying dimensions of cognitive ability.
Second, this divergence in AAFQT scores across the cohorts is not a function of Altonji
et al.’s age adjustment. This has to be the case if Altonji et al. used the rank order of
scores for non-16-year-olds and assigned by rank the numerical scores of 16-year-olds. We
confirm this in in Appendix Figure 4A.1 where we graph the AAFQT scores for just 16-
9There is a separate but important measurement debate about whether the AFQT test is racially biased
(Wigdor and Green Jr., 1991; Neal and Johnson 1996; Rodgers and Spriggs, 1996; Heckman, 1998). We
limit our analysis to non-Hispanic whites.
10Recall that the concordance of the AFQT score across cohorts that was done by Altonji et al. involves
two critical steps. The first step is a mapping between the computer-based test scores (in the NLSY–97) and
paper-based test scores (in the NLSY–79), which relies on the external study conducted by Segall (1997) for
the Department of Defense. The second step is a mapping between test scores at age 16 and test scores at
other ages. As discussed above, the second step relies on a somewhat strong assumption that the AFQT score
is rank-invariant across ages.
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year-olds in our sample, and in Appendix Figure 4A.5 where we also graph each section of
the adjusted ASVAB scores for 16-year-olds as well.
Third, the divergence does not seem to be a direct artifact of Segall’s conversion of
computer-based IRT scores to paper-based scores. In Appendix Figures 4A.6, we graph the
distribution of the original IRT-based scores for different ASVAB sections for the NLSY–
97 cohort alongside IRT-based scores that were constructed after-the-fact from the original
paper-based tests by researchers from the Ohio State University for the NLSY–79 cohort.11
Appendix Figure 4A.7 shows the same distribution for just 16-year-olds in our sample.
The divergence of scores in the NLSY–97 IRT-based scores relative to NLSY–79 scores is
clearly visible in different sections.
However, despite the existence of IRT-based scores (“thetas”) for both NLSY cohorts,
it far from clear that they are directly comparable for at least three reasons. First, we do
not know if the IRT models and estimation methods used for the two cohorts are the same.
Second, even if the models and methods are the same, the raw data imported to the models
may still not be comparable due to the very different test formats. Third, there is one
important hint that something is amiss in the IRT scores for the NLSY–97.
Appendix Figure 4A.8 plots the standard errors of the estimated IRT scores, the “thetas,”
for different ASVAB sections. As pointed out in past studies (Schofield, 2014; Jacob and
Rothstein, 2016, in IRT models, thetas in IRT models are more precisely estimated for
the middle of the distribution, leading to a non-classical measurement error structure with
larger errors at the tails. Thus, the measurement error in the test score is correlated with
the underlying true ability or skill.12 The error structure of the thetas in the NLSY–79 is
11See Ing, Lunney, and Olsen (2012) for more detailed discussion. IRT-based scores (“thetas”) are not
available for the numerical operations section of ASVAB in the NLSY–79.
12This particular measurement error issue of IRT scores is a feature of IRT, generally, and not just for
NLSY datasets. Jacob and Rothstein (2016) point out this issue for the many longitudinal studies conducted
by National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), such as the National Education Longitudinal Study
(NELS).
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generally symmetric, exactly as expected from the IRT model (Schofield 2014). What is
somewhat odd is that in the NLSY–97, the errors are abnormally large for low ASVAB
scorers.13 This empirical irregularity of the thetas for the later cohort is particularly worri-
some given our finding of the importance of low AAFQT scores in driving the estimates of
changing returns to cognitive skill.
All told, it appears that to the extent that there may be important measurement error
in the AAFQT scores in the NLSY–97 that drives the divergence across the cohorts, it
seems to be present in the original IRT-based AFQT test score results for the NLSY–97
respondents, and is not a function of Segall’s conversion to paper-based scores or Altonji
et al.’s age adjustment.
Aware of the potential bias caused by measurement errors, Castex and Dechter (2014)
used SAT scores as an instrumental variable for AFQT scores in some of their analyses. In
general, in order to use one test score as an instrument for another, one must assume that
measurement errors in the two test scores are both uncorrelated with the true underlying
skill and uncorrelated with each other. In the case of the IRT-based AFQT scores in the
NLSY–97, the measurement error is non-classical by the nature of the IRT process itself,
so as Schofield (2014) points out, the simple IV strategy used by Castex and Dechter (2015)
does not work. One alternative approach proposed by Junker, Schofield, and Taylor (2012)
is a “mixed effects structural equations” (MESE) method, which jointly estimates the wage
equation and the IRT model. In this way, the errors in the IRT estimation process can be
incorporated into the estimation of the wage equation. To apply the MESE method in the
estimation of wage returns to cognitive skills using the NLSYs, we would need the data on
the actual item-level responses of the individual NLSY test-takers to each question in the
ASVAB. These item-level responses are currently available for the NLSY–79 but not for
13We thank Dan Black for pointing this out to us.
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the NLSY–97. 14
In the end, we do not have enough information with which to assess the true extent to
which measurement problems in the AFQT exist. Moreover, we cannot correct for them in
the estimation of the (changing) return to cognitive skill. We do have enough information,
however, to be concerned that the changing distribution of AFQT scores (and thus, AAFQT
scores), may be an artifact of measurement error.
4.7 Conclusion
From an underlying economic perspective, if one wants to specify a Mincer-style OLS
regression of log wages on cognitive skill (as proxied by AAFQT scores), where returns
to cognitive skill are changing over time, one needs to take a stand on why these returns
are changing. Once the (reasonable) assumption is made that these changes over time are
being driven by technological change in the way that skills are used in firms, one needs
to then consider how endogenous investments in cognitive skill accumulation will change.
We show in a simple investment model that if the marginal productivity of cognitive skill
decreases due to technological change, both cognitive skill investments and labor market
returns to cognitive investment will decrease.
By reviving the Yitzhaki Decomposition, an old method for understanding the construc-
tion of least squares estimates, we demonstrate that declining estimated returns to AAFQT
scores in the NLSY cohorts are driven by changes in the distribution of AAFQT scores
between the two cohorts, and in particular by the increased left skewness of the distribution
14Issues in the measurement of labor market outcomes could also lead to biased estimates of the returns
to cognitive ability. In results available upon request, we show that the declining estimated wage return to
AAFQT in the NLSY are robust to reasonable alternatives. In particular, we find declining returns when
we use annual measures of hourly wages rather than averaging wage data across multiple years, when using
median instead of mean regression; when we exclude years when the national unemployment rate was greater
than 8.0; and when we account for the labor force attachment of individuals throughout the sample periods.
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of AAFQT in the NLSY–97. To the extent that returns to cognitive ability did decline for
the white men in our sample, the Yitzhaki weights and the accompanying unit slopes show
that they did so only at the lower part of the AAFQT distribution, where the distribution
of AAFQT scores was markedly changing across the cohorts. Rationalizing this within the
context of an economic model of cognitive skill investment in the face of changing techno-
logical skill requires a more complex model than we have outlined, and is a goal of future
research.
Nonetheless, we want to end with a cautionary note. While it is tempting for economists
to assume that our economic models are correct when they fit unusual patterns we see in
data, we need to be humble enough to consider the possibility that our models are only
as good as the data with which we test them. As we have shown, the conclusion that
cognitive skills in the U.S. labor market declined between the two NLSY cohorts relies
on the assumption that the shift in the observed distribution of AAFQT scores across the
cohorts is real (and that we have correctly specified the relationship between wages and
cognitive skill). We have shown that the shift in AAFQT scores may be an artifact of
measurement issues in the recorded and unadjusted AFQT scores for the two cohorts, and
especially for the NLSY-97 cohort. We cannot prove this, and we cannot correct for it
given the data that we have. Thus, the question of whether the return to cognitive skills has
declined in the U.S. remains an open one.
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Figure 4.1: Simulated distribution of Ht before (period 1) and after (period 2) increase in
productivity
Figure 4.2: Simulated Yitzhaki slopes b(h) before (period 1) and after (period 2) increase
in productivity
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Figure 4.3: Simulated Yitzhaki weights w(h) before (period 1) and after (period 2) increase
in productivity
Figure 4.4: Adjusted AFQT test scores for White Non-Hispanic Men
Chi-square test of two distributions














70 90 110 130 150 170 190 210 230
AFQT
NLSY 79 NLSY 97
  NLSY 79: Mean = 173, SD = 28, Min = 86, p25 = 154, p50 = 178, p75 = 197, Max = 218
  NLSY 97: Mean = 175, SD = 29, Min = 78, p25 = 160, p50 = 181, p75 = 197, Max = 220
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75 100 125 150 175 200 225
AFQT bin
NLSY-79 NLSY-97
  Pairwise slopes in 79: Mean = 1.221, SD = 9.92, OLS = .531
  Pairwise slopes in 97: Mean = .472, SD = 15.584, OLS = .364
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Lowess: bandwidth of 0.3
The vertical lines are p10, p25, p50, and p75 of NLSY-79
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NLSY-79: Weight NLSY-97: Weight
Lowess: bandwidth of 0.3
The vertical lines are p10, p25, p50, and p75 of NLSY-79
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NLSY-79: Log wage NLSY-97: Log wage
NLSY-79: Weight
Lowess: bandwidth of 0.3
The vertical lines are 10th pctile (131), 25th pctile (150), median (177), and 75th pctile (197) of NLSY-79
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NLSY-79: Log wage NLSY-97: Log wage
NLSY-97: Weight
Lowess: bandwidth of 0.3
The vertical lines are 10th pctile (131), 25th pctile (150), median (177), and 75th pctile (197) of NLSY-79
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Table 4.1: OLS estimates
NLSY–79 NLSY–97
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AFQT 0.53** 0.37** 0.32** 0.36** 0.15** 0.16**
[0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05] [0.05]
Education 2.97** 2.63** 4.18** 3.79**
[0.44] [0.44] [0.48] [0.48]
Change of AFQT from NLSY–79 –0.17 –0.22 -0.16
P-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Change of Education from NLSY–79 1.20 1.16
P-value (0.07) (0.08)
Social and non-cog scores X X
Observations 2,080 2,080 2,080 1,565 1,565 1,565
Adjusted R-squared 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.04 0.09 0.12
Note: ** p < 0.01; NLS custom sample weights are used.
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Appendix Figures
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AFQT
NLSY 79 NLSY 97
  NLSY 79: Mean = 174, SD = 29, Min = 97, p25 = 154, p50 = 180, p75 = 197, Max = 218
  NLSY 97: Mean = 174, SD = 29, Min = 78, p25 = 158, p50 = 180, p75 = 195, Max = 220
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Figure 4A.2: Adjusted AFQT test scores at age 16 pooling all genders, races and ethnicities
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Notes: The AFQT score is constructed based on four ASVAB sections: arithmetic reasoning,
word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, and numerical operation.
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Notes: The AFQT score is constructed based on four ASVAB sections: arithmetic reasoning,
word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, and numerical operation.
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Notes: The AFQT score is constructed based on four ASVAB sections: arithmetic reasoning,
word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, and numerical operation. IRT-based scores are not
available for numerical operation in the NLSY–79.
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Notes: The AFQT score is constructed based on four ASVAB sections: arithmetic reasoning,
word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, and numerical operation. IRT-based scores are not
available for numerical operation in the NLSY–79.
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Notes: MK=math knowledge, AR=arithmetic reasoning, WK=word knowledge, PC=paragraph
comprehension. The standard errors of estimated IRT-based scores (“thetas”) are plotted against
“thetas”.
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Yitzhaki Decomposition with Weights
For simplicity, Yitzhaki’s decomposition formula (Proposition 1 in Yitzhaki 1996) as-
sumes that each value of X has only one observation. In practice, each value of X can
be linked to multiple observations in the data. As suggested by Yitzhaki (1996), all ob-
servations with the same X should be aggregated, leading to a grouped dataset in which
the outcome Y is averaged within each value of X . In a univariate model, we can recap the
original OLS estimate by using the grouped data and weighting the grouped regression with
group size. In addition, each observation in the data can represent multiple observations
in the population. It is sometimes more appropriate to use Weighted Least Squares (WLS)
with sample weights than OLS (Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge 2015). In this appendix,
we extend Yitzhaki’s formula to allow for these two types of weights.
Following Yitzhaki’s notation, let yi and xi (i = 1, . . . ,n) be observations and ranked
in an increasing order of X. An important simplification that Yitzhaki makes is that ∆xi =
xi+1− xi > 0, i.e., each value of X has only one observation. Here we extend Yitzhaki’s
set-up and allow there to be duplicate observations. Let there be Ni duplicate observations
for (xi,yi). Let bi = ∆yi/∆xi be the slope of two adjacent values of X .
Like Yitzhaki (1996), we are interested in decomposing the point estimate. Given this,
the two types of weights mentioned above are both equivalent to adding duplicate obser-
vations. The distinction between the two cases is the construction of yi. In the first case
(without sample weights), yi is the average of all Y linked to xi. In the second case (with
sample weights, i.e. WLS), yi is the weighted average of all Y linked to xi.
With duplicate observations, the sample covariance of Y and X can be expressed as:





















Note that when there are no duplicate observations (Ni = 1, for alli), the expression










, which is what Yitzhaki presents
in Proposition 1 (Yitzhaki 1996).
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∆xibi, as in Yitzhaki (1996).
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matches with E(X | X > x)−E(X | X ≤ x) in the
continuous weighting function. Compared to the case with no duplicate observations, here
both the cumulative density and the conditional expected value are expressed in a weighted
form.
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Appendix A: A Note on Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score
In this section, I describe the background and essential details of the Armed Forces
Qualification Test (AFQT) score. This is a collection of information from different sources:
a manuscript by Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange (2009), a technical bulletin by Defense
Manpower Data Center (2006) which includes several chapters from Sands, Waters, and
McBride (1997), annual reports on population representation in the military services (e.g.
Quester and Shuford, 2017), and the introduction on the NLSY website (Bureau of Labor
Statistics, n.d.(b); Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1992; Bureau of Labor Statistics, n.d.(a)).
The AFQT score is constructed based on multiple sections of the Armed Services Vo-
cational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), a set of tests developed by the Department of De-
fense (DOD) for screening military enlistees and assigning them to military occupations.
Economists have long been using the AFQT score, as well as other tests in the ASVAB, to
measure skills and abilities (Neal and Johnson, 1996; Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzúa, 2006;
Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange, 2012; Prada and Urzúa, 2017). This is facilitated by the
data of the NLSY–79 and the NLSY–97, as survey respondents took the ASVAB test.
A.1 A short history of the ASVAB and the NLSY
The ASVAB was first introduced in 1968 and has undergone several adjustments and
revisions since. One important adjustment has been to update the norms of the ASVAB
(Defense Manpower Data Center, 2006). In practice, the military sets a goal of selecting
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only applicants who rank higher than X% of American youth in the national distribution of
ability and skill. Different military branches have different qualification cutoffs, and many
of them now use a cutoff of 30%–40% for applicants with a high school diploma. Recruiters
therefore need to know how the Xth percentile youth in the national population scores on
the ASVAB in order to compare military applicants to this benchmark. To ensure that
contemporary applicants are always compared to an appropriate benchmark, the benchmark
must be updated over time.1
In 1979, after questioning the appropriateness of using the World War II reference pop-
ulation as the benchmark, the DOD and Congress decided to let the NLSY–79 respondents
take the ASVAB, and the DOD used their scores as the new benchmark for military en-
listees. The NLSY–79 served as a natural group to benchmark the ASVAB because it is a
nationally representative sample of the cohort of Americans born 1957–1964. The respon-
dents took the ASVAB in the summer and fall of 1980, following the standard ASVAB
procedures. This study of benchmarking the ASVAB using the NLSY–79 is called ”Profile
of American Youth (PAY–80).”
A major revision of the ASVAB occurred when it shifted from a paper-based test to a
computer-based test. The military started to implement the computer-based ASVAB on a
large scale in 1996–1997, after about two decades of research and evaluation. The NLSY–
97 respondents took the computer-based test, while the NLSY–79 respondents took the
paper-based test.
In the paper-based test, all respondents received the same set of questions. In the
computer-based test, the next questions that respondents received depend on their answers
to previous questions. For example, if a respondent answered a question correctly, then
the next question becomes more difficult. This adaptive feature of the computer-based test
1For example, in 2015, the military services typically do not accept applicants who score in the bottom
30th percentile in the national AFQT distribution. In addition, DOD requires that at least 60 percent of new
enlistees score at the 50th percentile or higher in the national AFQT distribution (Quester and Shuford, 2017).
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means that different respondents can receive different sets of questions and with different
orderings. The raw count of correct answers is therefore no longer directly comparable
across respondents. Instead, item response theory (IRT) models are used to construct esti-
mates of ability and skill (also called “thetas”) for each respondent of the computer-based
ASVAB. These IRT estimates are supposed to be comparable across respondents.2
Due to the test format change, the military needed a new benchmark for the computer-
based ASVAB. As the NLSY–97 respondents were 12-17 when first interviewed in 1997,
and some were deemed too young for the purpose of benchmarking military enlistees, two
other nationally representative samples were identified to complete the computer-based
ASVAB during the NLSY–97 screening process. The first sample, the Student Testing
Program (STP), consisted of students who expected to be in grade 10–12 in the fall of
1997. Included were many respondents who also participated in the NLSY–97, as well
as youth who refused to participate in or were not eligible for the NLSY–97. The second
sample, the Enlistment Testing Program (ETP), was a nationally representative sample of
youth aged 18–23 as of June 1997. The ASVAB performance of respondents in these two
samples (again, which includes some NLSY–97 respondents) was then used to benchmark
the computer-based ASVAB for the military.
A.2 Concordance of different formats of ASVAB
A practical issue coming from ASVAB’s format change is how to concord the paper-
based and computer-based test scores. This is of significant importance for the military be-
cause, ideally, the selection criteria into the Armed Forces should be held broadly consistent
2Two sections, numerical operations and coding speed, in the computer-based ASVAB are administered
in a non-adaptive format (that is, everyone answers the same questions in the same order). The scores of
these two sections are therefore not ”thetas” estimated from IRT. However, the two sections are still done
on computers, so the scores are not directly comparable to the scores of the same sections but under paper
format.
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before and after the test format change. This is also extremely important for researchers
because otherwise the AFQT score and the ASVAB subsection scores, as measures of skills
and abilities, are not comparable between the NLSY–79 and the NLSY–97 cohorts (Altonji,
Bharadwaj, and Lange, 2012).
Daniel Segall, a researcher at the DOD specializing in psychometrics, developed a map-
ping between the paper-based and computer-based ASVAB scores (Segall, 1997). He drew
a sample of military applicants in two rounds, in 1988 (N=8,040) and from 1990 to 1992
(N=10,379). In each round, one third of the participants were randomly assigned to take
the paper-based ASVAB, and the other two–thirds took the computer-based ASVAB. Us-
ing the test performance of these military applicants, Segall created a mapping to link
each computer-based ASVAB component score to a paper-based ASVAB component score.
Since the computer-based ASVAB scores (”thetas” estimated from IRT models) are con-
tinuous and the paper-based ASVAB scores (counts of correct answers) are discrete by
construction, Segall applied certain smoothing and grouping to the score distributions in
the mapping procedure. For further technical details, see Segall (1997).
In their efforts to concord the AFQT score between the NLSY–79 and the NLSY–97,
Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange (2012) relied heavily on Segall’s mapping. Since the map-
ping is not publicly available, the authors sent the computer-based ASVAB subsection IRT
scores in the NLSY–97 to Segall, who mapped the scores into paper-based scores so that
they could directly be compared to the scores of the NLSY–79 respondents. With the scores
from Segall in hand, the authors adjusted for one more important difference between the
two NLSY cohorts: test-taking ages. The NLSY–79 respondents were around ages 15–23
and the NLSY–97 respondents were around ages 12–18 when they took the ASVAB. On
average, ASVAB performance improves as people age, and so it is critical to address the
differential test-taking ages both within and cross cohorts.
To construct the mapping across ages, the authors exploited the fact that both cohorts
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have a nontrivial share of respondents taking the ASVAB at age 16. Under the (somewhat
strong) assumption that a person’s ranking in the AFQT score distribution does not vary
with age, the authors mapped a person at age X (which is not 16) to the score distribution
of age 16 by their ranking in the score distribution of age X. For example, if a youth in
the NLSY–79 took the test at age 20 and ranked the 25th percentile within the AFQT score
distribution of age 20, the youth will be mapped to have the 25th percentile score of the
age-16 distribution in the NLSY–79. This relies on the assumption that whoever at the
25th percentile in the score distribution at age 16 will remain at the 25th percentile at age
20. Whether this rank-invariant assumption holds remains to be analyzed and tested. More
details can be found in Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange (2009).
In addition to converting the computer-based scores in the NLSY–97 to the paper-based
scores in the NLSY–79 (as Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange (2012) did), another potential
approach to compare ASVAB scores between the two formats is to also construct ability
estimates (”thetas”) using IRT for the NLSY–79. NLS Program staff created ”thetas” for
four sections of ASVAB in the NLSY–79 and made them publicly available.3 It is not
perfectly obvious whether the ”thetas” are directly comparable between the NLSY–79 and
the NLSY–97, for at least two reasons. First, it is unclear whether the IRT models and
estimation methods used for the two cohorts are the same. Second, even if the models and
methods are the same, the raw data taken to the models may still be incomparable due to
the very different test formats.
A.3 Different versions of AFQT score
The ASVAB has multiple sections. The AFQT score is a sum of scores from four
ASVAB sections. By picking scores from different sections, two versions of the AFQT
3The four sections are arithmetic reasoning, math knowledge, paragraph comprehension, and word knowl-
edge.
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score have been constructed and used. The AFQT–80, probably the most widely used
AFQT score, is the summation of arithmetic reasoning (AR), numerical operations (NO),
paragraph comprehension (PC), and word knowledge (WK). The formula is AFQT–80 =
AR + 0.5*NO + PC + WK.
In 1989, according to the NLS website, it was realized that the numerical operations
section had some design inconsistencies that resulted in unreliable scores (Bureau of Labor
Statistics, n.d.(b)). The DOD decided to replace numerical operations with math knowledge
(MK) in the construction of the AFQT score. The new score is called AFQT–89. The
formula is AFQT–89 = AR + MK + 2*VE. Verbal composite (VE) can be seen as a weighted
average of PC and WK with unequal weights. WK receives a higher weight because there
are more questions in the WK section.
Different studies have used different versions of the AFQT score. Neal and Johnson
(1996) used the AFQT–89 in the published version of their paper, and noted that results are
similar using the AFQT–80. Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange, 2012 used the AFQT–80 and
created the adjusted score that is supposed to be comparable between the NLSY–79 and
the NLSY–97. More recent studies have been using their adjusted AFQT–80 score (Castex
and Dechter, 2014; Deming, 2017). Although Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange, 2012 only
did the adjustment for the AFQT–80, their method can be applied to the AFQT–89 and/or
the ASVAB subsection scores.
In this dissertation, unless otherwise noted, I used the AFQT–80 score to be consis-
tent with Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange (2012), Castex and Dechter (2014), and Deming
(2017), who also compare the NLSY–79 with the NLSY–97.
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